Generating Enhanced Fishery Rents by Internalizing Product Quality Characteristics

This paper demonstrates howadditional rents are generated in a fisherycharacterized by intraseasonal variation infish characteristics, including size,condition, and composition. Based on anexpanded conceptual model of the optimalharvest rule, fish characteristics affect preand post harvest production yields and outputprices. A dynamic empirical model, which uses asystem of quality characteristics and anhedonic equation, illustrates the complexrelationships and management choices associatedwith internalizing seafood qualitycharacteristics in a hake fishery. The modelretains the regulated open access managementsystem, but controls intertemporal andintersectoral quotas, production portfolios,and total allowable catch. Results demonstratethat including revenue-side effects frominternalizing fish quality can generatesignificantly greater rents and reduce therelative benefits of increased productionyields. If excluded, bioeconomic models canunderestimate the level of regulatory rentdissipation and overemphasize managementobjectives such as full utilization, whichcould misdirect processing decisions and resultin a suboptimal resource management plan.Implications for data collection,multidisciplinary analysis, and improvements inmarine resource management are discussed.     

The Marshallian macroeconomic model: A progress report

In this progress report, we first indicate the origins and early development of the Marshallian macroeconomic model (MMM) and briefly review some of our past empirical forecasting experiments with the model. Then we present recently developed one-sector, two-sector and n-sector models of an economy that can be employed to explain past experience, predict future outcomes and analyze policy problems. The results of simulation experiments with various versions of the model are provided to illustrate some of its dynamic properties that include “chaotic” features. Last, we present comments on planned future work with the model.     

试论二元经济形态下的会计模式

本文分析了在知识经济兴起的环境下我国现行会计模式存在的缺陷,并根据知识经济发展的历程以及我国目前工业经济与知识经济并存的现状,提出了一种能适应两种经济形态的兼容性会计模式,最后指出了目前实施该模式尚存在的制约因素。     

浅析高校后勤财务管理

高校后勤财务管理存在资产流失严重、收入与成本费用核算不够规范、财务管理制度不够完善、工作效率不高等问题，应采取理顺关系、改变观念、建章立制、规范管理、转变职能、加强队伍建设等措施予以完善。     

中国商业银行市场结构分析——基于Panzar-Rosse模型

运用Panzar--Rosse模型这一国际上前沿的市场结构判定方法，分析中国商业银行的市场结构，发现其目前正处于垄断竞争状态，垄断性较强。在此基础上本文提出了降低市场准入门槛、改善市场竞争环境的政策措施。     

中国工业化进程与劳动力就业关系研究综述

工业化进程的加速推进与劳动力就业在一定程度上是存在矛盾的,国内外众多专家学者对这一问题也做了相应研究。文章分别从加速工业化进程对劳动力就业的抑制、促进和新型工业化与劳动力就业三方面对现有文献进行了梳理,并进行了评述,为进一步研究提供了理论基础和研究空间。今后进一步研究的方向主要是工业化进程与劳动力就业相互影响的内部机理,以为合理工业化路径选择和有效的劳动力就业模式提供理论支持。     

"双主型"大学英语教学模式研究

双主教学模式是一种能有效发挥教师主导作用和学生主体作用的教学模式.采用这种教学模式,可以有效地发挥学生思维能力、培养其综合应用能力.在现代信息技术手段日益获得提高的今天,充分利用网络资源的辅助作用,建立双主型大学外语教学模式,是高校大学英语教学改革的一种尝试.     

企业持续成长模式探讨——“变异”与持续成长

本文讨论了企业的持续成长模式．在借鉴生物生存机理的基础上．提出了“前变异”与“后变异”的概念．认为“前变异”是企业获取突破性技术的基本模式．“前变异”具有随机性和无指向性的特点．企业中大量存在的非分工合作是产生“前变异”的基础。     

Relative Guarantees

Many real-world financial contracts have some sort of minimum rate of return guarantee included. One class of these guarantees is so-called relative guarantees, i.e., guarantees where the minimum guaranteed rate of return is given as a function of the stochastic return on a reference portfolio. These guarantees are the topic of this paper. We analyse a wide range of different functional specifications for the minimum guaranteed rate of return, hereunder both so-called maturity and multi-period guarantees. Several closed form solutions are presented.     

Competition and Information Production in Market Maker Models

Abstract:   The microstructure literature models the mechanisms through which fundamental information is incorporated into market prices. This paper extends previous models by endogenising information production and analysing incentives for costly information production. In contrast to the existing literature, increasing the number of informed traders can result in reduced price informativeness. When prices have an allocative role this has welfare consequences: the regulatory implications of a dichotomy between private and public incentives for information gathering are discussed.