论会计学的职业特色及高职会计学教师知识结构的优化

该文分析了会计的职业特色和社会职能,并从会计学人才培养对教师的要求、会计学教师的知识体系及其优化等方面探讨了高等职业技术院校会计学教师知识结构的优化。最后本文提出了优化会计学教师知识结构的途径,即:脱产或在职理论学习、进修提高(包括读学位);到会计师事务所或企事业单位挂职;学校或相关系组织创办会计师事务所,为会计学教师提供执业机会;在职自学,不断更新和提高专业技能及理论水平。     

政治关系文明的制度分析--在国家与社会关系视角内

政治文明包括政治角色文明、政治行为文明、政治关系文明。政治关系文明是政治文明之基。国家与社会关系的文明，是政治关系文明的根本。当前中国国家与社会关系文明的建设是政治文明建设的突破口。为此要在“强国家一强社会”的视角下，通过制度供给构建适应我国国情的国家与社会良性互动的结构性基础。     

转轨时期我国小农经济改造思想演变与争议

改造小农经济是转轨时期社会主义建设的最艰巨的任务之一。本从家庭经营、规模经营、农业产业化、农村剩余劳动力、农地制度创新等5个方面总结了理论界对小农经济改造的争议与研究，并认为改造小农经济应以邓小平“两个飞跃”理论作为理论基础。     

国库集中支付角度下行政事业单位内部控制研究

国库集中支付与内部控制具有内在的联系性,国库集中支付的目的就是加强对行政事业单位资金的监管,提高财政资金的使用效益。但是在实际运行的过程中,行政事业单位的内部控制并未实现国库集中支付的预期目标。论文立足于国库集中支付视角提出行政事业单位加强内部控制的重要性,剖析行政事业单位内部控制体系建设的原则,最后提出构建基于国库集中支付的内部控制体系的具体对策。     

强化全面预算管理在科研事业单位中的应用

随着国有企事业单位经济体制改革的不断深入,原有“财政补贴”的科研事业单位获得的财政支持将会逐步减少,已经面向市场开展经营活动的科研事业单位最终将推行“自收自支”模式。随着中央财政补助收入的逐年削减,以及民营企业市场准入政策的推进,科研事业单位面临的市场竞争更加激烈,不能创造经济效益的单位不可避免地面临重组或剥离,根本无法生存。因此,怎样适应新的发展形势,推行全面预算管理并进行精准管控成为军工科研事业单位的一项重要课题。     

The New Comparative Political Economy

With the collapse of communism in the late 1980s the field of comparative political economy has undergone major revision. Socialism is no longer considered the viable alternative to capitalism it once was. We now recognize that the choice is between alternative institutional arrangements of capitalism. Progress in the field of comparative political economy is achieved by examining how different legal, political and social institutions shape economic behavior and impact economic performance. In this paper we survey the new learning in comparative political economy and suggest how this learning should redirect our attention in economic development.JEL classification: B53, O10, O20, P0     

Mass-Elite Equilibrium of Federal Constitutional Legitimacy

William Riker ((1964) Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little Brown) stressed the problem of the contested nature of federal institutions and argued that federations existed amidst the ongoing challenge to their rules, that federal institutions were being continuously endogenously produced in the interaction of political parties rather than serving as self-enforceable constraints on the political process. As parties changed, so did federalism, and eventually the balance was bound to shift to either one or the other extreme as far as the degree of centralization was concerned. An alternative approach to essentially the same problem of federal instability was to conceptualize the underlying game differently, as a game of coordination, so that institutions would be accepted as constraints and would therefore be self-enforceable because they allow the players to avoid the chaos and successfully converge to an outcome with payoffs exceeding their reservation values (Hardin, 1989, Ordeshook, 1992). The third proposed solution, consociationalism, emphasizes the elite effort to overcome the conflictual nature of the institutional choice (Lijphart, 1977). Here, as in the coordination argument, the hope is that one could create incentives for politicians to view the existing rules as advantageous and to avoid redistribution by means of the institutional revision. Yet, just like the coordination argument, it is based on an implicit assumption that politicians are more easily motivated to act “cooperatively” than are their constituencies. The missing step in the literature is the mechanism by which this more or less “cooperative” behavior of elected politicians could be sustainable in the environment of popular accountability. An essential component in building the theory of institutional design is to show the possibility in a democracy of elected politicians cooperating on institutional matters even when each of their constituencies would prefer to adjust the constitutional terms to its own advantage. Elite “cooperativeness” must be sustainable even in the presence of outside challengers promising to stay closer to the constituent preferences. Here, I present a model of mass-elite equilibrium of constitutional legitimacy, which demonstrates the possibility to motivate the incumbents to sustain the institutional stability while at the same time protecting them from electoral defeat. I also discuss the difficulties and limitations that such a solution faces, in particular, in plural societies. JEL classification: H77, D02 In working on this paper, I have benefited from the discussions with Mikhail Filippov, Peter Ordeshook, Charles Kromkowski, Carol Mershon, and from the comments of the participants of the conference on ‘‘Micro-Foundations of Federal Institutional Stability’’ at the MicroIncentives Research Center at Duke University, Durham, NC, April 30–May 1, 2004, and of the Lansing Lee proseminar at the University of Virginia. The responsibility for the many remaining flaws is solely mine.     

The Productivity of US States since 1880

This study uses state-level variation in labor productivity levels at twenty-year intervals between 1880 and 1980 to examine the relative importance of institutional and geographical influences in explaining observed and persistent differences in standards of living over time and across regions. Focusing on fundamental rather than proximate influences, we find that both institutional characteristics and some physical geography characteristics account for a high proportion of the differences in state productivity levels: states with navigable waterways, a large minerals endowment, and no slaves in 1860, on average, had higher labor productivity levels throughout the sample period. However, we find little support for two other influences that have previously received attention—climate and latitude.     

论强制性环境治理制度的实施效率

In the eco-environmental governance system,the compul-sive institutions are the most important as well as the mostcommonly utilized.A nation utilizes its administrative,lawand economic power to forbid,boost,bestir and help indi-viduals’behavior concerning environmental governance toensure the realization of eco-environment conservation.The fact,however,turns out to be disappointing about theimpulsive institution’s implementation.Actually,the unsatis-factory practices sometimes even lead to“…     

A Model of the Representation of Interests in a Compound Democracy

This paper provides a model of democratic government as a compound of independent elective and non elective centers of power that compete in fostering the demands of voters and of interest groups. The analysis describes how interests of voters and of pressure groups are represented and under what conditions the compound democracy is more responsive to voters' or to interest groups' demands. These conditions are shown to depend on the center of power's relative opportunity costs at serving a plurality of interests and on the severeness of informational asymmetries between voters and interest groups.