Repricing and Executive Turnover

We examine whether the threat of executive turnover faced by a firm affects its decision to reprice stock options held by its executives. We estimate a model of voluntary turnover among top executives and show that the predicted turnover from this model is positively related to the probability of repricing. The relationship is robust to the inclusion of several known determinants of repricing. Our results are consistent with a model in which a tight labor market makes executives hard to replace, forcing firms to reprice stock options when they go underwater.     

董事会对经理层治理风险预警模型构建研究

从形式上看，董事会对经理层治理风险主要表现为董事会自身建设风险、董事会对经理层决策与控制风险以及经理层执行风险等，因而理性构建董事会对经理层治理风险顸警指标体系十分必要。借助于主成分分析法建立治理风险预警模型，通过对警度临界值的界定，可初步判断公司董事会对经理层治理风险程度。     

执行案外第三人的策略研究

在我国加入世贸组织的新形势下，企业法律顾问工作中执行案外第三人的形象日渐增多，有的是所在企业成为被执行的第三人，有的是本企业作为申请人，申请执行案外第三人。     

CEO duality and firm performance: A contingency model

Several studies have addressed the CEO duality-performance relationship, with inconsistent results. This paper proposes that these inconsistencies can be resolved by integrating agency and stewardship perspectives on duality. Using data from 192 firms in 12 industries, both the direction and magnitude of the duality-performance relationship was found to vary systematically across Dess and Beard's (1984) environmental dimensions. These results provide partial support for both agency and stewardship perspectives.     

Incentives of Stock Option Based Compensation

We introduce explicitly the effort as a choice variable in a continuous time utility maximisation framework of an executive who is partly compensated with stock options. We solve the model in the case where the executive is not allowed to trade in the company’s stock but is able to achieve a partial insurance through trading in a correlated market portfolio. We define the executive’s value of the options through a certainty equivalence approach both in the case of European call options and non-standard capped stock options and study the behaviour of the reservation price as relevant parameters change.JEL Classification: G13, G30, G32, J33, M12     

惟有系统管理才能提高执行力——以酒店、餐饮为例

执行力,是企业管理共性的追求,是合格产品和营造顾客满意体验的根本保证。执行力的提高,是一个系统全面均衡管理的工作。设计,为执行道明理由,做好铺垫;配置,为执行提供保障,提供支撑;培训,使执行少走弯路,轻松到位;评估,为执行纠偏扬正,为新的执行事项承上启下做好必要过渡。通过系统务实的运作,不仅有效提高执行力,还会给企业带来更加和谐的氛围。     

Budgetary Accounting in National Governments: Anglo versus American Accounting

Abstract: This paper offers an understanding of the US federal budgeting and accounting system, in context. The system is unique among the major Anglophone countries, in being both cash‐based and obligation‐based, thereby providing what can be termed a polar opposite case to an accrual‐based system, the technicalities of which the paper explains. The paper uses, as a comparator, the UK government's cash‐based and accrual‐based system, also in context. This shows that the US system is primarily a system of control by the legislature, whereas the UK's is primarily one of control by the executive. The paper analyses the long history of institutions of the US federal government defending the obligation basis in the face of accrual‐based assaults; the obligation basis has remained resilient.     

上市公司高管薪酬与普通职工收入及其差距的实证分析

文章利用2007年852家上市公司年报数据,在扣除高管薪酬后计算了普通职工的收入,并采用了假设检验、多组均值比较等分析方法,考察了高管薪酬和普通职工收入及其差距的大小,并对其深层次的原因进行了分析,结果发现：金融保险行业高管薪酬和普通职工的收入都明显高于其他行业;虽然高管薪酬和普通职工的收入差距与行业、地域属性无关,但是远远高于2007年城乡居民收入差距,这说明高管薪酬和普通职工收入差距过大是普遍现象。     

银行高管薪酬具有风险敏感性吗？——来自中国上市银行的经验证据

基于我国经济转型期的特殊背景,运用2001—2012年间我国上市银行的数据,从银行风险承担角度检验了银行高管薪酬是否具有风险敏感性。研究结果表明,高管薪酬与风险承担间具有显著负相关关系,即风险承担对银行高管薪酬具有约束作用,也意味着我国上市银行的高管薪酬具有风险敏感性。进一步研究显示：董事会会议次数和独立董事规模未能对高管薪酬风险敏感性产生显著性影响,而董事会规模与风险承担对高管薪酬的约束表现出显著的相互替代关系,但这种替代关系仅体现在非国有控股银行中;另外,相对于非国有控股银行,高管薪酬风险敏感性在国有控股银行中显得更加显著,表明国有控股银行更加注重银行经营风险的控制。     

环境机会主义、问责需求和环境审计

通过分析环境机会主义行为的产生和控制,认为环境机会主义行为的存在和污染容忍度的下降产生了环境问责需要,问责需求产生环境审计。收集环境投资、水环境治理和能源消耗数据,分析其与相关环境审计结果公告之间的关系,发现环境保护的投资问责驱动环境部门的预算执行审计,水环境污染及治理问责驱动水环境审计,节能减排的问责需求驱动节能减排审计,验证了环境审计由环境问责需求产生和变迁的理论构想。