上市公司董事长与总经理的基本状况及年度报酬的相关性

董事长和总经理在现代公司治理结构中分别发挥不同的职能和作用。认识上市公司董事长与总经理的基本状况及其关系,是加强上市公司治理的一项重要基础工作。文章在对董事长和总经理相互关系理论分析的基础上,对我国1373家上市公司董事长和总经理的基本状况进行了全面的对比和分析,研究发现领取报酬的董事长与总经理年度报酬之间存在着高度相关和趋同的现象。     

基于中国股市微观结构的流动性与执行成本分析

运用市场微观结构理论来分析中国股市的交易制度、流动性和执行成本后发现:(1)在佣金和交易税相等的条件下,B股的知情交易者执行成本普遍大于A股,导致B股的流动性小于A股,买卖价差显著大于A股,表明投资者对B股交易要求较高的风险报酬;(2)一旦控制住执行成本中普通交易者对知情交易者所要求的风险补偿,A、B股买卖价差的区别就消失了。因此,证券管理部门应在B股市场引入做市商制度并在微观结构理论的指导下,加强交易监管系统,从而提高B股的流动性并降低其执行成本。     

高管激励、非效率投资与公司业绩

从代理理论出发,以2001--2010年A股上市公司的数据为研究样本检验高管激励方式、非效率投资与公司业绩之间关系,研究结果表明：显性激励和隐性激励对于投资效率和公司业绩的影响是不同的,显性激励能够通过提升投资效率来改善公司业绩,而隐性激励则没有这样的作用;在不同所有制样本中,隐性激励对国有企业影响更大,而显性激励对非国有企业影响更大。     

Chief Audit Executive as Supervisory Board Member and Executive Compensation Contracts

This paper studies a unique phenomenon in China's corporate governance—that chief audit executives (CAEs) sit on supervisory boards (CAE duality)—and examines its effects on executive compensation contracts. Using a sample of listed firms between 2010 and 2018, we find a significant positive relation between CAE duality and pay-for-performance sensitivity, which suggests that the dual position helps integrate monitoring resources and reduces agency costs. This positive relation is more pronounced when companies face a stricter monitoring environment and in non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than in SOEs. In addition, we find that the recent reforms on compensation strengthen the role of CAE duality in SOEs. Further analysis identifies the reliability of performance information (i.e., earnings quality) and reduced executive self-interested behaviours (i.e., perquisite consumption) as the influencing mechanisms that increase the demand for performance-based compensation and thus improve pay-for-performance sensitivity.     

Do firms lease to hedge? CEO risk-taking and operating lease intensity

Operating leases are used extensively for financing, but their ability to separate ownership and use also creates hedging opportunities. We investigate whether firms recognize such opportunities by examining the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) risk-taking incentives and the use of operating leases. Consistent with firms using operating leases to hedge, we find higher CEO risk-taking incentives lower operating lease intensity. To address endogeneity, we use the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 123R as an exogenous shock to option compensation, dynamic panel generalized method of moments, simultaneous equations, and change regressions. Our results are robust to placebo and alternative tests.     

社会资本与超额在职消费：激浊扬清还是推波助澜

作为企业治理的重要问题之一，代理成本诱发超额在职消费引起各界广泛关注。文章以2007-2019年A股上市公司为初始样本，考察我国各省社会资本水平差异对超额在职消费影响。研究表明，社会资本显著提高超额在职消费，起到推波助澜的负面效用；进一步研究表明，公司治理水平维度上通过提高机构投资持股比例、短期债务融资比例及扩大独立董事比例和监事会规模均能抑制社会资本加剧超额在职消费的负面效用，公司治理环境维度上通过强化企业内部治理环境、加快市场化进程亦能削弱社会资本对超额在职消费的“推波助澜”。以上结论为社会资本利弊之争提供有益补充，亦凸显非正式制度与正式制度的治理替代效应，同时为企业完善内部治理水平及政府优化制度环境与规则治理以抑制社会资本负面效用提供一定借鉴。     

Upper‐echelon executive human capital and compensation: Generalist vs specialist skills

This study extends current knowledge of upper echelon executive compensation beyond the CEO, specifically CFO compensation, based on whether they possess generalist or specialist skills. We find that “strategic” CFOs with an elite MBA (generalist) consistently command a compensation premium, while “accounting” CFOs (specialist) and CFOs with a non‐MBA master's degree, even from an elite institution, do not. Further, scarce “strategic” CFOs are awarded both higher salaries and higher equity‐based compensation. Our findings support the view that unique complementarities between scarce CFOs and firms increase these executives' bargaining power leading to pay premium. Our results are robust to post‐hiring years, firm sizes, board characteristics, and CFO's insider/outsider status. We contribute at the confluence of upper‐echelon compensation, executive human capital, resource‐based view, and assortative matching literatures. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does stardom affect the informativeness of a CEO's insider trades?

This study examines whether the celebrity or star status of a chief executive officer (CEO) affects the informativeness of his insider trades. Using three different measures to identify star CEOs in a sample of S&P 1500 firms, we find that trades of non‐star CEOs predict future abnormal returns and earnings innovations and that trades of star CEOs do not. The predictive power of non‐star CEO trades is mostly attributable to opportunistic trades, not routine trades. We also find evidence suggesting that the abnormal returns associated with non‐star CEO insider trades are due to the lower visibility and consequently less scrutiny of non‐star CEOs compared with star CEOs.     

Mutual monitoring and corporate governance

Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number two executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the No. 2 executive are positively related to future firm value (Tobin’s Q); (2) the beneficial effect is more pronounced for firms with stronger incentives for the No. 2 to monitor and with higher information asymmetry between the boards and the CEOs; and (3) mutual monitoring is a substitute for other governance mechanisms. The results suggest that mutual monitoring provides important checks and balances on CEO power.