CEO compensation in EU telecom companies: Does the state design the right incentives?

This paper analyzes the structure of CEO pay in European fixed telecommunication companies, focusing on the impact of state ownership. Results show that, under the (partial or total) control of the state, the level of CEO compensation is lower and pay-performance sensitivity is higher than in privately-controlled firms. This finding suggests the state provides an incentive as well as a monitoring effect. However, when the state holds the majority of the shares, the pay level is significantly affected by the CEO power, suggesting that in these firms, CEOs are more likely to be entrenched with boards and succeed in raising their pay.     

Managerial Private Benefits and Overinvestment

According to agency theory, we hypothesize that underpayment of top management motivates management to overinvest. Using a sample of Chinese-listed companies for the period 2005-10, we assess the effect of managerial compensation on overinvestment and the effect of overinvestment on managerial private benefits, including future compensation and perquisites, as well as on firm performance. We find that underpayment does motivate overinvestment, which increases managerial private benefits but not firm value.     

What Drives Executive Stock Option Backdating?

We study motives for executive stock option backdating, the practice of changing the grant dates of current options to dates in the past using hindsight. We find that smaller, younger and less profitable firms tend to be more heavily involved in backdating. These results are consistent with the retention hypothesis. In line with the incentive hypothesis, we find that backdating occurs more for options that are out‐of‐the‐money. We derive some evidence for the agency hypothesis, in the sense that backdating companies have a larger percentage of inside directors. However, contrary to this hypothesis, we conclude that backdating firms have better protection for minority shareholders compared to firms that do not backdate.     

Upper‐echelon executive human capital and compensation: Generalist vs specialist skills

This study extends current knowledge of upper echelon executive compensation beyond the CEO, specifically CFO compensation, based on whether they possess generalist or specialist skills. We find that “strategic” CFOs with an elite MBA (generalist) consistently command a compensation premium, while “accounting” CFOs (specialist) and CFOs with a non‐MBA master's degree, even from an elite institution, do not. Further, scarce “strategic” CFOs are awarded both higher salaries and higher equity‐based compensation. Our findings support the view that unique complementarities between scarce CFOs and firms increase these executives' bargaining power leading to pay premium. Our results are robust to post‐hiring years, firm sizes, board characteristics, and CFO's insider/outsider status. We contribute at the confluence of upper‐echelon compensation, executive human capital, resource‐based view, and assortative matching literatures. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Non-compensation-related consultant service and CEO compensation

This study examines how consultants’ non-compensation-related consulting service (NCS) affects the contractual usefulness of accounting and stock information in executive compensation, as reflected in pay-performance sensitivity. The hypothesis is based on anecdotal evidence suggesting that consultants’ provision of NCS is likely to adversely affect the quality of CEO compensation plans. We investigate whether the consultants providing NCS are involved in potential conflicts of interest. The results show that CEO pay is higher in companies where consultants provide NCS and have a higher NCS fee ratio. The pay-performance sensitivity in CEO compensation decreases when consultants engage in NCS. The overall results are consistent with NCS representing a conflict of interest and compromising the quality of compensation committees.     

行业属性、拉克尔法则与员工薪酬适度性研究--来自2008-2012年中国资本市场的经验证据

员工薪酬适度性是收入分配制度改革的关键。文章借鉴“拉克尔法则”，以行业属性为视角，选取沪深A股同类行业属性上市公司2008-2012年度财务报告数据，计算“拉克尔阀值”，判别员工薪酬适度性。研究发现，针对销售收入异常波动与垄断性的上市公司，“拉克尔法则”无法判别员工薪酬适度性，但竞争性行业上市公司则能判别员工薪酬适度性；同时，“拉克尔法则”能解释行业属性相同而地域不同的上市公司员工薪酬差异。     

股权再融资与企业现金分红

股权再融资往往意味着企业存在大量的融资需求,而实践中普遍存在的股权再融资后立即现金分红的现象有悖于募集资金的优序使用原则。基于此,本文从管理层自利视角出发,在对企业股权再融资后现金分红的行为偏好检验的基础上,进一步选取管理层薪酬增长率和企业股权质押活动作为管理层自利程度的代理变量,探索企业股权再融资后现金分红倾向的边界条件,为该行为背后的代理动机提供证明。基于2007~2017年所有A股上市公司样本,研究发现,企业的确存在股权再融资后立即现金分红的行为倾向;而较低的管理层薪酬增长率和企业股权质押活动会加剧企业股权融资对现金分红的促进作用。进一步研究发现,企业股权再融资活动会给现金分红带来消极的市场反应。上述研究结果表明,管理层自利是股权再融资的重要推动因素,而这一行为会给企业利益造成损害。     

Measuring Production and Irrigation Efficiencies of Rice Farms: Evidence from the Punjab Province,Pakistan

We employ a non‐parametric approach, data envelopment analysis, to estimate the technical and irrigation efficiency of rice farms in the Punjab Province of Pakistan. We use a cross‐sectional dataset of 80 rice growers, including 45 tube‐well owners and 35 water buyers. Mean technical efficiency scores show that tube‐well owners and water buyers are operating at fairly high efficiency levels, indicating that access to technology is not a major constraint. However, irrigation inefficiency is pronounced, with water buyers being more inefficient than tube‐well owners. A bootstrap truncated regression is used to investigate the determinants of technical and irrigation efficiency. We suggest that groundwater management policies should be designed to address efficiency enhancing factors such as knowledge of crop water consumption requirement, better credit opportunities, outreach extension services and training programs.     

环境税的生态补偿效应分析

环境税作为解决负外部性的一个重要手段,在生态补偿过程中发挥着重要作用。本文从经济效率、收入分配、就业、社会福利等几个方面分析了环境税的生态补偿效应,从而为我国生态环境税制的建立健全提供一定的理论依据。