Differences in managerial discretion across countries: how nation‐level institutions affect the degree to which ceos matter

The concept of managerial discretion provides a theoretical fulcrum for resolving the debate about whether chief executive officers (CEOs) have much influence over company outcomes. In this paper, we operationalize and further develop the construct of managerial discretion at the national level. In an empirical examination of 15 countries, we find that certain informal and formal national institutions—individualism, tolerance of uncertainty, cultural looseness, dispersed firm ownership, a common‐law legal origin, and employer flexibility—are associated with the degree of managerial discretion available to CEOs of public firms in a country. In turn, we show that country‐level managerial discretion is associated with how much impact CEOs have on the performance of their firms. We also find that discretion mediates the relationship between national institutions and CEO effects on firm performance. Finally, we discuss two inductively derived institutional themes: autonomy orientation and risk orientation. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

基于熵理论的企业组织创新分析

企业组织在发展过程中，随着规模的扩大，其轨迹呈现出从有序到无序的内在演变过程，因而通过组织创新。引导企业不断创造效能，吸收负熵流、减少正熵流，促进管理耗散结构的形成，对推动企业可持续发展尤为重要。我们从管理熵和管理耗散这一视角出发，对组织创新规律进行全新的霖索，并以此为基点，研究组织创新的内涵与特点，对组织创新的稳定性进行定量分析，最后提出导入管理负熵和建立耗散结构的措施。     

Innovation objectives,knowledge sources,and the benefits of breadth

Given the inherent risk of innovative activity, firms can improve the odds of success by pursuing multiple parallel objectives. Because innovation draws on many sources of ideas, firms also may improve their odds of successful innovation by accessing a large number of knowledge sources. In this study, we conduct one of the first firm‐level statistical analyses of the impact on innovation of breadth in both innovation objectives and knowledge sources. The empirical results suggest that broader horizons with respect to innovation objectives and knowledge sources are associated with successful innovation. We do not find diminishing returns to breadth in innovation objectives, which suggests that firms may tend to search too narrowly. We interpret these results in light of well‐known cognitive biases toward searching in relatively familiar domains. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

管理层持股、股权集中度与公司资本结构——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文以1176家上市公司为样本,实证检验了资本结构与股权结构之间的关系。实证结果表明:①管理层持股比例与负债率负相关,但不显著;②较高的股权集中度导致高的负债率;③管理层持股比例与公司债务之间的关联性不受公司股权集中度影响;④股权集中度与公司债务之间的关联性受管理层持股比例的影响;⑤管理层持股比例和股权集中度的相互作用能够调节股权与资本结构之间的关系。本文得出了许多有助于诠释资本结构之谜的结论。     

试论“治道”与中国管理哲学

本文针对牟宗三先生所提出的“政道”与“治道”说,考察了中国传统思想史中“治道”概念的内涵,认为所谓“治道”,其广义的指涉范围包括了中国古代学者们针对如何治理国家的问题所提出的理论、学说、思想等构成的以“治国平天下”为宗旨的知识体系。从管理哲学的角度,研究中国传统治道思想,也是可能的。     

Relevant and Preferred Public Service: A study of user experiences and value creation in public transit

When public service success is dependent upon creating value that attracts users, public managers can benefit from adopting private sector principles. This article draws on the theory of attractive quality and strategic management research to focus on the theoretical and managerial implications of how organizations’ resource allocations affect user experiences. The present study shows how public transit organizations’ achievement of twenty-five different service requirements affected their offerings’ relevance and preference among 930 users. This article increases the understanding of how strategic choices and prioritization between various service requirements affect both the effectiveness and efficiency of (public) service offerings.     

上市公司管理层薪酬与公司绩效的关系研究--以电子行业为样本

我国上市公司高层管理人员的激励问题一直是各方关注的焦点。本文运用我国电子类上市公司连续三年的经验数据来考察高层管理人员薪酬与公司经营绩效的关系。研究结果表明,我国电子类上市公司高级管理人员的年度货币薪酬与公司经营绩效并不存在显著的正相关关系,与第一大股东是否为国有股也无相关性,但与企业规模存在显著的正相关关系。     

工程建设项目战略灵活性的实物期权评价

为了进一步提高项目价值,项目经理必须认识项目规划和管理的不确定性。传统的工程项目规划、预算和管理往往认为不确定性降低了项目的价值,并没有从中充分地挖掘增加项目价值的机会。实物期权方法就是利用战略灵活性来识别和把握在动态不确定中所隐蔽的项目价值。通过一个高速公路项目的案例来展示实物期权方法所带来的管理灵活性对评价和选择战略的重要意义。还讨论了实物期权应用中的一些问题,指出了今后研究的方向。     

Competition,strategic delegation and delay in technology adoption

This paper examines how strategic managerial delegation affects firms' timing of adoption of a new technology under different modes of product market competition. It demonstrates that strategic delegation has differential impacts on adoption dates under Cournot and Bertrand competitions. Strategic delegation with ‘own-performance’-based incentive schemes always leads to early adoption in markets with Bertrand competition compared to that under no-delegation, but not necessarily so in markets with Cournot competition. It also shows that under strategic delegation with ‘own-performance’-based incentive schemes, adoption occurs earlier (later) in markets with Cournot competition than in markets with Bertrand competition, if the degree of product differentiation is high (low). In contrast, under strategic delegation with ‘relative-performance’-based incentive schemes, adoption dates do not differ across markets with different modes of competition. It also analyses implications of firms' choice over types of managerial incentive schemes on the speed of diffusion of new technology.     

Corporate governance structure and product market competition

This article assesses the effects of the competitive structure of a product market on a firm’s corporate governance structure. Our model demonstrates that shareholders strategically determine the corporate governance structure, including the manager’s stock ownership and his controlling power over the firm, in order to maximize their utility in the product market competition. We find that the manager’s stock ownership is lower and his controlling power over the firm is higher when the firm’s product is more profitable or when competition within the product market is more severe. The inefficiency of the wealth transfer from shareholders to the manager also affects the corporate governance structure.