The economics of land transfer and title insurance

In the presence of uncertainty over the title of land (due to fraud or error), a legal system can protect either the current (innocent) owner, or a previous owner who claims title. The predominant system in the United States generally awards title to the latter in the event of legitimate claim. Thus, current owners frequently purchase title insurance to provide indemnification in the event of a loss. In contrast, the Torrens system awards title to the current owner, but provides for indemnification of any legitimate claimants. We evaluate these two systems and argue that if transaction costs are low, both promote efficient assignment of title (according to the Coase Theorem), but if transaction costs are high, the Torrens system is more likely to award title to the party that values it the most (namely, the current possessor).     

The Wealth Effect of Domestic Joint Ventures: Evidence from Taiwan

This study presents important international evidence by examining the wealth effect of domestic joint ventures by Taiwanese firms. In opposite to United States evidence, we find that announcements of domestic joint ventures by Taiwanese firms are, on average, associated with significantly negative abnormal stock returns. We also find that the stock market response to announced domestic joint ventures is significantly positively related to the announcing firms' investment opportunities, size of investment and debt ratio, and is significantly negatively related to the business relatedness variable. In contrast, free cash flow, firm size, relative firm size and managerial ownership are found to have no significant power in explaining the market response. Our results support the investment opportunities, synergy and complementarity hypotheses as well as a broad interpretation of the free cash flow hypothesis, but reject the absolute size, relative size and alignment-of-interests hypotheses. This study makes valuable contributions to the literature by providing the first direct evidence on the role of investment opportunities, synergy and alignment-of-interests in explaining the wealth effect of domestic joint ventures     

Value of Multinationality: Internalization, Managerial Self-interest, and Managerial Compensation

In this paper, we examine the impact of managerial self-interest on the value of multinationality. Since agency theory also suggests that a divergence between the interests of managers and shareholders can be aligned by effective managerial incentive, we also examine the effect of managerial compensation on the value of multinationality. Our results show that for high- Q (Tobin's Q > 1 ) firms, investors do not associate the spending of free cash flow on multinationality with the problem of overinvestments. For high- Q firms, it is also found that the value of multinationality can be enhanced by effective managerial incentives. For low- Q firms (Tobin's Q < 1 ), it is found that the concern of managerial self-interest overwhelms the benefits of internalization, making multinationality a value-decreasing event. For low- Q firms, managerial compensation is also ineffective in promoting value-enhancing foreign direct investments.     

Land Reform: Taking a Long(er) View

The paper proposes a broad argument that the end of state–led development from the 1970s coincided with (i) the final wave of major redistributive land reform, and its place within transitions to capitalism, that lasted from about 1910 to the 1970s, and (ii) the beginnings of contemporary 'globalization'. Self–styled 'new wave' agrarian reform in the age of neo–liberalism, centred on property rights, is unlikely to deliver much on its claims to both stimulate agricultural productivity and reduce rural poverty. The reasons are grounded in the basic relations and dynamics of capitalism, and how these are intensified and reshaped by and through globalization. Understanding these processes, with all their inevitable unevenness, requires (i) recognizing that the historical conditions of the 'classic' agrarian question no longer apply, and (ii) developing the means to investigate and understand better the changing realities facing different agrarian classes within a general tendency to the concentration of capital and fragmentation of labour, including how the latter may generate new agrarian questions of labour.     

GATT/WTO与管理贸易

现实中的国际贸易不是自由贸易，国际贸易体制中一直都是自由贸易和贸易保护同时并存，以1GATT／WTO也不是自由贸易组织。管理贸易是指介于纯粹自由贸易和完全贸易保护之间的各种情形，其特点是规则导向、有较大兼容性以及可塑性。管理贸易的发展可以有两个完全相反的方向，而GATT／WTO倡导的贸易自由化实质上是在自由贸易和贸易保护两种成分并存的国际贸易体制中抑制贸易保护、提高贸易自由的程度。     

日本转移定价税制研究

转移价格是指跨国关联企业之间进行交易时使用的价格。70年代以后，随着日本经济实力的增强，日本企业经营国际化迅猛发展，出现了许多利用国际关联企业转移所得而避税的情况，而日本有关跨国公司转移定价的税制的实施，使这一避税现象得到了了的避免。随着我国加入WTO后外资的更多进入，加强转移定价的管理势在民行，学习发达国家的先进做法，将有助于我们在这方面少走弯路。     

Property Rights Reform in Rangeland China: Dilemmas On the Road to the Household Ranch

This paper contributes to the debate over land tenure in rural China by extending its spatial coverage to the country’s extensive rangeland regions. Key characteristics of pastoral tenure, identified from field appraisals in western China, include group tenure and fuzzy boundaries. Although these characteristics give rise to efficiency concerns, from a new institutional economics perspective they also facilitate the realization of certain benefits, benefits that could represent opportunity costs of further exclusiveness. The strengthening of rangeland co-management may constitute a more appropriate path to institutional improvement than the establishment of the household ranch, the current goal of national rangeland policy.     

城乡结合部用地矛盾成因分析--以北京市为例

特殊的土地利用和管理特点使得城乡结合部用地矛盾尤为凸现.人口、城市发展、集体经济发展是造成土地供求紧张的直接原因,但是管理制度的不健全则是导致和加剧矛盾激化的深层次原因.在对北京市城乡结合部土地利用与房地产市场调查的基础上,对北京市城乡结合部的用地矛盾进行分析,并从深层次揭示问题的根源和变化规律.     

强化处置闲置地

闲置地是当前土地资源利用和管理中值得关注的重要问题。闲置地弊端甚多，严重地威胁了子孙后代的生存和社会经济的可持续发展。闲置地本质上是二元土地制度的产物，也是投机因素作祟的结果。强化闲置地的处置须从改革土地制度、规范地方政府行为、无偿收回闲置地、健全政策法规等多方面努力。