Optimal portfolio choices using financial leverage

This paper investigates the role of leverage in determining the investor's optimal asset allocation over multiperiod investment horizons. To do this, we allow investors to lever their financial position by borrowing from credit markets. GMM methods are used to estimate and test the optimal portfolio weights and individual's optimal choice of financial leverage. These optimal choices are assumed to be parametric functions of a set of state variables describing the evolution of the economy. The empirical application of this methodology to a portfolio of cash, bonds and stocks reveals that a) financial leverage limits the reaction of investors to changes in the investment opportunity set; b) individuals increase leverage during recessions and deleverage in expansionary periods; c) optimal portfolio weights and financial leverage are negatively related to the degree of investor's risk aversion and positively related to the investment horizon.     

Understanding Bank and Nonbank Credit Cycles: A Structural Exploration

We explore the structural drivers of bank and nonbank credit cycles using a medium-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with two types of financial intermediation. We posit economywide and sectoral disturbances in both macro and financial sectors. We estimate that sectoral shocks to the balance sheets of entrepreneurs are important for fluctuations in bank and nonbank credit growth at the business cycle frequency. Economywide entrepreneurial risk shocks gain predominance for explaining the lower frequency comovement between the two series. Macro shocks play very little role in explaining financial cycles.     

The impact of D&O insurance on excess corporate leverage

The governance effects of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance), an important tool for risk diversification, are of strong concern in the capital market. Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2009 to 2018, we examine the impact of D&O insurance on excess corporate leverage. We find that D&O insurance is negatively associated with excess corporate leverage and that this result is consistent with a series of robustness tests. Further analyses show that D&O insurance impedes excess corporate leverage mainly because of its effect on external monitoring. The effect is more pronounced for firms that are state-owned, have political connections and are located in provinces with low marketization than for other firms.