双寡头竞争下的反倾销与补贴政策比较

与现有相关研究只注重Cournot模型不同,文章在Bertrand模型中,就反倾销税和生产补贴对进口国产量、进口量、消费量及社会福利等方面影响进行比较,试图理解进口国政府使用反倾销为代表的进口保护手段的动因。分析表明,在进口产品和本国产品差别不大的情况下,如果进口产品对本国产品具有明显的成本（即价格）优势,进口国政府从本国社会福利出发,会倾向使用反倾销税为代表的进口保护政策。根据结论,针对中国遭遇反倾销的现实,提出了调整出口目标和理念、调整和优化出口产品结构、调整中国出口产品的竞争策略等对策措施。     

The Panzar–Rosse revenue test and market power in banking

The Panzar–Rosse H statistic is a commonly used measure of market power in banking. It is widely believed that $H>0$ is inconsistent with significant market power. This study rigorously disproves that perception. Instead, the possibility of $H>0$ under conditions of substantial market power turns out robust to the timing of banks’ actions, relative costs, choice of strategic variable, degree of product differentiation, strategy (static or dynamic), and degree of heterogeneity in banks’ conduct (collusive versus fringe), and hence may be common in practice.     

Price Rigidity and Industrial Concentration: Evidence from the Indonesian Food and Beverages Industry

This paper investigates the relationship between industrial concentration and price rigidity in the Indonesian food and beverages industry. A Cournot model of firm behavior is used in which prices adjust according to a partial adjustment mechanism. The model is applied to panel data of the Indonesian food and beverages industry over the period 1995–2006. The results suggest that industrial concentration has a positive effect on percentage price changes. Furthermore, the speed of price adjustment is higher when the per unit cost of production rises.     

“寡头”市场结构、贸易媒介与贸易商品定价——分析框架及基于棉花贸易史的案例研究

中国在贸易中面临"寡头"地位确立与定价权缺失共存的困境,通过提出一个引入贸易媒介环节的三分法贸易商品定价框架对此进行解释。贸易商品定价受到"寡头"国家/政府政策作用于贸易媒介市场结构程度的影响,还依赖于出口国/进口国的微观市场结构状况。贸易媒介通过与生产者和消费者的定价博弈选择使其利润最大化的买卖价格,政府政策/私人保护通过影响贸易媒介市场结构间接影响贸易商品定价。利用典型的英美棉花贸易"双寡头"案例,通过价格变动的相对弹性、转嫁系数和Granger因果检验三种方法定量分析了英美棉花贸易的定价博弈,计量结果与三分法分析结果完全符合,为论文提出的分析框架提供了例证支持。     

Horizontal Mergers and Successive Oligopoly

This paper considers a successive oligopoly setting in which a set of upstream firms sell output non-exclusively to a group of downstream firms using a linear tariff. If the concavity of retail demand is constant then the profitability of horizontal merger at either the upstream or the downstream stage is shown to depend on the number of firms in the stage experiencing the merger and not on the number of firms in the other stage. Furthermore, the profitability of merger at either stage is the same as the profitability of merger amongst a set of vertically integrated firms in a setting in which all firms are vertically integrated. Finally, mergers at either stage are shown to reduce the sum of producer and consumer surplus. Moreover the negative effects of merger on surplus are unambiguously increased by increases in concentration in the merging stage and ambiguously affected by increases in concentration in the non-merging stage.JEL classification: L10, L20, L40     

Prohibiting State Aid in an Integrated Market: Cournot and Bertrand Oligopolies with Differentiated Products

The prohibition of state aid in an integrated market such as the European Community is analyzed in a model where firms produce differentiated products and market structure is either Cournot or Bertrand oligopoly. State aid is financed by distortionary taxation so the opportunity cost of government revenue exceeds unity. Under both Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, if products are sufficiently close substitutes then there exists a range of values for opportunity cost where governments give state aid and where the prohibition of state aid will increase aggregate welfare. With sufficiently differentiated products, the prohibition of state aid will reduce aggregate welfare.     

Goodwill and dynamic advertising strategies

In this paper, we empirically analyze weekly advertising policies of manufacturing firms in consumer goods markets. We assume firms engage in persuasive advertising, thus policies of firms affect the goodwill of a brand. We introduce a demand and a goodwill production function. A simple transformation of the demand function allows us to identify not only the demand parameters but also the parameters of the goodwill production function. We reconstruct the unobserved goodwill levels using these parameters and past advertising levels. We restrict our attention to Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) strategies which are functions of payoff relevant state variables. Without imposing further restrictions on the dynamic competitive environment, we investigate the relationship between observed advertising strategies—which are assumed to be MPE—and payoff relevant state variables by means of several reduced form specifications. The most important determinant of advertising intensity turns out to be goodwill. We demonstrate that controlling for an advertising campaign significantly improves the explanatory power of the model. JEL Classification L13 . C73 . M30 . M37 I would like to thank Volkswagen Stiftung for the generous financial support which made this research possible.     

Quality and Welfare in a Mixed Duopoly with Regulated Prices: The Case of a Public and a Private Hospital

Abstract. Hospital markets are often characterized by price regulation and the existence of different ownership types. Using a Hotelling framework, this paper analyses the effect of heterogeneous objectives of hospitals on quality differentiation, profits and overall welfare in a price‐regulated duopoly with exogenous symmetric locations. In contrast to other studies on mixed duopolies, this paper shows that, in this framework, privatization of the public hospital may increase overall welfare. This holds if the public hospital is similar to the private hospital or less efficient and competition is low. The main driving force is the single‐regulated price which induces under‐provision (over‐provision) of quality of the more (less) efficient hospital compared with the first best. However, if the public hospital is sufficiently more efficient and competition is fierce, a mixed duopoly outperforms both a private and a public duopoly due to an equilibrium price below (above) the price of the private (public) duopoly. This medium price discourages over‐provision of quality of the less efficient hospital and – together with the non‐profit objective – encourages an increase in quality of the more efficient public hospital.     

The effectiveness of R&D subsidies

In this paper, the effectiveness of R&D subsidies is analyzed in an oligopolistic model that we apply to the cases of international R&D competition and cooperation. We find that the existence of asymmetric information among firms on whether a rival (or partner) is being subsidized or not may play a key role in explaining whether subsidies are effective or not in increasing R&D investments. In particular, it is shown that if the existence of the subsidy is made public (e.g. because strict information release regulation about R&D subsidies is enforced) and depending on the strategic relationship between the firms’ R&D efforts, an R&D subsidy could even hurt the subsidized firm.     

The saving rate and the upgrade of the trade commodity structure in developing countries: A dynamic H–O model under an oligopolistic market structure

This paper constructs an oligopolistic dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin (H–O) model of a small open economy to analyze the relationship between the saving rate and the upgrade of the trade commodity structure. The analysis shows that the saving rate determines the trade commodity structure of a country in the long-run equilibrium. Furthermore, a developing country with a low capital–labor ratio in the initial state will change from exporting labor-intensive goods in the initial state to exporting capital-intensive goods in the long-run equilibrium if it has a higher saving rate, and this upgrade of trade commodity structure has a social welfare effect under an oligopolistic market structure. The effect of trade policy on the upgrade of the trade commodity structure is uncertain in our model; therefore, a high saving rate is the irreplaceable driving force for trade commodity structure upgrades in developing countries.