Moral Hazard, Inspection Policy, and Food Safety

Buyers have imperfect information about the food safety efforts exerted by suppliers. To gather information about safety, buyers often employ sampling inspection. Sampling inspection exhibits sampling error so some unsafe product passes inspection and some safe product does not. This uncertainty influences buyer and supplier behavior. In this article, I use a principal–agent model to examine how sampling inspection policies influence food safety. I use the model to examine the sampling inspection policies in the 1996 Pathogen Reduction/Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point Act. I conclude that the regulation of sampling inspection procedures is an effective tool for policy makers who wish to improve food safety.     

第三方物流道德风险监督机制的博弈分析

以货主企业与第三方物流企业合作中存在的道德风险为出发点，构建了双方共同承担监督成本的监督机制模型，通过博弈分析得出：货主企业应将惩罚金和监督成本控制在一定范围内，同时应适当逐步加大固定监督成本的投入。     

Corporate Moral Responsibility: What Can We Infer from Our Understanding of Organisations?

The question of corporate moral responsibility – whether corporate bodies can be held morally responsible for their actions – has been debated by a number of writers since the 1970s. This discussion is intended to add to that debate, and focuses for that purpose on our understanding of the organisation. Though the integrity of the organisation has been called into question by the postmodern view of organisations, that view does not necessarily rule out the attribution of corporate agency, any more than the postmodern view of the person rules out the attribution of individual agency. The postmodern view is opposed to a reifying, metaphysical view of corporate agency, but a semantic view of corporate agency would seem to sit more comfortably with it. A bigger problem for the idea of corporate moral responsibility arises from the fact that in Kantian terms organisations are not ends in themselves. In that sense they are not like persons, and this must limit their autonomy, and their responsibility. This aspect of organisations also limits their punishability. For these reasons corporate moral responsibility must be seen as more limited than the responsibility of persons.     

美国政府对问题金融机构注资制度的演变及借鉴

本文考察了美国对问题银行注资救助制度的演变及不断完善过程,并对制度内涵及机理进行了研究.政府对濒临倒闭问题金融机构注资救助就是政府干预、防止金融风险扩散的一种手段,但这种手段在制度不健全的情况下也很容易被滥用.滥用会导致个别金融机构将风险向政府转嫁、增加纳税人的负担,同时对市场机制具有很大破坏作用.美国在防止政府干预滥用的制度建设上取得了许多成功经验,这些经验对我国目前正在启动的政府对证券公司的注资具有非常重要的借鉴意义.     

大学生的思想道德建设应注意的几个问题

大学生思想道德建设摄应注意以下几个问题：一是注重到的评价与道德的实践；二是营造有利于道德文明建设的德育环境；三是构建良好的校园文化；四是加强对大学生思想道德教育的方式。     

Insider Ownership and Risk–taking Behaviour at Bank Holding Companies

This paper investigates the relationship between bank ownership structure and risk–taking. We find robust evidence that the greater risk taking incentives of stockholder controlled banks (compared to managerially controlled banks) are more pronounced for the set of banks with larger asset size, lower stock–return volatility, and lower balance–sheet–risk characteristics. Considering that the probability of failure for these banks is relatively low, these results may suggest that the efficacy of insider ownership in mitigating the agency problem could be affected by the costs perceived by the managers associated with aligning their interests with outside stockholders (i.e., the expected loss of benefits from control of the firm in the event of failure).     

Do IMF and IBRD Cause Moral Hazard and Political Business Cycles? Evidence from Panel Data

Using panel data for 94 countries in 1975–97, we estimate OLS, 2SLS and GMM regressions to explain IMF and IBRD lending as well as monetary and fiscal policies in the recipient countries. With respect to moral hazard, we find that a country's government budget deficit and its rate of monetary expansion are higher the larger its borrowing potential in the Fund. New net lending of the Bank (relative to GDP) raises monetary expansion but lowers budget deficits of the recipient countries while new net credit from the Fund is associated with less expansionary policies. As for political business cycles, our evidence indicates that new net credits from the IMF are significantly larger prior to elections and that borrowing from the IBRD is significantly smaller after elections.     

Moral Hazard and the Market for Used Automobiles

I examine a moral hazard problem faced by the owners offleet automobiles. Because fleet vehicles are generally notdriven by their owners, the drivers of these vehicles do not bearall of the costs of either neglecting or abusing the vehicle, causingthese vehicles to depreciate faster than owner-operated vehicles. Empirical estimates show that, after controlling for mileage, fleetvehicles depreciate approximately ten to thirteen percent fasterper-year than owner-driven vehicles. I argue that at least partof this increased depreciation is attributable to moral hazard.     

Ethics Through an Entrepreneurial Lens: Theory and Observation

Recent work in the fields of ethics and entrepreneurship has raised the possibility that entrepreneurs may differ from other individuals in the moral issues they face, in their moral judgements and behaviors concerning those issues, and even in their level of cognitive moral development. While this work has been exploratory and its conclusions tentative, the findings raise two interesting questions: do entrepreneurs actually differ from non-entrepreneurs in their ethical orientations and, if so, why? We propose a model of ethical decision making for small business entrepreneurs. We suggest some ways in which the ethical framework of entrepreneurs may differ systematically from that of other business people and propose some areas for future research.