“Success breeds success” or “Pride goes before a fall”?: Teams and individuals in multi-contest tournaments

We study the impact of progress feedback on players' performance in multi-contest team tournaments, in which team members' efforts are not directly substitutable. In particular, we employ a real-effort laboratory experiment to understand, in a best-of-three tournament, how players' strategic mindsets change when they compete on a team compared to when they compete individually. Our data corroborate the theoretical predictions for teams: Neither a lead nor a lag in the first component contest affects a team's performance in the subsequent contests. In individual tournaments, however, contrary to the theoretical prediction, we observe that leaders perform worse—but laggards perform better—after learning the outcome of the first contest. Our findings offer the first empirical evidence from a controlled laboratory of the impact of progress feedback between team and individual tournaments, and contribute new insights on team incentives.     

多重委托代理下医生最优激励模型设计探究

"过度医疗"即指超过疾病实际需求的诊断和治疗的行为。医疗服务的特殊性,使患者、医生、监督方之间存在信息不对称和多重委托代理关系。鉴于此,从政府的第三方监督职能出发,将政府和患者作为共同委托人,避免政府与医院之间道德风险的发生,构建医生作为代理人的最优激励模型,并得出相关结论与启示。     

官员排名赛与环境政策执行——基于环境约束性指标绩效的实证研究

以从2006年开始实行的环境约束性指标为研究对象,结合晋升锦标赛和弱排名激励理论,提出了官员排名赛理论,认为约束性指标制度的建立为地方政府提供了环境绩效排名的平台,由此推动了地方政府环境政策执行力度。利用2006—2015年中国省际环境数据,采用动态面板数据估计方法,实证检验了各省环境绩效排名对其未来环境政策执行力度的影响。实证结果表明,环境绩效排名落后的省份在未来1~3年显著提高了节能和减排的政策执行力度。     

对高校评奖评优工作的几点思考

评奖评优是高校学生管理的重要组成部分,具有激励、资助和导向的作用。本文主要就高校评奖评优工作进行了研究,并提出了一些看法。     

Can Agents Be Better Off with Pay Caps?

A popular way to discipline the managers of companies or banks that got into trouble during the recent financial crisis has been to impose caps on managers' pay. Using a small extension of the standard principal–agent model, we argue that pay caps might serve the opposite purpose, because the agent might be better off with a pay cap. Specifically, we show that, given a fixed effort level to be implemented, the agent's expected utility can be decreasing in an upper bound for the agent's reward. The effect of pay caps on the general structure of optimal incentive contracts is also characterized. While an improvement of contracting information always helps the principal, it might increase or decrease the marginal cost of imposing pay caps.     

Incentives to move up: Effects of pay gaps between levels on employee performance

Employees of a certain rank are motivated by the pay gap between them and the levels above (upward comparison), and the pay gap between them and the levels below (downward comparison). In some cases, employees face multiple upward comparisons such as immediate and subsequent upward comparisons. We hypothesise that upward comparison matters more than downward comparison, and in the case of multiple upward comparisons, the immediate one matters more than the subsequent ones. We also hypothesise that the pay gap effect resulting from the upward/downward comparison ought to be non‐linear in that performance increases with pay gap size at a decreasing rate. The results from two empirical studies, namely, a longitudinal field study and a laboratory experiment, largely support our hypotheses.     

Tariffs and formation of free trade agreements networks

This paper examines the formation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) on the basis of country heterogeneity in the tariff level. We demonstrate that a country's unilateral incentive to form an FTA depends on the relative magnitudes of the (negative) market concession effect and the (positive) market expansion effect, both of which are determined by the tariff levels of the two FTA partner countries. Global welfare is maximised when all country pairs form FTAs. Two countries in equilibrium are more likely to form an FTA when their tariff gap is smaller or when their tariff levels are neither very high nor very low. This finding is robust to several extensions of the model. Our preliminary empirical analysis provides some evidence for the finding.     

社会资本视角下我国环保市场的激励机制研究

社会资本是一种无形资本。本文通过分析我国环境保护市场的发展现状，明确社会资本视角下促进环境保护市场的意义，最终提出以内部社会资本为导向的环境产权激励措施，以外部社会资本为导向的财税激励措施，有利于我国环境保护市场的进一步完善。     

组织视角下的企业员工情绪管理

员工情绪管理是现代企业管理中新的课题。文章从组织的角度出发,将员工情绪分为个体情绪、组织情绪、企业情绪三个层次,对相关概念进行了界定。研究了激励理论与员工情绪管理的关系。将相关理论应用到实践当中,论述进行员工情绪管理应当遵循匹配和疏导的原则,并从引导员工树立正确的情绪管理、采取多种激励手段与员工积极进行沟通、丰富企业文化内涵等方面提出了具体对策。     

Equilibrium theory under ambiguity

We extend the classical results on the Walras–core existence and equivalence to an ambiguous asymmetric information economy; that is, an economy where agents maximize Maximin Expected Utility (MEU). The interest of considering ambiguity arises from the fact that, in the presence of MEU decision making, there is no conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility (contrary to the Bayesian decision making). Our new modeling of an ambiguous asymmetric information economy necessitates new equilibrium notions, which are always efficient and incentive compatible.