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111.
This paper shows that in the lightly regulated Alternative Investment Market (AIM) voluntary corporate board structures might not reduce agency costs between shareholder and executive directors. In this less regulated market, we find that the extent of debt affects executive pay. In addition, the theoretical determinants of executive pay affect CEO and other executives’ pay and incentives differently in this market. We find no evidence that debt levels affect CEO pay in a matched sample of Main Market firms. Our results suggest that debtholders could be better monitors of executive directors’ actions, in comparison to voluntary governance committees in less regulated markets. 相似文献
112.
The aim of this study was to explore the characteristics of executive pay, equity ownership incentives and pay–performance relationship in government-controlled firms. Data were hand-collected from the annual reports of 179 companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. The results show that executive pay is lower in government-linked companies. Positive pay–performance relationship is also not evident for this category of firms, which indicates that their executives were largely guaranteed with certain level of pay irrespective of performance. The level of equity ownership incentives provides the executives in government-controlled firms with very little incentive to produce effort that can improve firm performance. Overall, our findings are consistent with the inefficient pay hypothesis developed in this study. 相似文献
113.
We investigate the link between the incentive mechanisms embedded in CEO cash bonuses and the riskiness of banks. For a sample of U.S. and European banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that increases in CEO cash bonuses lower the default risk of a bank. However, we find no evidence of cash bonuses exerting a risk‐reducing effect when banks are financially distressed or when banks operate under weak bank regulatory regimes. Our results link bonus compensation in banking to financial stability and caution that attempts to regulate bonus pay need to tailor CEO incentives to the riskiness of banks and to regulatory regimes. 相似文献
114.
董事会治理、高管薪酬对内部控制有效性的影响——来自沪、深两市采掘业上市公司2008~2010年经验数据 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
本文为研究董事会治理、高管薪酬与内部控制有效性的关系,选取2008~2010年沪深两市采掘业上市公司为样本数据,构建内部控制指数,从董事会治理和高管薪酬两个方面来考察对内部控制有效性的影响。研究发现,董事会治理和高管薪酬对内部控制有效性有一定影响。合理的董事会治理结构是企业增强竞争力和提高经营效率的必要条件,同时高管薪酬在某种程度上也影响着公司内部控制有效性的实现。 相似文献
115.
如何设计一套具有激励性的薪酬方案对于现代公司发展至关重要,以我国2010年创业板上市公司为样本,对以净利润衡量的公司绩效与高管薪酬结构间的关系的研究发现:公司绩效与高管层平均薪酬显著正相关,与CEO薪酬无显著相关性;与CEO持股比例负相关性较显著,但与高管层平均持股比例无显著相关性;与CEO和高管层的薪酬差距、持股比例差距均显著负相关;与公司规模、公司董事、监事和高级管理人员总数显著正相关。 相似文献
116.
Prior studies have examined the relation between product market competition (PMC) and research and development (R&D) investments, while the impact of executive risk incentives on this relation remains unexplored. In this study, we find that Vega (the sensitivity of executives’ wealth to stock return volatility) weakens the negative relation between PMC and R&D. We also find that Vega strengthens the negative relation between PMC and firm performance when R&D investments grow higher. In sum, our results suggest that high‐Vega compensation portfolios in competitive environments may induce executives to overinvest in R&D projects, therefore hurting firm performance. 相似文献
117.
118.
Timothy Fogarty Michel L. Magnan Garen Markarian Serge Bohdjalian 《Journal of Business Ethics》2009,84(2):165-187
By employing the theoretical template provided by agency theory, this article contributes a detailed clinical analysis of
a large multinational Canada-headquartered telecommunications company, Nortel. Our analysis reveals a twenty-first century
norm of usual suspects: a CEO whose compensation is well above those of his peers, a dysfunctional board of directors, acts
of income smoothing to preserve the confidence of volatile investors, and revelations of financial irregularities followed
by a downfall. In many ways, the spectacular rise and – sudden – fall of Nortel illustrates excesses of actors within, and
contradictions of the system of corporate governance implied by the agency model. Furthermore, this case illustrates limitations
of the agency framework in complex situations with short-term oriented investors. 相似文献
119.
120.
执行力就是生命力。执行力有着极其丰富的内涵,本文查摆了执行力存在问题,分析了根源,提出了四个方面的方法途径:即要树立正确的执行理念;要用学习创新的成果充实执行力;要用科学管用的制度保障执行力;要用实际成效检验执行力。 相似文献