Delegation and polarization of platforms in political competition

Summary. We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters. The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates is feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued formally here that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized. Received: January 10, 2002; revised version: May 8, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We thank Alberto Alesina, Levent Ko?kesen, Antonio Merlo, Ronny Razin, Vijay Krishna, Alessandro Lizzeri, and seminar participants at Alicante, Columbia, Copenhagen, and NYU for helpful comments. We also thank an anonymous referee for its useful suggestions. A good fraction of this research was conducted while Ok was a visitor in the Department of Economics at University of Alicante; he thanks for the kind hospitality of this institution. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant CICYT BEC2001-0535 (Faulí-Oller) and BEC2001-0980 (Ortu?o-Ortín). Correspondence to:I. Ortu?o-Ortin     

The evolution of competition in innovation resource: a theoretical study based on Lotka–Volterra model

This research uses the Lotka–Volterra model to analyse the competition of innovation resource between two enterprises and studies the dynamic effects of environmental changes through the change of model parameters. The research finds that there are three possible results of the competition in innovation resource. That comprises ‘crowding out effect’, ‘unstable equilibrium’ and ‘stable equilibrium’. The results of competitive evolution are determined by enterprises’ interaction parameters. However, the natural growth rates, the initial resource possessions of both enterprises and the amount of regional innovation resource have a significant impact on the evolution of competition.     

False claims in politics: Evidence from the US

In this paper, we use data on 2459 public claims made by 444 politicians from the leading US fact-checking site (PolitiFact) to provide an empirical analysis of false claims in politics, shedding light on their characteristics within an advanced democracy. The frequency of falsehoods differs according to party affiliation and topic, with false claims more likely on such topics as elections, health, labor, taxes and values. For Republican politicians, falsehood pays off in the short run, as it is associated with greater political support.     

Are microfinance markets monopolistic?

Do microfinance institutions (MFIs) operate in a monopoly, monopolistic competition environment or are their revenues derived under perfect competition markets? We employ the Panzar–Rosse revenue test on a global panel data to assess the competitive environment in which MFIs of five selected countries operate: Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Peru and Philippines, over the period 2005–2009. We estimate the static and the dynamic revenue tests, with analyses of the interest rate and the return on assets. We control for microfinance-specific variables such as capital-assets-ratio, loans-assets and the size of the MFI. The analyses also account for the endogeneity problem by employing the fixed-effects two-stage least squares and the fixed-effects system generalized method of moments. Our results suggest that MFIs in Peru and India operate in a monopolistic environment. We also find weak evidence that the microfinance industry in Ecuador, Indonesia and Philippines may operate under perfect competition.     

STRATEGIC EXPORT POLICY IN VERTICALLY RELATED MARKETS

This paper analyses how strategic export policies are affected by introducing an imperfectly competitive intermediate good into a Bertrand duopoly model with product differentiation, where a home and a foreign final‐good firm export to a third‐country market. It is shown that when the home and foreign markets for the intermediate good are segmented, the optimal export policy towards the final good is a tax. In contrast, under integrated markets, the optimal export intervention is a subsidy. Whether bilateral export intervention is welfare improving compared with free trade, depends on the degree of product differentiation between the home and foreign final goods.     

THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT POLICY ON TOBACCO ADVERTISING STRATEGIES

This paper contributes to the very limited literature examining the factors determining tobacco companies' advertising strategies. The paper explores whether firms in the UK tobacco market significantly changed their advertising expenditure in the face of proposed changes to the UK and European Commission tobacco advertising legislation. The results suggest that changes in legislation have little impact on firms' advertising strategies for existing brands, but that legislative changes impact upon product launch dates. Our results also offer some information on the nature of firm interdependencies in the UK tobacco industry.     

Price versus quantity in a mixed duopoly with foreign penetration

We characterize the endogenous competition structure (in prices or quantities) in a differentiated duopoly between a public firm that maximizes domestic welfare and a private firm that can be owned by domestic or foreign investors. The market for which they compete can be domestic or integrated: in the first case Bertrand competition emerges endogenously and in the second case Cournot competition can emerge if the fraction of domestic consumers in the integrated market is low enough. We also determine the optimal degree of foreign penetration showing the optimality of a partial foreign ownership. Finally, we extend the model to increasing marginal cost confirming the robustness of the results.     

我国移动通信产业的市场结构与规制改革

双寡头垄断是我国当前移动通信市场的格局。在移动通信行业打破独家垄断、促进竞争的规制改革初期,为争夺市场份额,中国联通有进行价格竞争的动机,价格竞争可以带动其他方面业务竞争,这样的市场格局能够增进社会福利。但随着中国联通和中国移动在市场份额上逐渐接近,价格竞争的动机不再明显,进行"默契串谋"的动机增强。同时,技术的进步和市场需求量的增加也使得双寡头的市场竞争格局不再是最有效的,构建一个三寡头有效竞争的市场格局应成为我国移动通信市场规制改革的取向。     

Bidding for Firms with Unknown Characteristics

When a region successfully attracts a firm by offering subsidies, the firm often commits itself to performance targets in terms of employment. In this paper, we interpret these firm‐specific targets as a consequence of incomplete information. We analyze a model of two regions that compete for a firm, assuming that the firm's productivity is ex ante unknown. We show that performance targets often induce overemployment in high‐productivity firms, and that tax credits are often superior to lump‐sum payments. Moreover, when regions differ in wage rates, the low‐wage region wins the bid and has a higher surplus than under complete information. Finally, we show that, under incomplete information, bidding might not lead to efficient firm location.     

Determinants of the allocative,cost and scope efficiencies of Indian banks

ABSTRACT

This study aims to investigate the impact of competition on determinants of allocative, scope and cost efficiencies of Indian scheduled commercial banks (SCBs). Specifically, the study, analyzes the impact of the second round of licensing on the efficiency of Indian SCBs. This is the first paper to measure scope efficiency of Indian banks and analyze its determinants. A two-stage analysis is performed on a balanced panel dataset of Indian SCBs for the period 1999–2016. In the first stage, the allocative, cost and scope efficiencies for each bank are estimated following the data envelopment analysis approach. In the second stage, internal determinants of the stated efficiency measures are estimated following the system of the generalized method of moments approach. The findings suggest that competition has not resulted in enhancing the efficiency of Indian SCBs. Among factors that can influence efficiency, it is seen that size does matter. Larger banks can enhance the efficiency of SCBs. It is also seen that having more foreign banks improves the overall efficiency of SCBs. However, before embarking on further rounds of licensing, the study posits that market-driven correction to succeed, it is imperative to address sunspots in the form of investor or borrower repression.