浅析商业银行对企业贷款中的道德风险问题

商业银行如何防范企业信贷中的道德风险一直倍受关注。先通过一个模型分析了企业偿贷中存在的道德风险及激励的作用，然后举例说明，最后给出了相应的建议。     

新时期加强高职院校德育工作的几点思考

通过对新时期加强高职院校德育工作的必要性和重要性的分析,提出以创新德育理念为先导、以延伸和优化德育途径和方法为突破、以提高德育工作队伍素质为保障,努力开创德育工作的新局面。     

校园信息化对高校德育的影响与教育对策

大学校园的信息化创造了一个新的德育环境 ,为培养大学生的现代文化精神 ,实现德育目标 ,提高德育效果提供了良好的机遇 ;同时 ,校园的信息化也增加了社会主义理想信念教育的难度 ,使学校德育面临着新的挑战。面对新的形势 ,我们必须树立新的德育观念 ,拓展新的多媒体式德育途径 ,探索新的主体性德育模式     

制度在经济绩效中的作用

中央计划经济的绩效与市场经济的绩效有显著性的差异，产权和资源配置方式的差异是决定不同经济体系经济绩效差异最为重要的因素。制度是经济体中经济个体博弈的基本规则。市场经济比中央计划经济提供了更强的激励．从而更有效地减轻了道德风险带来的效率损失，所以从消费者福利来看，市场经济比中央计划经济更有效。在一定的条件下，无论是从产出还是从消费者的福利来看，市场经济都比中央计划经济更有效率。     

Double Moral Hazard,Monitoring, and the Nature of Contracts

generalized double-sided moral-hazard model, with risk-averse parties who mutually monitor each other (to get a reasonable idea of outcome/effort). The model considers trade-off between monitoring costs and moral hazard costs, which are endogenously determined by the extent of monitoring. Using this model, we formally prove a generalized version of Coase's conjecture – that the optimal contract minimizes the agency and risk costs. We then show how varying assumptions about the feasibility or cost of monitoring of the outcome or the worker's effort lead to different contracts being optimal. The analysis is then used to explain the nature of contracts observed in practice under many different situations. We will give an explanation as to why industrial workers typically work under wage contracts, while share contracts are common in agriculture and will explain why profit sharing is more common for senior managers than for the production workers. Received September 19, 2000; revised version received October 30, 1997     

Incentive Contract and Weather Risk

We study contracts designed to remunerate a farmer for the production of an ecosystem service with the payment dependent on the results of the farmer’s actions and on weather conditions. Two contracts are proposed: the first takes into account both the results of the farmer’s actions and a weather variable that reflects the actual atmospheric conditions during the life of the contract; the second bases the payment on the results alone incorporating only the average effect of weather. Social welfare is optimal when both the results and the specific atmospheric conditions are taken into account; however, this type of contract may be less acceptable to the farmer due to his perception of the level of risk involved.We thank two referees for valuable comments.     

道德风险存在下董事责任保险市场的保费水平分析

本文通过对董事责任保险市场的介绍,指出在董事责任保险市场中存在着严重的道德风险问题,通过对市场中保险双方行为的博弈分析,得到在道德风险存在下的保费变动范围,并指出防止或减轻董事责任保险市场中道德风险的方法.     

浅谈建设项目招投标无标底报价的投标机制选择

无标底的投标机制有利于形成有效的市场竞争环境,能鼓励各建筑承包企业提高管理水平、降低生产成本、提高生产水平.应用信息经济学中的信息不对称理论分析了建设项目招投标过程中的信息不对称,并在此基础上建立了基于委托代理关系的建设项目招投标模型,并探索较合理的投标机制.     

风险投资家的最优激励契约模型研究--一种基于逆向选择和道德风险条件下的博弈模型分析

为减少风险投资融资中风险投资家的逆向选择和道德风险,风险投资者必须设立一套有效的激励机制来让风险投资家选择,从而根据风险投资家选择的结果来甄别其真实能力类型,同时又能激励其努力工作。文章建立了风险投资家能力类型和努力都是不可观测条件下的最优激励契约模型,并根据显示原理,利用最优控制理论求出了最优解进而进行了分析。得出的结论是:最优激励契约能使高能力风险投资家乐于选择具有高强度激励、低固定收入和风险小的项目,同时又能激励其签约后更加努力工作。     

Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden

If a regulator is unable to measure firms’ individual emissions, an ambient tax can be used to achieve the socially desired level of pollution. With this tax, each firm pays a unit tax on aggregate emissions. In order for the tax to be effective, firms must recognize that their decisions affect aggregate emissions. When firms behave strategically with respect to the tax-setting regulator, under plausible circumstances their tax burden is lower under an ambient tax, relative to the tax which charges firms on the basis of individual emissions. Firms may prefer the case where the regulator is unable to observe individual firm emissions, even if this asymmetric information causes the regulator to tax each firm on the basis of aggregate emissions.