高管机会主义品行与公司信息披露决策

文章构建相应策略识别了高管机会主义品行,并探究其对公司信息披露决策的影响。研究结果表明,高管的机会主义品行会显著增加公司信息披露违规、真实盈余管理行为;提升公司选择非国际"四大"会计师事务所的概率,并支付更高的审计费用。随着高管机会主义水平上升,公司更有可能作出上述决策。进一步地,国有产权能在一定程度上抑制高管机会主义品行对信息披露质量的负面影响,却显著增加了公司应计盈余管理;当高管机会主义水平较高时,国有产权也无法发挥有效治理作用。从经济后果看,高管的机会主义品行能被资本市场识别,并显著减损公司未来价值。     

地理信息系统在农业决策服务中的应用

[目的]近年来,GIS技术逐渐渗透到农业各环节,在助力提高农业生产效率和经营效益等方面,发挥出越来越重要的作用,为农业现代化发展带来了生机和活力,文章将介绍地理信息系统技术在农业部农业决策服务系统建设过程中的应用,与农业系统从业者分享我们的GIS应用经验。[方法]在构建我国农业决策服务系统过程中,根据我国农业产业特征,选择以Eclipes为开发环境,以Oracle 11gR2为数据库,以SuperMapGIS-T ServerV2.0为服务发布管理平台,以国家测绘局提供的空间地理数据为基础,综合运用WebGIS、REST架构等先进技术,把全国农业生产、经营、流通、管理范围内的地理信息进行分类编制,建成一个功能齐全、应用方便的农业决策服务系统,从而实现了把GIS技术在农业部管理决策层面上的应用。[结果]通过深入调研、走访和分析,迄今历时2年时间,在设计并搭建农业部电子政务内网应用支撑平台的基础上,经研究策划,初步建成了农业部决策服务系统。[结论]GIS技术在农业决策服务中有巨大的应用潜力,不仅可为农业决策服务系统提供空间分析和可视化方法,而且通过该决策服务系统的运行,还能够实现农业部门提供日常监管和应急决策所迫切需要的空间信息。因此,GIS技术在农业决策服务中的应用前景广阔。GIS技术在农业决策服务系统建设过程中的应用,尤其是系统建设思路和架构,对继续探索GIS技术在农业各业务领域中的应用和农业信息平台研发,都将有较大的借鉴作用。     

Technical Analysis as a Rational Tool of Decision Making for Professional Traders

The psychological background of technical analysis usage is investigated to further explain the popularity and common usage of technical analysis as an investment decision tool. Attitudes toward technical analysis of professional futures market traders and neophyte investors, represented by finance students, were examined. Technical analysis is one of the most popular methods supporting investment decisions and it is much more popular among future market traders than among neophyte investors. The concept of processing information was used to explain this phenomenon. Neophyte investors are more experiential and intuition-driven while using technical analysis models, while futures market traders are more rationally driven. Technical analysis methods help professional traders on futures markets, which are less transparent than regulated stock markets, to process information; those methods are perceived by them as rational, cognitive tools supporting their decision making.     

Fundamental disagreement

We document a novel set of facts about disagreement among professional forecasters: (1) forecasters disagree at all horizons, including the long run; (2) the term structure of disagreement is downward sloping for real output growth, relatively flat for inflation, and upward sloping for the federal funds rate; (3) disagreement is time varying at all horizons. We propose a generalized model of imperfect information that can jointly explain these facts. We further use the term structure of disagreement to show that the monetary policy rule perceived by professional forecasters features a high degree of interest-rate smoothing and time variation in the intercept.     

关于上市公司会计信息失真的研究

证券市场的有效运转是以信息披露制度的成熟程度为基础的 ,现从上市公司会计信息披露现状入手 ,分析我国会计信息失真的原因是企业管理层和外部信息使用者各自掌握的信息不对称 ,进而从完善内部约束机制、完善外部监控机制、完善会计准则方面提出规范措施     

信用效应认识的深化与信用秩序的恢复和增强

市场经济从本质上讲是信用经济.在市场经济条件下,信用是最基本的社会经济关系,是整个社会经济得以维系和发展的基础.随着中国经济改革的逐步深入,特别是在加入WTO后,信用的作用逐步显现出来.但是,人们对信用效应的认识还有待深化,尤其是对信用关系紊乱可能带来的负面作用认识得不多,而对信用的积极作用往往习惯于借鉴美欧现成的信用模式.本文从深化对信用效应的认识入手,分析了信用秩序混乱的形成原因,并在简要评价我国信用基本状况的基础上,提出了恢复和增强我国信用秩序的建议.     

浅谈上市公司会计信息披露存在的问题及对策

我国证券市场尚处于逐步发展完善阶段,虽然建立了一些上市公司会计信息披露制度,但还不够健全,存在问题很多,这不利于其健康发展。本文针对上市公司会计信息披露制度中存在的问题,提出了一些对策,进而提高会计信息披露的质量。     

供应链式虚拟经营对“牛鞭效应”的弱化分析

由于信息在供应链的各个企业中不对称,需求出现逐级的放大,产生"牛鞭效应"。在供应链中有选择的建立伙伴关系,采取供应链式虚拟经营有利于"牛鞭效应"的弱化。应认真筛选合作伙伴、加快信息的流通速度及采取VIM等方式来保证供应链式虚拟经营中信息渠道的通畅。     

Keeping Public Institutions Invested in Tobacco

Increasingly through the 1990s, tobacco control advocates questioned the practice of public institutions investing in tobacco company stocks. The questioning was framed in at least three ways. First, is it ethical to fund public expenditures with profits from a product that causes addiction and disease? Second, is it sound social policy to derive public income from a product that increases healthcare costs and reduces worker productivity? Finally, is it sound fiscal policy to invest in an historically profitable industry facing multiplying legal and regulatory challenges? While the tobacco industry preferred to restrict discussion to the fiscal question, and offered an affirmative answer, its position was weakened by depressed stock prices brought on by actions of the industry as much as by tobacco control activism. As part of a campaign to restore its credibility as an investment vehicle with public fund managers, Philip Morris (PM) commissioned a report from the influential investment managers/advisors Wilshire Associates. However, Wilshire had only recently conducted such a study for the Washington State Investment Board (WSIB), assuring the board that the value tobacco stocks added to an investment portfolio – if any – was too small to be measured. Nonetheless, within a year, Wilshire produced a report for PM which appeared to laud the investment value of tobacco and to dismiss tobacco-excluded investment alternatives. This paper examines how Wilshire produced apparently diametrically opposed reports for clients with different interests. It reveals a pattern of potential conflicts of interest among tobacco companies, financial analysis firms, investment authorities, and institutional fund managers. It demonstrates substantial violations of two generally accepted ethical principles of business consulting: veracity and transparency.     

The Costs of Increasing Transparency

In their seminal paper, Morris and Shin (Amer Econ Rev 92(5): 1521–1534, 2002a) argued that increasing the precision of public information is not always beneficial to social welfare. Svensson (Amer Econ Rev 96: 448–451, 2006) however has disputed this by saying that although feasible, the conditions for which this was true, were not all that likely. In that respect, therefore, increasing ‘transparency’ remains most of the times beneficial to social welfare. In this paper, we extend the Morris and Shin attempt by setting it up as an explicit interactive game between the Central Bank, the objectives of which we model explicitly, and the private sector. We show that in the absence of costs, both players benefit from transparency in the manner described previously in the literature, and point the differences in their gains. Following that, we then introduce the fact that increasing transparency comes at some costs and show how both players face incentives to free ride on each other as a result. The presence of costs thus alters the way in which greater transparency is attained.