Reviewing Oates' insights in a repeated game setting

This paper analyzes the optimal assignment of public good policies to layers of a federal system in a repeated game setting. Under a centralized regime, public goods are financed jointly across regions, and a federal legislature decides on the regional quantities. Under a decentralized regime, public goods are financed locally, and governments play a non-cooperative provision game. We find that a centralized (decentralized) regime is more likely to provide the efficient public good policies in case spillovers are small (large). Received: September 2003, Accepted: October 2004 JEL Classification: H11, H41 I wish to thank Clemens Fuest, Anke Kessler, Christoph Lülfesmann, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments on this paper. Financial support by the DFG (SPP 1142) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Lower Bound Restrictions on Intensities in Data Envelopment Analysis

We propose an extension to the basic DEA models that guarantees that if an intensity is positive then it must be at least as large as a pre-defined lower bound. This requirement adds an integer programming constraint known within Operations Research as a Fixed-Charge (FC) type of constraint. Accordingly, we term the new model DEA_FC. The proposed model lies between the DEA models that allow units to be scaled arbitrarily low, and the Free Disposal Hull model that allows no scaling. We analyze 18 datasets from the literature to demonstrate that sufficiently low intensities—those for which the scaled Decision-Making Unit (DMU) has inputs and outputs that lie below the minimum values observed—are pervasive, and that the new model ensures fairer comparisons without sacrificing the required discriminating power. We explain why the low-intensity phenomenon exists. In sharp contrast to standard DEA models we demonstrate via examples that an inefficient DMU may play a pivotal role in determining the technology. We also propose a goal programming model that determines how deviations from the lower bounds affect efficiency, which we term the trade-off between the deviation gap and the efficiency gap.     

Optimising a Probabilistic Model of the Development of Play in Soccer

We present a probabilistic model based on the one developed by Hernández Mendo and Anguera (Revista de Psicologíca Social, 16(1), 71–93, 2001). Here we have tried to break down the interaction contexts that the opposing teams are able to generate and transform during the game. We are aware that a given player or team does not produce consistent behaviour in similar situations. However, a degree of uncertainty is assumed to exist regarding whether the results obtained are a specific function of the analysis used. In order to carry out this research a category system which optimized that used in the previous model was developed. This system should enable the interaction between teams to be observed within the actual play of a soccer game. A lag sequential analysis was performed on the basis of a coding of the behavioural flow. After describing the behavioural patterns obtained a probabilistic model of the development of play in soccer is proposed.     

基于顾客导向的物流企业风险预警

文中通过回顾企业风险预警管理相关文献,分析了物流企业风险形成主要影响因素,并结合物流企业运营特征,建立基于顾客导向的物流企业预警指标体系,运用灰关联分析方法评价物流企业顾客满意度,对物流企业的风险进行预警。     

Preventing HIV in injection drug users: exploring the tradeoffs between interventions

Injection drug users (IDUs) transmit the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) via both needle sharing and sex. Available interventions for this population have varying costs and effectiveness and focus on different risk behaviors. In this analysis, we look at two interventions. One is inexpensive, broad-based and provides modest risk reductions (street outreach (SO)); the other is narrowly focused, expensive and relatively effective (methadone maintenance). This analysis explores the effects of population risk behavior, intervention effectiveness, intervention costs, and decision constraints when allocating funds between these two interventions to maximize effectiveness. We develop a model of the spread of HIV, dividing IDUs into susceptibles (uninfected) and infectives, and separately portraying sex and injection risk. We simulate the epidemic in New York City for time periods from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, and incorporate the behavioral effects of two interventions performed singly or in combination to find the allocation that maximizes the number of infections averted in the IDUs and their noninjecting sex partners, assuming interventions have increasing marginal costs. We find that the optimal allocation nearly always involves spending the maximum allowable amount on SO. This result is largely insensitive to variations in risk parameters, intervention efficacy, or cost. The model's structure, however, makes clear that many factors contribute to this insensitivity, namely the scope of the interventions, the dual drug/sex nature of HIV risk in the population, the asymmetry of sexual risk for men and women, and the potential benefits to nonIDUs.     

Selecting Sites for New Facilities Using Data Envelopment Analysis

This paper develops a mathematical programming model for obtaining a best set of sites for planned facilities. The model is concerned with those situations where resource constraints are present. The specific setting for the paper involves the selection of sites for a set of retail outlets, wherein the ratio of aggregate outputs to inputs for the selected set is maximal among all possible sets that could be chosen. At the same time, the model guarantees that the only sets of stores allowable are those for which the available resources are used to the maximum extent possible.     

湿地公路与农田水利建设关系分析

湿地因其特殊的自然状况，公路交通建设投资大，成绩显著，但农田水利设施损失严重，正确处理好湿地公路建设与农田水利建设的矛盾，有利于发展交通建设和解决三农问题。文章从公路交通与农田水利现状分析出发，试图找到湿地交通发展与农田水利建设的平衡点，形成公路建设，农田水利建设共同发展的良好循环。     

建筑工程无标底招标理论与实践

随着中国建筑业管理体制改革的不断深化，招投标制度在中国得以推广应用，但在招投标机制方面还存在不足，有待完善。文章通过无标底招投标的博弈论基础，分析了无标底招标的意义和作用，同时对无标底招标的实施提出了一些相应的措施和建议，最后指出，随着中国加入WTO，与国际接轨，推广无标底招投标方法是我国建筑业招投标制度改革的当务之急。     

Hybrid governance and governance performance in industrial purchasing relationships

Hybrid governance arrangements (e.g. joint action, long-term contracting and vertical coordination) feature regularly as an effective response to inter-firm dependence in the literature of business-to-business relationships. However, current empirical work has paid little attention to whether such governance arrangements really do improve governance efficacy and reduce transaction costs. The present study focuses on the governance efficacy of vertical coordination in industrial business-to-business relationships. Building on transaction costs arguments, the author examines whether vertical coordination is an effective means for adapting to inter-firm dependence, realized as the substantial employment of specific assets.Empirical findings from a survey of 170 industrial supplier–buyer relationships demonstrate that when asset specificity reaches a certain level, greater vertical coordination reduces ex post transaction costs significantly. On the other hand, this efficacy pattern is modest or non-existent in relationships with low asset specificity.The research findings support the basic TCA assumption that the performance of hybrid governance arrangements is highly dependent on a situation of substantial inter-firm dependence with subsequent small-number conditions.     

区域性物流园区布局方案优选的博弈研究

本文基于区域物流理论与博弈论的理论基础，建立了相应的区域性物流园区布局方案的优选博弈模型，并列出了可行的计算步骤，做出了方法评价，指出了该方法后续研究的方向，为物流园区区域性总体布局的优选问题提供了一种解决方法。