浅析利率变动对我国股票市场的影响

近年来我国中央银行依据宏观经济变化频繁地调整利率,利率变动对股票市场的运行带来一定的影响。本文在理论分析的基础上,结合我国的实际情况,通过实证分析方法对这一问题进行了简要阐述。     

管理者过度自信与企业过度负债

本文从权衡理论和非理性管理者出发,以企业过度负债而非企业实际负债率的角度,重新衡量企业资本结构与管理者过度自信之间的关系.研究发现:管理者过度自信会导致企业过度负债,加重企业债务负担.进一步研究发现,在融资约束较低和资本市场环境较好的情况下,过度自信的管理者会加重企业负债的程度;同时在多个大股东的股权结构下,大股东容易与过度自信的管理者形成共谋,恶化企业过度负债程度,而外资大股东则能起到监督和制衡的作用,约束管理者的激进行为.本文一定程度上丰富了资本结构和管理者过度自信的研究,对于推进"去杠杆"和实现经济软着陆有较强的政策意义.     

The funding of subsidiaries equity,double leverage and the risk of bank holding companies

Banking groups exploit double leverage when ‘debt is issued by the parent company and the proceeds are invested in subsidiaries as equity’. Financial authorities have frequently raised concerns about the issue of double leverage because this type of intra‐firm financing appears to allow for both the arbitrage of capital and the assumption of risk. This article focuses on the relationship between double leverage and risk‐taking within banking groups. First, we discuss this relationship based on an examination of balance sheet figures. Second, we analyze a large sample of United States Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) from 1990–2014. The results show that BHCs are more prone to risk when they increase their double leverage, namely, when the stake of the parent within subsidiaries is larger than the stand‐alone capital of the parent. This paper's primary implication for policymakers is that the regulators of complex financial entities should more efficiently address the issue of double leverage, thereby limiting the potential negative consequences that arise from corporate instability.     

Do cash flow imbalances facilitate leverage adjustments of Chinese listed firms? Evidence from a dynamic panel threshold model

This paper investigates the asymmetric impact of cash flow on firms’ leverage adjustments. We use a dynamic panel threshold model and estimate it with a newly-developed first-difference GMM approach, which allows endogeneity in both threshold variable and regressors. Employing data of 1054 Chinese listed firms during 2004–2016, we show that Chinese listed firms have leverage targets, towards which they adjust at an average speed of 25.9%. Moreover, firms with larger absolute cash flow adjust towards their leverage targets significantly faster than those with smaller absolute cash flow. This finding is robust to a post-financial crisis sample period, alternative measures of leverage and cash flow, and the incorporation of an additional control variable. We find evidence that cash flow imbalances facilitate leverage adjustments by reducing adjustment costs, and Chinese listed firms rely more on debt issues. These findings provide new insights on firms’ leverage adjustment and cash flow management.     

官员晋升激励、债务杠杆与企业技术创新

以2007-2016 年沪深的非金融上市公司为样本，研究了地级市官员晋升如何影响企业的 债务杠杆，以及这种债务杠杆又如何进一步影响技术创新。研究发现：地方官员的晋升压力越大， 企业更容易获得债务融资，但这种债务杠杆更容易抑制企业的技术创新；进一步，官员晋升激励 下债务杠杆对技术创新的这种抑制效应在官员的长任期组中更为明显；债务杠杆对企业技术创新 的负面影响也因债务结构而存在差异，即当官员晋升压力越大，短期债务杠杆越不利于技术创新 投入，而长期债务杠杆则不利于技术创新产出。     

The effectiveness of economic sanctions with application to the case of Iraq

In a recent article, San Ling Lam (1990) used a probit estimation technique to re-examine the conclusions of Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (1985) regarding the effectiveness of economic sanctions in achieving foreign policy goals. While Lam's criticisms of the HSE methodology are valid, the results of the model developed here differ in lending support to the HSE conclusions. In addition, the model can be used to predict the probability of sanctions contributing to a peaceful resolution of the recent Middle East crisis. The predicted probabilities of success in the Iraq case were above average and well above 50 percent.     

宏观审慎政策是否推动了企业去杠杆？——基于沪深A股上市公司的实证分析

依据2007—2019年中国沪深两市A股非金融上市公司年度财务数据,运用多元线性回归模型,考察宏观审慎政策和企业杠杆率之间的作用关系。结果表明：适度从紧的宏观审慎政策有利于降低企业杠杆率,受企业特征和地区金融结构异质性影响,非国有控股、规模较小、非过度负债状态企业及金融结构化程度较高地区更为明显;进一步分析发现,宏观审慎政策通过银行信贷渠道和资产价格渠道影响企业杠杆率,其中非国有控股及小规模企业受影响更深。因此,应优化宏观审慎政策对企业杠杆率的调节方式,加强宏观审慎政策结构性监管与跨部门监管,提高宏观审慎政策的有效性和针对性。     

Informational leverage: the problem of noise traders

The literature suggests that security design can be used to manipulate the information content of securities prices [what is referred to as the “informational leverage effect” in Boot and Thakor (J Finance 48, 1349–1378, 1993)]. The informational leverage effect arises in this literature in a market microstructure environment in which noise trade is exogenous, which is a fairly standard assumption dating back to the framework developed in Grossman and Stiglitz (Am Econ Rev 70, 393–408, 1980). This assumption is relaxed in our paper, and we show that the informational effects described in the related literature become less clear cut when noise trading activity is endogenous. We find that the intensity and direction of these effects depends crucially on the parameters describing the modeling environment. The elegant point of the informational leverage literature is that these effects arise largely independently of such parameters, but with endogenous noise trading that is no longer true. This literature may, therefore, lead to too strong conclusions being drawn about the relationship between information revelation and security design. We are very grateful for the helpful comments made by an anonymous referee.     

基于资金循环流动视角的结构性杠杆与金融脆弱性——理论框架与中国实践

基于资金循环视角,从杠杆率定义推导出资产收益率是连接微观杠杆率与宏观杠杆率的纽带,进而从理论上论证我国经济部门结构性微观杠杆率差异在于各部门之间的资产收益率的差异。依据该理论考察我国现实杠杆率结构,结果发现:当前我国一些部门与行业的现实杠杆率与理论分析相悖,造成了资金的错配,严重冲击了我国金融体系的稳定性,加大了我国金融体系的脆弱性。因此,在保稳定、防风险政策实施过程中要精准识别不同部门、不同领域杠杆率的性质,科学施策,避免“一刀切”的金融去杠杆。     

Lateral hiring and the performance of professional service firms: the moderating effects of leverage ratio

We theorized and tested the performance implications of the lateral hiring by professional service firms (i.e. law firms). Using a longitudinal dataset of lateral partner hires in 148 US law firms between the years of 2004 and 2008, the results indicated that the size of lateral hiring had a reversed U-shape relationship with the financial performance of a firm. In addition, the leverage ratio (i.e. the ratio between associate lawyers and partners) significantly moderated the reversed U-shape relationship between lateral hiring and firm performance, such that the placement of the bend in the curvilinear relationship, that is, the threshold, occurred more quickly at a low than at a high leverage ratio. This study contributes to the literature on strategic human resource management in professional service firms by providing empirical evidence on the effect of lateral hires and by emphasizing that lateral partner hiring should be considered with other important HR issues to fully capitalize lateral partners.