基于感知价值的服务失误补救后顾客满意的实证研究

本文在资源交换理论的框架下，提出了一个基于感知价值的顾客补救后满意的整合模型，研究服务失误和补救服务属性的交互作用对顾客感知价值的影响，最终决定顾客补救后满意。研究表明，感知价值对顾客补救后满意有较强的解释作用，同时还证明了服务失误内容和补救服务属性之间的交互作用，确实对顾客感知价值有显著的影响。     

Recovering Hicksian Consumer Surplus within a Collective Model: Hausman's Method for the Household

The purpose of this paper is to describe the implications of the collective model of household behavior for the methods used to estimate the economic value of non-marketed environmental resources. After demonstrating how the separability restrictions inherent in the collective model allow individual preference and household income allocation choices to be distinguished, the paper demonstrates how the framework can be used to recover Hicksian consumer surplus. An algebraic example is used to illustrate how the framework can be used in valuing environmental resources.     

Dissertation abstract: “Essays in applied economics on the intervention of a third player in agency relationships”

Agency theory has established that appropriate incentives can reconcile the diverging interests of the principal and the agent. Focusing on three applications, this dissertation evaluates the empirical relevance of these results when a third party interacts with the primary contract. The analyses provided rely on either laboratory or natural experiments. First, corruption is analyzed as a two-contract situation: a delegation contract between a Principal and an Agent and a corruption pact concluded between this Agent and a third player, called Briber. A survey of the recent microeconomic literature on corruption first highlights how corruption behavior results from the properties of those two agreements. We thereafter show that the Agent faces a conflict in reciprocities due to those two conflicting agreements. The resulting delegation effect, supported by observed behavior in our three-player experimental game, could account for the deterrence effect of wages on corruption. Second, health care is governed by contradictory objectives: patients are mainly concerned with the health provided, whereas containing health care costs is the primary goal of health care administrators. We provide further insights into the ability of incentives to balance these two competing objectives. In this matter, our theoretical and econometric analysis evaluates how a new mixed compensation scheme, introduced in Quebec in 1999 as an alternative to fee-for-services, has affected physicians’ practice patterns. Free switching is shown to be an essential feature of the reform, since it implements screening between physicians. Finally, the demand for underground work departs from the traditional Beckerian approach to illegal behavior, due to the dependence of benefits from illegality on competitors’ behavior. We set up a theoretical model in which the demand for underground work from all producers competing on the same output market is analyzed simultaneously. We first show that competition drastically undermines the individual benefits of tax evasion. At equilibrium, each firm nonetheless chooses evasion with a positive probability, strictly lower than one. This Bertrand curse could then account for the “tax evasion puzzle” i.e. the overprediction of evasion in models that ignore market interactions. We thereafter show that allowing firms to denounce competitors’ evasion is not likely to solve this curse—by providing a credible threat against price cuts, it fosters illegal work. Empirical evidence from a laboratory experiment confirms these predictions. Without denunciation, experimental firms often choose evasion whereas evasion benefits are canceled out by competition. When introduced, denunciation is rarely used by firms, but the threat makes evasion profitable. JEL Classification K42, I18, D21, C25, C91     

Strategic Firm Behavior Under Average-Revenue-Lagged Regulation

Price caps have been shown to have incentive properties superior to traditional rate of return regulation. Average-revenue-lagged regulation (ARL) is attractive in that steady-state prices are known to be efficient. We show that the ARL scheme can be manipulated by the firm so as to yield the unregulated global profit maximum. While tests exist that can provide the regulator with evidence of this strategic behavior, we also demonstrate that the unregulated global profit maximum will not be attainable if Laspeyres (L) regulation is employed.Jel classification: L43, L51I would like to thank Michael Crew and an anonymous referee for their extremely helpful suggestions.     

中国船舶制造业:SCP范式分析

以产业组织理论中哈佛学派的SCP范式为基本分析框架,考察我国的船舶制造业的产业组织状况后发现,中国船舶制造业市场结构是寡占型结构,垄断程度比较高,市场行为表现为更多的政府推动下的兼并与重组行为,而市场绩效相对效率低,技术进步和产品创新乏力.降低行业进入壁垒,鼓励民间资本进入造船业,推进产业规模经营是中国船舶制造业发展的必然选择.     

新政治经济学及其在发展问题中的应用

新政治经济学倡导用经济学的方法研究政治问题，强调经济和政治的内在关联性，坚持个人主义的方法论和经济人假设，试图把政治过程理解为类似经济的交换过程。新政治经济学关于公共选择、集体行动、寻租和官僚的理论成果，在发展问题的研究中得到了广泛应用。     

植入"公平博弈"的委托-代理模型——来自行为经济学的一个贡献

本文通过将Rabin(1993)提出的"公平博弈"概念植入现有委托一代理模型,获得一个考虑了代理人表现出"互惠性"非理性行为的新委托一代理模型.由该模型给出来的最优委托一代理合约可以给委托人带来比现有委托一代理最优合约更高的利润水平.研究发现,现有的Holmstrom-Milgrom模型中的最优合约不是帕累托最优的.新模型可以解释企业人性化管理和许多有特色的人性化企业文化的形成.本文是行为经济学与现有激励理论相结合研究的一种初步尝试,是运用行为经济学原理重建信息经济学基本框架的原创性工作.     

模仿行为经济学分析——对经济波动的一种新解释

当前 ,世界经济面临衰退的威胁 ,科学解释经济波动具有重大的理论意义和现实意义。RBC理论或方法是当代西方经济学界解释经济波动最具前沿的一种理论或方法 ,也是宏观经济分析的方向。但存在明显缺陷。本文在修正RBC模型的基础上 ,首次建立模仿行为理论模型重新解释经济波动 ,并就中国政府在防止和治理经济波动的作用进行了独特的解释 ,认为政府所起的作用是示范人作用。     

转轨中国公共品导出机制中的政府行为分析

本文从政府角度出发,对公益品和私益品的特性进行了重新思考,从偏好、福利二分、绩效衡量难易、制度环境、意识形态等角度考察政府行为的独特性.并以我国体制转轨的特殊时期为背景,分析了不同于西方代议制的政体下,在公共品导出机制中政府行为的复杂性,指出了制度上的缺陷和由此导致的一系列现实问题.     

银行监管的微观基础和战略监管体系选择

本探讨了银行监管的微观基础，认为在信息不对称以及银行业不完全竞争的作用下，银行业具有内在的不稳定性，需要外部监管力量的支撑来维护稳健经营，但是政府机构监管作为监管垄断力量会引发一系列新的道德危害从而导致监管失灵。中详细分析了各种重要的监管措施带来的正负影响，在此基础上提出监管的战略体系至少应当包括监管、激励结构、市场约束和公司治理。