构建我国个人信用体系保障机制--韩国"坏银行"重整制度考察之思考

我国个人消费信贷近几年的发展十分迅速，但是在个人消费信贷的快速发展中，银行由于个人不良信贷所引发的不良债权比重逐年上升，而且信用环境不良有恶化这一问题的趋势。个人信用制度的建设、个人不良信贷资产的处置和我国个人信用安全体系的构建，已经成为摆在我们面前的现实问题。韩国资产管理公司在处置信用卡公司不良债权中的“坏银行”重整制度，构成了韩国金融安全网络的重要组成部分，这一制度设计值得我们借鉴。     

Deposit insurance and bank regulation in a monetary economy: a general equilibrium exposition

Summary. It is commonly argued that poorly designed banking system safety nets are largely to blame for the frequency and severity of modern banking crises. For example, underpriced deposit insurance and/or low reserve requirements are often viewed as factors that encourage risk-taking by banks. In this paper, we study the effects of three policy variables: deposit insurance premia, reserve requirements and the way in which the costs of bank bailouts are financed. We show that when deposit insurance premia are low, the monetization of bank bailout costs may not be more inflationary than financing these costs out of general revenue. This is because, while monetizing the costs increases the inflation tax rate, higher levels of general taxation reduce savings, deposits, bank reserves, and the inflation tax base. Increasing the inflation tax rate obviously raises inflation, but so does an erosion of the inflation tax base. We also find that low deposit insurance premia or low reserve requirements may not be associated with a high rate of bank failure.Received: 2 January 2002, Revised: 1 March 2003JEL Classification Numbers: D5, E5, G1.B. D. Smith: Sadly, our co-author, colleague and dear friend, Bruce D. Smith, died on July 9, 2002.     

The politics of redistributive social insurance

This paper analyses the political support for a social insurance that includes elements of redistribution when there exists an imperfect private insurance alternative. Individuals differ both in their income and risk. The social insurance is compulsory and charges an income-related contribution with pooling of risks. The private insurance is voluntary and charges a contribution based on individual risks. However due to the adverse selection problem, private insurance companies provide only partial insurance. Adopting a non-expected utility model, we show that there is a general majority support for social insurance and that this support is increasing with risk aversion. We also show that a mixed insurance is politically impossible, regardless of the degree of redistribution of social insurance and the joint distribution of risk and income in the population. Lastly, we analyse how the political support for social insurance is affected by any change in its redistributive component and the possibility of using genetic tests.     

Unemployment dynamics in an OLG economy with public pensions

Pension benefits in old age establish a disincentive to save in youth, thereby yielding lower levels of capital stock and the wage rate. As a result, the trade union has an incentive to change the composition of its two targets: employment and the wage rate. This paper develops a model that includes employment effects of public pensions via capital accumulation and union wage setting. Within this framework, we consider how contribution rates to the pension system influence the level and time path of the unemployment rate. It is demonstrated that (1) a higher contribution rate results in a lower unemployment rate, and (2) the economy with a high (low) contribution rate experiences monotone convergence towards (oscillatory convergence towards or a period-2 cycle around) the steady state. The author would like to thank an anonymous referee, Kazutoshi Miyazawa, and seminar participants at Osaka University for their useful comments and suggestions, and Masako Ikefuji and Hiroaki Yamagami for their research assistance. Financial support from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) through a Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B) (No.17730131), the Asahi Glass Foundation, the Japan Economic Research Foundation and the 21st Century COE Program (Osaka University) is gratefully acknowledged. All remaining errors are mine.     

构建贫困农村养老保障体系的对策研究——基于河北省涞水县的实证分析

本文通过对涞水县3个乡的12个村、362户居民的入户调查，了解了困扰涞水县贫困农民养老的问题所在，并就贫困农村养老保障进行了对策性探讨，旨在帮助贫困农民解决实际的养老问题，同时也为构建贫困农村养老保障体系提供参考。     

基于生命周期的虚拟企业知识活动分析及其伙伴选择过程研究

随着新经济的到来,知识越来越成为企业快速响应市场机遇和获取竞争优势的最短缺资源.而企业自身知识资源的有限性使企业越来越多地采用虚拟企业的高级形态--知识联盟型虚拟企业来弥补企业知识资源的不足以快速响应变化的市场需求.本文首先对知识联盟型虚拟企业的知识缺口类型进行研究和划分,然后分析并描述虚拟企业生命周期各阶段的知识活动;在此基础之上,探讨虚拟企业组建阶段考虑知识要素的伙伴选择过程;最后,针对不同的知识缺口,提出伙伴选择过程的评价指标体系设计中应考虑的知识性因素.     

GAME THEORETIC MODELS OF MIXED OLIGOPOLY

Abstract. In this paper we review various models that have been proposed for the study of mixed oligopoly, that is markets in which private and public firm compete on equal basis using only market instruments.     

Does support from government help firms survive? Evidence on financial and political assistance in China, 1998–2007

ABSTRACT

Using the National Bureau of Statistics data set over the period 1998–2007, this article examines the dual roles of financial assistance and strong political links on firm survival in China by applying a semi-parametric duration model. We find that generally either financial assistance or strong political links had a positive effect on the likelihood of firm survival. Furthermore, if firms received both types of support from government, their survival rate was around two times as high compared to only receiving a single support. The likelihood of survival depended on the amount of assistance a firm received. We also find firm ownership impacts on its survival pattern. Lastly, China joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO) coincided with (cet. par.) higher firm failure, especially with regard to state-owned firms; however, this period also saw the authorities targeting political and financial help on the ‘better’ firms (especially SOEs) with characteristics likely to increase their chance of survival.     

Market Structure and Risk Taking in the Banking Industry

We demonstrate that the common view according to which an increase in competition leads banks to increased risk taking fails to hold in an environment where homogeneous loss averse consumers can choose in which bank to make a deposit based on their knowledge of the riskiness incorporated in the banks outstanding loan portfolios. With an exclusive focus on imperfect competition we find that banks incentives for risk taking are invariant to a change in the banking market structure from duopoly to monopoly. Finally, we show that deposit insurance would eliminate the gains from bank competition when banks use asset quality as a strategic instrument.revised version received October 15, 2003     

家族式治理对公司理财行为的影响机制研究

家族企业已经越来越受到人们的重视。在现有文献的基础上,论文以所有权和控制权为两维对家族企业做了严格的定义和划分,并把研究对象界定在拥有高控制权的家族式企业。通过将家族式治理和公司理财分析范式结合分析,家族式治理中的网络式组织结构、封闭式的股权结构和作为家族意愿体现的董事会治理机制对家族企业理财行为产生影响。家族式治理对公司理财行为产生正面影响,但由于其自身的局限性和家族企业所处环境的变化,家族式理财必须进行变革:非家族化的理财方式变革,家族规则与现代市场游戏规则的融合,引入有效专家理财制度,以及对家族式理财的扬弃。