糙木家居产品初探

简约环保已成为当今家居设计的潮流。糙木作为低碳、环保、生态、自然的原材料正好符合这一主题。分析了其产品特征及糙木家居产品艺术形态塑造的基本方法和糙木在家居产品设计中的广泛应用。为糙木家具相关设计与理论研究提供相应借鉴。     

传统环境管理模式下农村环境污染和破坏的制度因素分析

我国传统环境管理模式以城市和工业为导向,在这种模式下,农村环境保护规划、农村环境保护法律政策几乎空白,而农村地方传统知识对环境保护的作用没有得到应用.农村环境管理“软”“硬”约束的缺失,乡镇环保“结构性”和“功能性”空洞的存在,是农村环境污染和破坏无法得到有效遏制的主要原因.农村环境社区治理模式是以农村社区为基本单元,利用村民自治的制度资源,实现政府引导、市场激励、社区自治、农民参与,凝聚各方力量,有效解决农村环境问题.     

基于SSP范式的环境影响评价有效性研究

引入美国密歇根州立大学教授阿兰·斯密德开创的状态-结构-绩效(SSP)范式来分析我国环境影响评价制度的执行绩效.通过对该制度成本和收益的比较得出:环境影响评价制度的设计所带来的绩效更倾向于占社会总体一少部分的政府与建设单位,占社会总体绝大多数的公众的环境权益得到的是形式的而非实质的保证,最终导致制度设计与制度目标的背离.     

Liability for Past Environmental Contamination and Privatization

This paper examines the role ofliability for past environmental contaminationin the privatization processes of Central andEastern Europe. In particular, it establishes alink between a risk-averse investor's amount ofinformation regarding the extent of pastenvironmental contamination (and its cleanupcosts) and the investor's willingness to payfor a particular enterprise, i.e., bid. As theinvestor obtains a more precise estimate of theuncertain cleanup costs, the investor facesless risk; therefore, the investor's riskpremium falls and the investor's bid rises.This link generates four hypotheses regarding aprivatization agency's responses to theinvestor's knowledge of clean-up costs.     

The Case of the Missing Pollution Haven Hypothesis

One particularly vexing puzzle for economists and policymakers over the past several decades concerns the empirical significance of the theoretically predicted pollution haven hypothesis. While neoclassical theory and conventional wisdom both surmise that local economies will suffer deleterious effects from stricter environmental regulations, empirical studies have largely failed to validate such claims. This study utilizes the method of matching to show that the impact of stricter regulation is heterogeneous spatially, varying systematically based on location-specific attributes. Previous studies that assume a homogenous response may therefore inadvertently mask the overall impact of more stringent regulations by pooling unaffected and affected regions.JEL Classification: Q25, Q28, H00, L51, R1The authors wish to thank to Michael Crew, Anthony Heyes, an anonymous referee, Werner Antweiler, Randy Becker, Wayne Gray, Shelby Gerking, Michael Greenstone, Vern Henderson, and Arik Levinson. Participants at various university seminars and conferences also lent useful insights to this line of research.     

Asymmetric FDI and tax-treaty bargaining: theory and evidence

Tax treaties are often viewed as a mechanism for eliminating tax competition, however, this approach ignores the need for bargaining over the treaty's terms. This paper focuses on how bargaining can affect the withholding taxes set under the treaty. In a simple framework, we develop hypotheses about patterns in treaty tax rates. A key determinant for these patterns is the relative size of bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) activity. In plausible situations, more asymmetric countries will negotiate treaties with higher tax rates. This theory is then tested using 1992 data from US and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) bilateral tax treaties. Overall, the data supports the prediction that greater asymmetric FDI activity increases the negotiated tax rates.     

OPEC's Response to International Climate Agreements

This paper studies a game between a group of countries that have agreed to participate in an international climate agreement (the signatories) and OPEC. The purpose of the signatories is to design carbon taxes that maximize their total net income, given a goal on global carbon emissions. As a response to the climate agreement, OPEC imposes an oil tax on its member states that maximizes OPEC's profits. Within a numerical model we find the subgame-perfect equilibrium of a game in which each player chooses when to fix his decision variables. It is shown that in equilibrium the group of signatories chooses to be the leader and OPEC chooses to be the follower. It is demonstrated, however, that for both agents the order of move is of minor (numerical) importance. Hence, the players have limited incentives for strategic behaviour.     

地方政府环境支出行为的空间策略互动研究——传导机制与再检验

本文从理论和实证两个维度检验了地方政府环境支出行为的空间策略互动的传导机制。结果表明,环境支出存在明显的空间策略互动与时间滞后效应。其表现为相邻省级地区之间环保财政支出行为的互相模仿和路径依赖。外商直接投资和财政分权并不是导致地区间环境支出"逐底竞争"的直接原因。在构建多维度政绩考核体系来引导政府财政支出竞争的同时,建立地区间环境支出的协调机制和对外开放等途径,有利于实现均衡和绿色发展。     

考虑环境因素的中国电力能源效率测度与改进

在界定全要素电力能源效率概念的基础上,构建了考虑环境因素的非径向全要素电力能源效率DEA模型。利用相关数据,从省际、区域两个层面对我国30个省(自治区、直辖市)的电力能源效率进行测度分析。结果显示:在全国30个省(自治区、直辖市)中,只有14个省区的电力能源效率是有效的,且这些省区不存在电力节能潜力;北京、天津、上海三大城市的平均电力能源效率最高,西部地区的该均值最低;我国省际电力能源效率存在显著的区域性差距,且4大区域的电力能源效率存在一定的梯度差距;对省区进行投入、产出调整,可使全国的电力消费量缩减6309.08亿千瓦小时。最后提出提高我国电力能源效率的政策建议。