浅谈培养和提高学生数学建模能力的对策

数学建模是一种数学思想方法,可以帮助学生灵活地综合地应用所学的知识来处理和解决一些现实生活中的问题.文章首先对数学建模的步骤、数学建模能力作了介绍;接着分析学生在数学建模中存在的问题,并针对问题提出培养和提高学生数学建模能力的对策.     

电子商务实训课程教学改革与探索

高职院校电子商务实训课程教学应增加实战训练环节,通过Internet网上电子商务的交易开展实战训练,使学生真正掌握电子商务交易的流程,培养其成为电子商务行业的职业操手。     

股票交易的数学模型分析

股票投资要慎重决策,公司的基本面即公司的发展状况是股票价格的重要依据。用预测公司的每股利润的增长率来预测股价的未来走势,建立相关的数学模型,算出股价变动期望值与方差,依据数值的大小来决策买入卖出,这是较为可行的股票交易决策方法。同时也可参考成交量的变化来决策买入卖出的时机。     

由《多面体欧拉定理》教学案例试探数学史的教育价值

数学文化不仅指数学知识,还指数学精神、数学思维方法、研究方法等,数学所具有的独特文化内涵,对学生的思想,道德和观念的发生、发展有着重大的影响,本文从《多面体欧拉定理》这节课出发探讨了数学史的教育价值:纯真自然的教育价值,思想方法的教育价值,积极的情感教育价值。     

基于ATIS下的鲁棒连续交通网络设计问题

考虑基于ATIS下的连续交通网络设计问题,假定网络上交通需求不确定,但属于一个有界椭球闭集,应用鲁棒优化的方法建立基于ATIS下的连续交通网络设计的鲁棒模型,然后应用需求生成的算法求解此模型,数值算例表明鲁棒设计方案更加可靠。     

基于数学期望的采购风险管理决策分析

风险决策中的期望值法是处理风险决策问题的常用方法。借助于期望值法,结合某企业的案例数据,对如何实现物流采购的最优化进行风险决策分析,并对最优方案进行了稳定性分析。     

Experimental internet auctions with random information retrieval

We run an experiment where 97 subjects could retrieve records of completed past auctions before placing their bids in current one-bid, two-bid, and auction-selection games. Each subject was asked to participate in 3 current auctions; but could retrieve up to 60 records of completed (past) auctions. The results reveal a positive relation between the payoffs earned by the subjects and their history-inspection effort. Subjects act as if responding to the average bidding-ratios of the winners in the samples that they have retrieved. They apply intuitive signal-dependent stopping rules like “sample until observing a winner-value close to my won” or “find a close winner-value and try one more history” when sampling the databases. History-inspection directs bidders with relatively high private-valuations to moderate bidding which increases their realized payoffs. (JEL C9 D4 D8) Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C93, D44, D83     

A network experiment in continuous time: The influence of link costs

In recent work on non-cooperative network formation star-shaped networks play an important role. In a particular theoretical model of Bala and Goyal (2000) center-sponsored stars are the only strict Nash networks. In testing this theoretical model, Falk and Kosfeld (2003) do not find experimental evidence that players select the center-sponsored star. Based on a slight modification of Bala and Goyal’s model, we design a network formation experiment in which, depending on link costs, periphery-sponsored stars and the empty network are the only strict Nash networks. We observe that almost all groups not only reach a strict Nash network once but also switch the center player in periphery-sponsored stars several times. The main innovation in our experiment is to use a continuous time framework which we believe to be a more realistic setting to study behavior in network formation situations and which makes coordination on stars much easier than simultaneous strategy adaptation in discrete time. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9125-1. JEL Classification C72 · C92 · D81     

基于建构主义的高职微积分教学方法探讨

微积分是高职院校一门非常重要的基础课程,是学生学习专业课程的基础和工具。传统的微积分教学基本上是传授型,重理论轻应用,忽视概念产生的实际背景和方法的实际应用,学生学起来感到困难,学了不知道如何用于解决实际问题。该从微积分的内容、教材的编写、教师的教学、学生的学习态度与方法四个方面分析了当前微积分教学中存在的问题,提出以建构主义学习理论为指导对微积分的教学进行改革,对从微积分发展史出发建构教学内容、以问题为中心组织教学、利用计算机进行微积分概念的辅助教学、注重数学建模能力的培养等教学方法进行了探讨。     

A Backward Induction Experiment

This paper reports experiments with one-stage and two-stage alternating-offers bargaining games. Payoff-interdependent preferences have been suggested as an explanation for experimental results that are commonly inconsistent with players' maximizing their monetary payoffs and performing backward induction calculations. We examine whether, given payoff-interdependent preferences, players respect backward induction. To do this, we break backward induction into its components, subgame consistency and truncation consistency. We examine each by comparing the outcomes of two-stage bargaining games with one-stage games with varying rejection payoffs. We find and characterize systematic violations of both subgame and truncation consistency. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C78.