论市、县级政府在旅游行政管理中的 “位”与“为”

本文对当前市、县级政府在旅游行政管理中的“无位”与“无为”原因进行了分析，并从政府行政组织的结构、体制与实施机制角度出发，研究如何解决旅游行政部门在旅游行政管理中的“位”与“为”问题。     

中国企业执行力存在的问题及对策研究

执行力是决定企业成功的一个重要因素,是21世纪构成企业竞争力的重要一环。在激烈竞争的市场中,一个企业的执行力如何,将决定企业的兴衰。当今世界,中国的企业也正以空前的速度成长着。尽管如此,中国的企业依然面临着严峻的挑战,要继续保持高速的增长,就必须更加关注企业的执行能力。     

CEO Incentives and Corporate Social Performance

This paper examines the relationship between CEO incentives and strong and weak corporate social performance. Using the KLD database we find that incentives have no significant relationship with strong social performance. Salary and long-term incentives have a positive association with weak social performance.     

中国高层经理股票期权最优激励比例研究

高层经理股票期权机制将经理人员的报酬与公司的市场价值联系在一起,从而达到降低代理成本,增加社会福利的目的。目前国内关于股权激励问题的研究很多,但还存在着一定的争议,特别是关于股权激励的定量分析。本文以经济分析法为基本研究方法,辅以实证研究的方法以高层经理股票期权为内容进行了分析,针对最优期权比例的确立进行研究,通过委托-代理模型分析方法建立最优股权激励模型,并对影响最优股权激励的因素进行讨论,提出建议,以促使股票期权激励制在中国达到应有的实施效果。     

An Examination of the Structure of Executive Compensation and Corporate Social Responsibility: A Canadian Investigation

We explore the extent to which Boards use executive compensation to incite firms to act in accordance with social and environmental objectives (e.g., Johnson, R. and D. Greening: 1999, Academy of Management Journal 42(5), 564–578 ; Kane, E. J.: 2002, Journal of Banking and Finance 26, 1919–1933.). We examine the association between executive compensation and corporate social responsibility (CSR) for 77 Canadian firms using three key components of executives’ compensation structure: salary, bonus, and stock options. Similar to prior research (McGuire, J., S. Dow and K. Argheyd: 2003, Journal of Business Ethics 45(4), 341–359), we measure three different aspects of CSR, which include Total CSR as well as CSR Strengths and CSR Weaknesses. CSR Strengths and CSR Weaknesses capture the positive and negative aspects of CSR, respectively. We find significant positive relationships between: (1) Salary and CSR Weaknesses, (2) Bonus and CSR Strengths, (3) Stock Options and Total CSR; and (4) Stock Options and CSR Strengths. Our findings suggest the importance of the structure of executive compensation in encouraging socially responsible actions, particularly for larger Canadian firms. This in turn suggests that executive compensation can be an effective tool in aligning executives’ welfare with that of the “common good”, which results in more socially responsible firms (Bebchuk, L., J. Fried and D. Walker: 2002, The University of Chicago Law Review 69, 751–846; Zalewski, D.: 2003, Journal of Economic Issues 37(2), 503–509). In addition, our findings suggest the importance of institutional context in influencing the association between executive compensation and CSR. Further implications for practice and research are discussed.Lois. Mahoney is an Assistant Professor at Eastern Michigan University. Her research is focused in the areas of ethics and accounting information systems. She has published in ethics and accounting journals including Journal of Business Ethics, Business Ethics Quarterly, Research on Professional Responsibility and Ethics in Accounting, Information and Organization. Dr. Mahoney has received several research awards, including Best Paper award at the Seventh Symposium on Ethics Research in Accounting. Dr. Mahoney is also actively involved in the American Accounting Association.Linda Thorn is an Associate Professor at York University in Toronto Ontario. Her research focuses on ethical decision making, the ethics of accountants and accounting students and ethical aspects of accounting information. She has published in ethics and accounting journal including among others, Business Ethics Quarterly, Journal of Business Ethics, Contemporary Accounting Research, Behavioral Research in Accounting and Audit: A Journal of Practice in Theory.     

