The price relationship between organic and non-organic vegetables in the U.S.: evidence from Nielsen scanner data

This study investigates price relationships between organic and conventional carrots, tomatoes, and lettuce in the U.S. utilizing Nielsen scanner data from 2006–2015. We employ a threshold vector error correction model (TVECM), threshold vector autoregressive model (TVAR), and threshold cointegration test to test whether market integration exists between organic and conventional vegetables as well as the existence of asymmetric price transmission. The results find positive long-run relationships between organic and conventional prices of carrots and tomatoes and show the existence of asymmetric price transmission in price pairs of lettuce and tomatoes. Our findings suggest that the price relationship between organic and conventional vegetables varies by characteristics, such as shelf life, volatility in the price premium, and substitutability.     

Poverty Traps, Indeterminacy, and the Wealth Distribution

We consider a one-sector growth model in continuous time with a production externality and endogenous labor supply. There is a continuum of households who have identical preferences but differ with respect to their initial wealth. We show that there exist economies such that an indeterminate steady state exists for some wealth distribution but not for others. A second result is that a redistribution of wealth may drive the economy from a steady state with strictly positive output to a poverty trap in which output converges asymptotically to zero. These results indicate that differences in the wealth distribution may be responsible for drastic differences in the long-run standard of living. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D31, D50, O41.     

由临街地价推算区片价的方法探讨

如何利用临街样点地价推算区片平均地价及基准地价始终是城镇基准地价评估的一个难点。文章利用赤峰市的实际调查数据,分别采用临街贡献率和面积加权两种方法推算区片平均地价,并采用回归分析方法探讨区片价与临街地价之间的关系,结果证明两种方法所推算的区片平均价是基本一致的,而且区片价与临街地价之间呈“反S”曲线关系。     

Economic Growth with Imperfect Protection of Intellectual Property Rights

This paper examines the growth effects of intellectual property right (IPR) protection in a quality-ladder model of endogenous growth. Stronger IPR protection, which reduces the imitation probability, increases the reward for innovation. However, stronger protection also gradually reduces the number of competitive sectors, in which innovation is easier than in monopolistic sectors. With free entry to R&D, the number of researchers in each remaining competitive sector increases, but the concentration of R&D activity raises the possibility of unnecessary duplication of innovation, thereby hindering growth. Consequently, imperfect rather than perfect protection maximizes growth. Welfare and scale effects are also examined.     

Strategic Firm Behavior Under Average-Revenue-Lagged Regulation

Price caps have been shown to have incentive properties superior to traditional rate of return regulation. Average-revenue-lagged regulation (ARL) is attractive in that steady-state prices are known to be efficient. We show that the ARL scheme can be manipulated by the firm so as to yield the unregulated global profit maximum. While tests exist that can provide the regulator with evidence of this strategic behavior, we also demonstrate that the unregulated global profit maximum will not be attainable if Laspeyres (L) regulation is employed.Jel classification: L43, L51I would like to thank Michael Crew and an anonymous referee for their extremely helpful suggestions.     

论中国期货市场价格操纵行为监控体系的构建

为防范我国期货市场的价格操纵行为，在详细剖析期货市场价格操纵行为的具体表现形式及其成因的基础上，采用定性与定量相结合的方法系统构建了防范期货市场价格操纵行为的监控体系，包括监控组织机构、监控数据库系统、价格和仓单自动监控系统、大户监控报告系统、不当交易举报系统和监控反应机制六个部余对扼制我国期货市场的价格操纵行为给出具体的对策建议。     

如何界定反倾销调查中的"生产成本"概念

“生产成本”是反倾销调查中的核心问题。该文通过国际反倾销法“生产成本”概念的界定，分析了反倾销调查中企业“生产成本”的差异，提出了按照国际惯例进行调整的方法，以及为反倾销调查取证提供的承诺。     

Investor efficiency in the face of takings

Governmental entities at all levels are empowered to acquire private property for the public's benefit, provided that just compensation is paid. The level of compensation typically viewed by courts as just is market value, but questions arise as to whether market value compensation motivates the private owner of land, potentially subject to a taking, to improve the property to a degree that is socially efficient. Earlier works have found market value to be a compensation level too high to promote efficiency. The present paper offers an analysis, based on a simple model of investor profit maximization, that provides a unified view of models presented in some important earlier works. In a special application of the general case, it is shown that market value can be too low a level of compensation to promote efficient behavior by the land owner.     

Hedging Housing Risk*

An unusually rich source of data on housing prices in Stockholm is used to analyze the investment implications of housing choices. This empirical analysis derives market-wide price and return series for housing investment during a 13-year period, and it also provides estimates of the individual-specific, idiosyncratic, variation in housing returns. Because the idiosyncratic component follows an autocorrelated process, the analysis of portfolio choice is dependent upon the holding period. We analyze the composition of household investment portfolios containing housing, common stocks, stocks in real estate holding companies, bonds, and t-bills. For short holding periods, the efficient portfolio contains essentially no housing. For longer periods, low-risk portfolios contain 15 to 50 percent housing. These results suggest that there are large potential gains from policies or institutions that would permit households to hedge their lumpy investments in housing. We estimate the potential value of hedges in reducing risk to households, yet yielding the same investment returns. The value is surprisingly large, especially to poorer homeowners.     

Pollution Externalities in a Model of Endogenous Fertility and Growth

An endogenous growth model with human capital formation, pollution caused by production of consumption goods, and endogenous fertility decisions made by altruistic agents with infinite horizons is presented. Consequences for optimal policy of modelling fertility as an explicit decision variable are examined. Because ordinary lump-sum transfers to individuals are no longer neutral, either revenue from a pollution tax must be redistributed to dynasties (working as an implicit tax on child births), or lump-sum transfers must be supplemented with an explicit fertility tax. Alternatively, the government can avoid distortions of the fertility decisions by maintaining an appropriate public debt. When abatement is highly productive, it can be optimal to subsidize fertility in order to increase total production.