职位隔离对高管薪酬性别差异的影响

目前国内对性别工资差异研究很多，但对高管人员薪酬性别差异的分析还较少。本文利用2005-2010年沪深两市A股上市公司数据，在综合考虑不同性别在不同职位层级上的代表性的同时，采用Brown分解法分析了高管人员的性别薪酬差异问题。结果表明我国上市公司女性高管在较高层级的职位上代表性不足，同时也存在着“玻璃天花板效用”。女性高管在职位晋升方面受到了严重的歧视，在每一个职位层级上，女性高管职位晋升的门槛值都显著高于男性高管职位晋升的门槛值。男性高管和女性高管存在明显的性别薪酬差距，其中，超五成的薪酬差异是同一职位内的，四成以上的差异是职位间的；而有超七成的薪酬差异无法用教育程度、工作经验等可观测因素解释。     

Top pay transparency in Europe: codes,convergence and clichés

Following the waves of corporate scandals and the increasing attention to corporate governance, the transparency of reporting on director-level pay has increased across Europe. This article examines the extent of convergence in laws, codes and corporate reporting practices in regard to director-level pay in France, Germany, Switzerland and the UK. The paper analyses annual reports and the websites of 23 companies, using institutional theory to discuss the coercive, normative and mimetic pressures for convergence that are revealed, not just in the laws and codes in each country, but also in the standardized wording in the relevant sections of reports which have become clichés.     

Opening up the black box: a UK case study of top managers’ attitudes to their performance related pay

This paper examines the attitudes of the top managers within one large financial services organization in the UK to fixed and variable components of their compensation package. The rationale for performance-related pay for senior managers is to align their interests with those of the shareholders, but little is known about the views of top managers on the effectiveness of such incentives. The results suggest that the design of effective bonus systems is not just a technical issue: perceptions of market fairness with respect to the compensation package and the clear communication of goals are important in getting senior managers to focus on shareholder interests.     

行政腐败防治机制的建立问题探究

文章从树立正确的行政价值观、健全防治行政腐败的专门法律法规和建立行政激励机制等三个方面入手对行政腐败防治机制的建立问题进行分析。     

A model of person‐pay interaction: how executives vary in their responses to compensation arrangements

A wealth of research indicates that both executive characteristics and incentive compensation affect organizational outcomes, but the literatures within these two domains have followed distinct, separate paths. Our paper provides a framework for integrating these two perspectives. We introduce a new model that specifies how executive characteristics and incentives operate in tandem to influence strategic decisions and firm performance. We then illustrate our model by portraying how executive characteristics interact with a specific type of pay instrument—stock options—to affect executive behaviors and organizational outcomes. Focusing on three individual‐level attributes (executive motives and drives, cognitive frame, and self‐confidence), we develop propositions detailing how executives will vary in their risk‐taking behaviors in response to stock options. We further argue that stock options will amplify the implications of executive ability, such that option‐heavy incentive schemes will increase the performance of talented executives but worsen the performance of low‐ability executives. Our framework and propositions are meant to provide a starting point for future theorizing and empirical testing of the interactive effects of executive characteristics and incentive compensation on strategic decisions and organizational performance. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Executive Compensation: A Model of Disclosure Choice

Recent public policy debates have led to increased calls for full transparency of executive compensation. However, in practice, many firms are reluctant to disclose the full details of how they link executive compensation to performance. One possible reason for lack of full disclosure is that managers use their power to hide the details of their compensation plan in order to disguise opportunistic rent extraction. If this is the reason for secrecy, then public policy designed to force firms to provide full disclosure is unlikely to be resisted by shareholders. However, another possible explanation for less than full transparency is that some degree of secrecy about executive compensation may be in the interest of the company and its shareholders. If this explanation is correct, then public policy moves to increase transparency may be met by counter moves designed to protect managers and shareholders from such policies. In this paper we investigate if full disclosure of executive compensation arrangements is always optimal for shareholders. We develop a model where optimal executive remuneration solves a moral hazard problem. However, the degree to which the moral hazard problem affects the shareholders depends on hidden information, so that disclosure of the executive compensation scheme will typically reveal the hidden information, which can be harmful to shareholders. The model derives, therefore, the optimal disclosure policy and the optimal remuneration scheme. We find that the shareholders are better off pre‐committing not to disclose the executive compensation scheme whenever possible. Executive directors are shown to be better off too in the absence of disclosure of executive compensation schemes. An argument for mandating disclosure is that it provides better information to shareholders but our analysis demonstrates that disclosure does not necessarily achieve this objective. The results suggest that less than full disclosure can be in the interest of shareholders, the reason for this being that disclosures cannot be made selectively to shareholders but will also be made to strategic opponents. This will be the case if the board of directors and the remuneration committee includes enough independent directors. Whether or not non‐disclosure to shareholders is in their interest is however an empirical matter involving a trade‐off between the proprietary costs associated with disclosure to shareholders and the costs of potential collusion between executive and non‐executive directors associated with non‐disclosure.     

Institutional ownership,capital structure,and firm performance

In most studies of ownership and firm performance, researchers have assumed different forms of ownership do not interact in their effect on firm strategy or performance. Focusing on the role of institutional owners, this study poses two related questions: (1) What are the relationships between outside institutional shareholdings, on the one hand, and a firm's capital structure and performance, on the other? and; (2) Does the size of stockholdings by corporate executives, family owners, and insider-institutions modify those relationships? The data, collected from 40 pairs of manufacturing firms selected from as many industries over a 3-year period, shows that the size of outside institutional stockholdings has a significant effect on the firm's capital structure. We have also found that family and inside institutional owners' shareholdings moderate the relationship between outside institutional shareholdings and capital structure. Likewise, corporate executives' shareholdings supplement the relationship between outside institutional shareholdings and firms' performance. These findings suggest that internal and external coalitions interact with each other to influence the firm's conduct.     

