Epilogue—from ‘Gray Space' to Equal ‘Metrozenship'? Reflections On Urban Citizenship

This epilogue provides an overview and critique of the articles in this symposium, and an invitation to rethink, conceptually and empirically, our urban future. Using examples from cities in Israel/Palestine, it links the articles to the main currents in the literature on urban citizenship and ‘right to the city'. It draws attention to several voids in current debates, particularly around the rapid growth of urban informality and the changing nature of globalizing urban regimes. The epilogue introduces the notions of ‘gray spacing' to account for recent transformations in these regimes and the rise of ‘defensive urban citizenship' under conditions of neoliberal economy and persisting nationalism. It argues for the rethinking of the struggle for urban democracy in terms of ‘metrozenship' as a foundation for renewed critical research and political transformation.     

社会保险费的就业效应:综述与启示

社会保险费的经济归宿主要受到劳动力市场供求弹性、工资弹性和缴费-收益预期的影响。如果社会保险费不能完全转嫁给劳动者,将对就业产生不利的效应,而在二元劳动力市场特征明显的国家,还可能会带来显著的非正规就业问题。我国当前社会保险费的制度缺陷、最低工资标准的逐年提高和《社会保险法》的实施,可能存在严重的就业风险。     

Trapped in Informality: The Big Role of Small Firms in Russia’s Statist-patrimonial Capitalism

Manifestations of patrimonialism such as corruption and state predation on business are widespread in many emerging economies. This paper presents the case of Russian political economy, dubbed ‘statist-patrimonial capitalism’, which is marked by state threats to private property rights through bureaucratic extortion or legal harassment. How can we explain the resilience of Russia’s statist-patrimonial capitalism? Predominant accounts focus on the lack of institutional constraints on state predation. The paper offers a different perspective by exploring the often-overlooked contribution of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). First, statistical data show a steady rise of SMEs in the 2000s despite increasing state predation, suggesting that SMEs are not simply subjugated by the state. Second, in-depth interviews with Russian entrepreneurs reveal that business contributes to the maintenance of the statist-patrimonial system through the mechanism of the ‘informality trap’: firms that choose the informal strategy have difficulties to return to the legal sphere and get stuck in informality. The drivers of informality include firm-specific characteristics, institutional factors and socio-cultural factors dubbed ‘normality’. The mechanism of the ‘informality trap’ highlights the agency of firms in corrupt polities and may be applicable to other emerging economies.     

The Impact of Bank Credit on Employment Formality: Evidence from Uruguay

This article examines the effect of bank credit on employment formalization in Uruguay. Using a difference-in-differences methodology the article finds that financial deepening decreases informality, especially in more financially dependent sectors. In addition, the effect is found to be greater among women and older workers. In the period under analysis the economy underwent a severe economic crisis and bank credit contracted sharply, but we find no evidence that the effect of bank credit on employment formality changed over time.     

Informality and credit constraints: evidence from Sub-Saharan African MSEs

The attributes of micro and small enterprises (MSEs) influencing access to credit, in particular the level and role of firm informality, are analysed in the article. The puzzle is the push for MSEs to join the formal sector and the tug to avoid the extra burden it places on the firm. It is important to know more clearly what forces are at work and the sources of the causal effects. This study uses data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys for five low-income countries (LICs) in Sub-Saharan Africa. The method is empirical and as we find informality to be endogenous to credit constraints, an instrumental variable approach is estimated. Further, to address the possibility of reverse causality, an instrument for the informality variable is required; not registered with Inland Revenue (tax office) is the chosen instrument variable. The findings reveal that as the probability of a firm operating in the formal sector increases, there is greater access to external credit. The causality relationships are tested providing a strong platform for the formalization of polices to reduce the informality of the MSE sector. These are discussed in the context of the research findings.     

COMMODITY TAX STRUCTURE AND INFORMAL ACTIVITY

Commodity tax structure affects the firm's choice between formality and informality. An increase in the specific tax rate, relative to an equivalent increase in ad valorem taxation, makes informality attractive to more firms. Formality becomes attractive at lower levels of profits under ad valorem taxation. For both the maximization of welfare subject to a revenue constraint and the unconstrained maximization of revenue, the optimal rate of specific taxation is zero.     

Cross‐Subsidies,and the Elasticity of Informality to Social Expenditures: The Case of Mexico's Seguro Popular

How is the size of the informal sector affected when the distribution of social expenditures across formal and informal workers changes? How is it affected when the tax rate changes along with the generosity of these transfers? In our search model, taxes are levied on formal‐sector workers as a proportion of their wage. Transfers, in contrast, are lump‐sum and are received by both formal and informal workers. This implies that high‐wage formal workers subsidize low‐wage formal workers as well as informal workers. We calibrate the model to Mexico and perform counterfactuals. We find that the size of the informal sector is quite inelastic to changes in taxes and transfers. This is due to the presence of search frictions and to the cross‐subsidy in our model: for low‐wage formal jobs, a tax increase is roughly offset by an increase in benefits, leaving the unemployed approximately indifferent. Our results are consistent with the empirical evidence on the recent introduction of the “Seguro Popular” healthcare program.