上市公司高管薪酬现实状况、变化趋势与决定因素:1999～2009

以1999～2009年中国上市公司的全样本面板数据,对中国上市公司高管薪酬的现实状况、变化趋势与决定因素分析表明,中国竞争性行业上市公司总经理的薪酬决定基本遵循了市场的决定逻辑,治理机制也发挥了一定的作用;而垄断性行业上市公司总经理的薪酬由于行业的行政性垄断性质,使其在决定机制上偏离了市场原则,尽管其利用政治激励等方式使其薪酬水平在绝对意义上相对较低,但这一措施却扭曲了公司治理机制的正常作用。在其他条件一定的情况下,企业的政府控制特别是中央政府控制,由于其委托-代理链条的延长,使企业高管薪酬比私有产权控制企业相对更高。     

CEO optimism,CEO selection,compensation, and corporate investment decision: The case of CEOs who were rehired as CEOs by another firms after turnover

What happens to CEOs after they are let go by their firm? This study is designed to investigate CEOs who are rehired as CEOs by another firms after turnover. CEOs defined as “moderately optimistic” and those who left voluntarily from their departing firms, are younger, have better prior performance, and work in larger firms are found to have a greater likelihood of being rehired as a CEO by another employer. Moreover, new-hire firms with higher growth opportunity and higher R&D expenditures are found to be significantly more willing to hire overconfident CEOs. Furthermore, more-optimistic CEOs are found to receive higher total compensation from their new-hire firms than CEOs who are less optimistic. Finally, overconfident CEOs working in firms with high growth opportunity and higher R&D show a significantly greater tendency toward increasing firm investment.     

创新驱动发展与企业劳动收入份额

选取2012—2020年沪深A股上市公司为样本,实证检验创新驱动发展与企业劳动收入份额之间的关系,以及高管股权激励和员工持股对上述关系的调节效应。研究发现：企业创新驱动发展能够有效提高企业劳动收入份额;实施高管股权激励和员工持股计划均能显著增强上述关系。进一步研究发现,盈利水平发挥了部分中介效应,且当企业处于成长期和衰退期、市场化程度较高的地区以及为非国有企业时,上述关系更显著。研究结论表明,特别是处于成长期与衰退期、市场化程度较高地区的企业,以及非国有企业,大力推动创新驱动发展,并辅之以高管股权激励和员工持股计划,可以提高企业劳动收入份额,实现和谐发展,推进共同富裕目标实现。     

高管薪酬、交互效应与公司绩效间的动态关系——基于动态内生性的经验研究

本文以2002—2011年716家上市公司为样本,在动态内生性框架下,运用动态面板System GMM估计方法,在考虑了高管薪酬与其他治理机制间的交互作用情况下,研究了高管薪酬与公司绩效间的动态关系。研究结果表明：（1）前期高管持股比例与公司绩效呈负相关,前期高管货币薪酬与公司绩效呈正相关;（2）前期公司绩效对高管薪酬产生了显著的反馈效应;（3）高管薪酬与其他公司治理机制间存在＂交互效应＂,即高管薪酬与其他治理机制间的相互作用对公司绩效产生了显著的影响;（4）高管薪酬与公司绩效间存在动态内生性。     

基于全流通高管薪酬变动与控制权转让绩效研究

以2005年5月1日～2007年12月31日的国有-国有、行业未变更的控制权转移公司为样本,在控制高管变更等因素后,检验薪酬变动与控制权转移后业绩变动的相关关系,研究发现：高管薪酬增加与控制权转移后业绩改善存在显著的正相关关系。这一结论对国有上市公司薪酬改革和控制权转移后如何提升公司业绩具有重要意义。