我国银行业的市场结构与竞争行为

本文运用产业组织理论对我国银行业的结构、行为与市场绩效进行分析 ,认为目前我国银行业的市场结构具有较为明显的寡头垄断特征 ,国有产权占绝对垄断地位。国有银行的垄断来自传统惯性、行业进入管制与较高的退出壁垒。从行业集中度指标判断 ,我国银行业现存的产业化进程迟滞、行业规模不经济、国有商业银行盈利能力下降等因素制约着整个银行业市场绩效的提高。一旦政策性进入壁垒放开 ,高效的进入者将对原行业成员构成强有力的竞争威胁。同时 ,法律规制不力、信用低下、信息不对称、激励约束机制不健全等制度框架 ,导致银行业市场竞争不足、市场行为异化。要解决上述诸多问题需要各方的共同努力。     

农民旅游者出游特征、影响因素及对策——以浙江省为例

在我国大力发展乡村旅游的同时,人们往往只重视农村居民作为旅游产品的生产者,却忽视其同时也是旅游产品的消费者.目前,随着农村经济的平稳发展,尤其在沿海经济发达地区,农村居民人均可自由支配收入逐年上升,其旅游需求市场日益壮大.文章通过对浙江省11个地市进行抽样调查,在分析农民旅游者行为特征的同时,剖析其对出游的态度与动机,并对影响其出游决策的因素进行归类分析,最后提出相应对策.     

Aggregate stock market behavior and investors’ low risk aversion

This paper studies whether investors’ high risk aversion can be avoided in a representative-agent model that is able to explain aggregate stock market behavior in the US financial market. We present a consumption-based asset pricing model with a representative agent who has a ‘catching up with the Joneses’ preference to show that high risk aversion can be avoided in a representative-agent model that can help explain many of the empirically observed properties of the aggregate stock market return, including the equity premium and risk-free rate puzzles, the predictability of long-horizon stock returns, and the ‘leverage effect’ in return volatility.     

重大工程高层管理团队冲突、行为整合与工程绩效研究

为揭示重大工程高管团队冲突对工程绩效的作用机理,构建了以重大工程高管团队冲突为自变量、行为整合为中介变量、工程绩效为因变量的中介模型,并通过215位高管问卷样本进行实证研究,实证结果表明重大工程高管团队任务冲突对工程绩效有显著的正向影响,关系冲突对工程绩效有显著的负向影响.合作行为和信息交换和在团队冲突和工程绩效之间存...     

电网故障模型中贝叶斯网络和DS证据理论的应用

由于电网的复杂性和多变性,导致电网故障中存在信息不确定性问题,这就需要依靠贝叶斯网络和DS证据理论的自动生成方法。文章主要描述了这两种方法的原理,讨论了贝叶斯网络和DS证据理论在电网故障模型领域应用的可能方式和情况,并运用一些实例证明了这种方法的可靠性。     

Why Do Some Households Save So Little? A Rational Explanation

This paper offers an explanation for the puzzle of low wealth holdings among a significant fraction of the elderly. Instead of invoking irrational, nonrational, or nonoptimal behavior to resolve the puzzle, it is shown that widespread low wealth holdings are consistent with a rational life-cycle model of saving with uncertain lifetime and borrowing constraint. When there is uncertainty about the length of life, it is optimal for some individuals to save little and exhaust their wealth early. The characteristics of these individuals are derived. The simulation results support that the model can account for low wealth holdings as well as early terminal wealth depletion. The analysis also rejects the common perception that uncertain lifetime reduces dissaving. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D11, D91, E21, I12, J14.     

基于融资行为的中小企业社会信任网络构建

中小企业社会信任网络的多层次性与其融资的可获得性有着密切的关系。通过社会信任网络解决中小企业内生资源不足问题,利用网络内含的默契、惯例、信任以及惩罚机制,构建以融资效率为核心的中小企业社会信任网络,有助于改善中小企业融资环境,消除中小企业融资障碍,提高中小企业融资效率。     

Licensing policies for a new product

This paper studies licensing policies for the owner of a new product and addresses their welfare impact in the assessment of market failures. We show that the best licensing policy for the patent holder is fixed fee licensing with an exclusive territory clause. Consumers are also better off with fixed fees but do not prefer the exclusive territory clause. Social welfare is higher under exclusive territories when fixed costs are not too large. As for efficiency, the number of licences in the private market equilibrium falls short of the socially optimal solution. Our analysis discloses that (i) any policy measures aimed at enhancing the diffusion of technology, in terms of the number of licences, would be welcomed and, (ii) the permissive treatment received by licensing agreements with exclusive territories is justified.