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31.
一种逆向物流Stackelberg博弈下的库存契约研究 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
供应链中的库存协调是供应链管理的一项重要工作,而如何针对不同的供应链设计有效而合理的契约是其中的关键。本文分析研究了由一个供应商和一个生产商组成的供应链在集成条件下和分散条件下的最优库存,并研究了stackelberg主从博弈下如何通过设计契约使供应链库存达到最优。 相似文献
32.
Oded Stark 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2004,14(1):37-42
We offer a game-theoretic proof of Hamiltons rule for the spread of altruism. For a simple case of siblings, we show that the rule can be derived as the outcome of a one-shot prisoners dilemma game between siblings.JEL Classification:
A13, C70, D64Correspondence to: Oded Stark, ZEF, University of Bonn, Walter-Flex-Strasse 3, 53113 Bonn, GermanyWe are indebted to an anonymous referee and to Uwe Cantner for helpful comments and suggestions. Partial financial support from the National Institute on Aging (grant RO1-AG13037) and from the Humboldt Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
33.
Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. We investigate a
class of cooperative games that generalizes some economic applications with a similar structure. These are the so-called line-graph
games being cooperative TU-games in which the players are linearly ordered. Examples of situations that can be modeled like
this are sequencing situations and water distribution problems. We define four properties with respect to deleting edges that
each selects a unique component efficient solution on the class of line-graph games. We interpret these solutions and properties
in terms of dividend distributions, and apply them to economic situations.
This research has been done while the third author was visiting Tinbergen Institute at the Free University, Amsterdam. The
research is part of the Research Programme “Strategic and Cooperative Decision Making” at the Department of Econometrics.
Financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) in the framework of the Russian-Dutch programme
for scientific cooperation, is gratefully acknowledged. The third author also appreciates partial financial support from the
Russian Leading Scientific Schools Fund (grant 80.2003.6) and Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fund (grant 02-02-00189a). We
thank three anonymous referees for their valuable comments. 相似文献
34.
Miguel A. Costa-Gomes 《Journal of Economic Theory》2002,104(1):104-136
M. Rabin (1994, J. Econ. Theory63, 370-391) proposes a model of behavior in two-person complete-information games with preplay communication, using non-equilibrium notions in the spirit of rationalizability to derive lower bounds on players' expected payoffs when players have unlimited communication opportunities. This paper adapts Rabin's model so that it can be used to analyze the results of the experiments of R. Cooper et al. (1989, Rand J. Econ.20, 568-587) on structured preplay communication in the Battle of the Sexes and the results of the unstructured bargaining experiments of Roth, Malouf, and Murnighan. Adding empirically motivated restrictions that allow the model to predict the payoff effects of changes in bounded communication possibilities like those in the experiments, it is shown that the data from both experiments are generally consistent with Rabin's model, and with the predictions of the extended model. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72, C78, C91. 相似文献
35.
具缺货期不同决策支配权的两级供应链合作机制研究 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
从考虑市场需求固定且卖方和买方对缺货期的不同决策支配权情况,研究了两级供应链的合作机制,建立了其不完全信息的动态博弈模型,并得出其精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡,从理论上证明了卖方和买方分别占支配地位和从属地位时买方卖方应相互合作。 相似文献
36.
知识经济时代,企业自主研发是增强其竞争力的必经途径。而在国内,众多中小企业对研发投入持消极态度,尽管政府多方鼓励,但收效不大,且企业在自主研发的投入方面与发达国家有着较大的差距。可从严格保护研发成果、协作研发与加大政府的政策优惠力度等方面对中国中小企业的研发投入情况进行改进。 相似文献
37.
James W Friedman 《Information Economics and Policy》1983,1(1):37-53
This paper deals with an infinite horizon n firm oligopoly in which firms are assumed to have incomplete information about one another's actions and profit functions. An equilibrium concept is defined that is similar to the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium, but is suitable for the information assumptions of the model. The equilibrium uses a type of bounded rationality which makes firms' computations relatively easy. This is due to an implicit assumption that computation is costly and a Bayesian approach is prohibitively costly. This low information Nash equilibrium is proved to exist, and, in addition, an adaptive expectations decision process is described which, if followed by all firms, leads to the low information Nash equilibrium. 相似文献
38.
一种项目采购模式的博弈分析 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
本文试图用经济学理论 (主要是博弈与信息经济学的理论 )来分析目前工程项目建设中采用的一种工程设备、材料的采购模式。文章首先提出这种模式的内容与特征 ,然后就制度内各参与方 (主要为业主、承包商、供货商 )之间的博弈进行分析 ,分不完全信息博弈、完全信息博弈两种情况来分析这种采购制度下达到的均衡。 相似文献
39.
基于博弈论的二层供应链网络竞争与结盟模型 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
就两个制造商和一个零售商所组成的供应链模型进行研究,运用博弈论方法来研究制造商间的竞争及制造商与零售商间的竞争和协调决策问题,给出了两种决策下相应的数学模型,并比较了制造商与零售商间有无联盟关系时对各自收益的影响。 相似文献
40.
企业网络是一种新型组织结构形式和制度安排。本文首先分析了企业网络的形成动因,然后运用博弈论建立模型论证了横向互补型企业网络得以形成的动因在于网络成员自身的利益最大化。 相似文献