一种新的认知无线电非合作功率控制博弈算法

当认知无线电网络以"衬底式"(Underlay)的方式与主用户网络共享频谱时,需要对认知用户进行功率控制,以确保认知用户在不干扰主用户的前提下,公平地共享认知频谱资源。利用博弈分析的方法,设计了一个基于链路增益因子的代价函数,并据此提出了一种新的非合作功率控制博弈算法。仿真结果表明,该算法的均衡结果既改善了用户的帕累托(Pareto)性能,又提高了链路增益较差的用户的吞吐量,实现了网络资源的平等共享。     

Cannibalism and the Optimal Sharing of the North-East Atlantic Cod Stock: a Bioeconomic Model

This paper shows how intra-stock relations such as cannibalism and growth enhancement, determine the economically optimal sharing of a fish resource between heterogeneous harvesting agents. The sharing of resources between different vessel groups is often left for political decision making. Nonetheless, such decisions may have both biological and economic consequences. This becomes quite clear when different harvesting groups exploit different sections (age groups) of a stock that has intra-stock interactions in the form of cannibalism. A two-agent bioeconomic model with cannibalism is developed and used to determine (i) optimal annual harvest sizes (TACs) for cod, and (ii) the optimal proportion of the TAC that should be harvested by the different vessel groups in the fishery. Applying biological and economic data in a numerical procedure, and comparing the results obtained to previous studies, it is shown that intra-stock interactions such as the presence of cannibalism has a significant impact on who should take what proportion of the TAC, and hence, the standing stock size and discounted economic rent achievable. In contrast to other studies, we find that the optimal harvest requires that both trawlers and coastal vessels should harvest the fish resource. In addition, the results indicate that, from a bioeconomic perspective, the existing trawler fleet’s harvest share in the cod fishery is too high. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory

Abstract. The present paper provides a method by which the Nash Program may be embedded into mechanism theory. It is shown that any result stating the support of any solution of a cooperative game in coalitional form by a Nash equilibrium of some suitable game in strategic form can be used to derive the mechanism theoretic Nash-implementation of that solution. Received: 29 June 1999 / Accepted: 3 April 2002     

RECENT ADVANCES IN OLIGOPOLY THEORY FROM A GAME THEORY PERSPECTIVE

Abstract. This paper surveys the contribution that recent developments in game theory have made to the understanding of oligopoly theory. It is argued that conventional models suffer from the problem that there are a number of solution concepts offered with little guidance as to which should be selected, and this is related to the static nature of the models employed. One important development in game theory has been the analysis of repeated games, and when applied to oligopoly theory this suggests that outcomes may be more cooperative than conventional theory suggests. Related to this is the requirement that firms employ credible threats to punish cheating from cooperative outcomes, and the paper examines the extent to which imperfect information may restrict the scope of firms to employ such punishments. One way in which firms may seek to make threats credible is through strategic investments, for example in production capacity, and the paper explores how competition over price or output is integrated with competition over instruments for strategic investment.     

Linear-quadratic approximation, external habit and targeting rules

We examine the linear-quadratic approximation of nonlinear dynamic stochastic optimization problems. A discrete-time version of Magill [1977a. A local analysis of N-sector capital accumulation under uncertainty. Journal of Economic Theory 15(2), 211–219] is generalized to models with forward-looking variables paying special attention to second-order conditions. This is the ‘large distortions’ case in the literature. We apply the approach to monetary policy in a DSGE model with external habit in consumption. We then develop a condition for ‘target-implementability’, a concept related to ‘targeting rules’. Finally, we extend the approach to a comparison between cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria in a two-country model and show that the ‘small distortions’ approximation is inappropriate for this exercise.     

企业间反需求状况定价行为:价格总水平的“内在稳定器”

运用重复博弈的方法建立了一个企业间长期价格竞争模型,用于论证这样一个机制:随着市场需求的波动,企业为实现自身利益最大化所采取的非合作定价行为会与市场需求状况呈相反方向,从而对宏观价格总水平起到一种稳定器的作用。同时对该模型在我国的应用及模型本身可能存在的问题进行了探讨。     

Bargaining rationale for cooperative generic advertising*

The beggar-thy-neighbour aspect of commodity advertising means that benefits to one commodity from advertising come at the expense of other commodities. The effect can be mitigated by cooperation among groups as shown by Alston, Freebairn and James (AFJ). A drawback to AFJ's analysis is that some cooperative outcomes require side payments from one producer group to another. This paper offers a bargaining solution as an alternative to cooperation in the case where cooperative side payments would be needed. We show that while bargaining without side payments is not as effective as cooperation at reducing beggar-thy-neighbour effects, it is a welfare improving alternative to non-cooperation and is likely more practical in many situations.     

一种单天线同频混合信号幅度的估计算法

针对非协作通信中平坦衰落条件下单天线接收两路MSK混合信号分量的幅度估计问 题,提出了一种基于max-min思想的幅度盲估计算法。该算法采用混合信号幅值序 列中多个极大极小幅值的估计值来进行混合信号分量的幅度估计,并采用加窗局部极值平均 的方法来获得多个极大极小幅值的估计值。仿真结果表明：在信噪比大于10 dB条件下 ,该 算法 对MSK混合信号幅度估计较为准确,并且该算法对混合信号分量功率比和相对时延差的变化 具有较强的鲁棒性,具有不需要数据辅助、计算量较小的优点,能够满足后续盲信号处理的 需要。     

股权分置改革对价谈判博弈分析

中国证券市场股权分置改革是一个系统工程，对价谈判博弈不仅仅包含讨价还价博弈，还包括上市公司股价估值，上市公司的行业背景和成长性分析，上市公司的股权结构特点分析等，是一个非常复杂的博弈模型。本文通过分析股权分置改革对价谈判的博弈过程给出了一个在完全信息条件下对价谈判的非合作博弈模型及其纳什（Nash）均衡最优解的求解过程．并详细分析了影响对价最终结果的关键因素和得到纳什均衡最优解的泽森（Zeuthen）讨价还价过程，供股权分置改革方案的设计者和广大投资人参考。     

Monetary and Fiscal Policy-Makers in the European Economic and Monetary Union: Allies or Adversaries?

Optimal monetary and fiscal policies within the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) are determined by simulating a global model under alternative assumptions about the objective function of the European Central Bank (ECB) and about cooperation vs. non-cooperation between monetary and fiscal policy-makers and among the latter. The results show the high effectiveness of fixed rules in the presence of supply-side shocks and the usefulness of cooperative discretionary measures against demand-side shocks. More generally, cooperation among fiscal policy-makers in the EMU is nearly always superior to non-cooperative equilibrium solutions, yielding a strong case for the coordination of fiscal policies.