CEO cash compensation determinants: an empirical examination of US airlines

This study empirically investigated the determinants of cash compensation for chief executive officers (CEOs) for US airlines in the post-9.11 period. After an analysis of 53 firm-year observations from 2002 to 2004, we found that the airline CEO cash compensation was positively correlated with the size and revenue efficiency of an airline firm whereas growth, debt use, profitability, and stock performance were irrelevant to the compensation. Larger airlines with better revenue-generating ability tended to offer high cash compensation to their CEOs. Our findings suggest that the pay-for-performance principle has yet to be fully implemented in the airlines industry. To minimize agency problems and enhance the firm value of US airlines, CEO compensation should be based not only on revenue efficiency but also on profitability and stock performance.     

Educational Marketing in the Latin American Context: An Executive MBA Case

ABSTRACT

This paper provides Latin American Executive MBA students' approaches to studying, achieving profile, preferences and perceptions of instructional methods used in teaching marketing courses and educational marketing segments based on their preference ranking of instructional methods and approaches to studying. Results indicate that, in general, these students have a strong need for excellence, and for gaining status with experts. Their approach to studying is directed first at understanding what they learn, and then at doing well in their courses. Results also indicate that such students strongly prefer courses using participative instructional methods, such as case studies, to the instructor-dominated lecture method. Thus, there appears to be a gap between the types of instructional methods now being emphasized in MBA classrooms and the methods preferred by the students. These students can be placed into four distinct segments, namely Technology Sophisticated Learners, Academic Success Seekers, Degree Seekers and Instructor-Oriented Learners. Managerial implications from the results are drawn both for the administrators and for the faculty members teaching in an EMBA program.

RESUMEN. Este estudio ilustra el enfoque do los estudiantes latinoamericanos de MBA Ejecutivo sobre las materias de estudio, trazado de un perfil, preferencias y percepción de los métodos de enseñanza utilizados en los cursos de mercadeo y mereadeo educacional en base a sus preferencias, que se utilizaron para desarrollar un sistema de clasificación de los métodos y enfoques de la enseñanza y el aprendizaje. De acuerdo a los resultados, los estudiantes sienten una gran necesidad de alcanzar la exceleneia, y de adquirir renombre junto a los expertos. Ellos encaran sus estudios eonsiderando prioritaria la función de comprender lo que aprenden, y tienen como meta secundaria el obtener buenos resultados en sus cursos. Además, los resultados también indican que estos esludiantes prefieren claramente usar métodos de enseñanza participativos–tales como los estudios de caso–al método disertivo dominado por el profesor. Consecuentemente, nos parece que existe una brecha entre los métodos de enseñanza que se están implementando en las salas de aulas de los cursos de los MBA, y los métodos preferidos por los alumnos. Estos estudiantes pueden dividirse perfectamente en cuatro segmentos, o sea, Estudiantes de Tecnologías Sofisticadas, Buscadores de éxito Académico, Buscadores de Diplomas y Estudiantes Orientados por el Instructor. En el estudio trazamos las implicancias administrativas inherentes a estos resultados, así como para los docentes que están enseñando el programa EMBA.

RESUMO. Este trabalho apresenta a visão de estudantes do MBA Executivo da América Latina, em relação ao estudo, à formação do seu perfil, às preferências e às percepções dos métodos didáticos utilizados nos cursos de marketing e nos segmentos educacionais dc marketing, baseados no ranking de suas preferências pelos métodos didáticos e pelas abordagens do estudo. Os resultados indicam que, em geral, estes estudantes buscam rigorosamente a excelência e a conquista de status através de especialistas. A sua abordagem do estudo está direcionada. primeiramente, ao conhecimento e, em segundo lugar, ao sucesso do seu desempenho. Os resultados também indicam que tais estudantcs preferem nitidamente os cursos que utilizam o método didático participativo, como o estudo de casos, ao método de ensino tradicional expositive Assim. parece haver uma lacuna entre os tipos de métodos didáticos atualmente sendo enfatizados nas aulas de MBA e entre os métodos preferidos pelos estudantes. Estes alunos podem ser classificados em quatro segmentos distintos: Aprendizes da Alta Tecnologia, Perseguidores do Sucesso Acadêmico, Perseguidores de Títulos e Aprendizes Orientados por Instrutor. As implicações gerenciais, a partir dos resultados, são delineadas tanto para os administradores quanto para os membros do corpo docente que ensinam no programa de MBA Executivo.     

Contestability and Pay Differential in the Executive Suites

In comparison to the abundant evidence on CEOs' compensations, little is known about the compensation of other senior executives, and on how the pay differential between CEO and other senior executives affects firm performance. We examine several potential explanations of the pay differential in the executive suite, using a sample of 367 Israeli firms listed on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange. The empirical results fail to support the tournament and pay equity models. Instead, our evidence suggests a model where senior executives are encouraged (by the structure implied in their pay contract) to cooperate with each other (the team playing model). In a subset of firms managed by their owners we observe greater pay differentials between the owner-CEO and other senior executives. Interestingly, only in this subset of owner-managed firms, higher pay differentials can be associated with better firm performance.