This dissertation aims at elucidating the history of Vernon Smith’s experimental economics by focusing its attention upon the three themes of rationality, minds and machines that assumed significance at different (albeit overlapping) stages of the development of Smith’s experimental economics with the help of his published and unpublished papers.Chapter 1 is devoted to the scrutiny of the form of rationality incorporated into the portions of Smith’s laboratory experiments whose results have usually been taken as corroborations of his “Hayek Hypothesis.” By bringing into the foreground Smith’s definite position on demand theory and its concrete instantiations on many different occasions, we make the case that Smith has consistently imposed by means of the induced value theory certain narrowly defined preference structures that have definite implications for the form of rationality instantiated in the laboratory.The main narrative in Chapter 2 concerns Smith’s intellectual interchanges with behavioral scientists in the early 1960s, more specifically, his reactions to behavioral scientists’ attempts at cognitive modeling. We present several reasons for interpreting Smith’s initiation of the attempt at the maximization-based induced value theory as an endeavor to discipline subjects’ minds. We also provide in Chapter 2 a portrayal of Smith’s missed opportunities to get involved in the large-scale laboratory experimentation projects pursued in the 1950s in close connection with several branches of psychology.Chapter 3 consists of two parts. In Part 1, we describe the origin of mechanism design economics, and offer a detailed explanation of the analytical kinship between Smith’s “microeconomic system theory” and the standard conceptual framework utilized in mechanism design economics. Part 2 is devoted to describing the roles played by the computer in both Smith’s empirical research agenda and the theoretical, mechanism design research pursued by Stanley Reiter (one of Smith’s intellectual companions since the 1950s). Our historical narrative in Chapter 3 is intended to clarify that computer experience and computational theory drove the development of Reiter’ version of mechanism design economics, and that they also (partially) shaped some crucial events in the history of Smith’s version of experimental economics.JEL Classification: B21, B31, C90, C92, D02Prof. Philip E. Mirowski: Advisor 相似文献
Economic literature on groundwater managementhas traditionally been split into two areas: there are papers that evaluate different
schemes of dynamicaquifer management, considering that pumping costs vary with stock but ignoring water quality. On the other
hand, there are papers that considercontamination problems caused by specificpollutants. This paper presents two alternative
models for joint quantity-quality management, and it shows that existing models are in fact special cases of these. The framework
isdynamic and considers both the stock of waterquantity and a stock measure of water quality. Optimal taxes are derived, and
shown to be different from those in existing quantity-only or quality-only models. Implementationproblems are briefly discussed. 相似文献
Summary. We study a one-sector stochastic optimal growth model with a representative agent. Utility is logarithmic and the production function is of the Cobb-Douglas form with capital exponent
. Production is affected by a multiplicative shock taking one of two values with positive probabilities p and 1-p. It is well known that for this economy, optimal paths converge to a unique steady state, which is an invariant distribution. We are concerned with properties of this distribution. By using the theory of Iterated Function Systems, we are able to characterize such a distribution in terms of singularity versus absolute continuity as parameters
and p change. We establish mutual singularity of the invariant distributions as p varies between 0 and 1 whenever
. More delicate is the case
. Singularity with respect to Lebesgue measure also appears for values
such that
. For
and
Peres and Solomyak (1998) have shown that the distribution is a.e. absolutely continuous. Characterization of the invariant distribution in the remaining cases is still an open question. The entire analysis is summarized through a bifurcation diagram, drawn in terms of pairs
.Received: 9 April 2002, Revised: 29 October 2002, JEL Classification Numbers:
C61, O41.Correspondence to: Tapan MitraThis research was partially supported by CNR (Italy) under the "Short-term mobility" program and by M.U.R.S.T. (Italy) National Group on "Nonlinear Dynamics and Stochastic Models in Economics and Finance" . We are indebted to Rabi Bhattacharya for providing us with the reference to Solomyak's (1995) paper. The present version has benefitted from comments by Mukul Majumdar and two anonymous referees. 相似文献
Summary. I prove that the equilibrium set in a two-player game with complementarities, and totally ordered strategy spaces, is a sublattice
of the joint strategy space.
Received: May 31, 2001; revised version: October 4, 2002 相似文献
Consider an estimate of the common value of an auctioned asset that is symmetric in the bidders’ types. Such an estimate can
be represented solely in terms of the order statistics of those types. This representation forms the basis for a pricing rule
yielding truthful bidding as an equilibrium, whether bidders’ types are affiliated or independent. We highlight the link between
the estimator and full surplus extraction, providing a necessary and sufficient condition for ex-post full surplus extraction, including the possibility of independent types. The results offer sharp insights into the strengths
and limits of simple auctions by identifying the source of informational rents in such environments.
Harstad acknowledges hospitable accommodation by the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, and the Olin School of Business,
Washington University in St. Louis, during parts of this research. We are grateful for comments and suggestions from Richard
McLean and Jeroen Swinkels. 相似文献
Past field validity tests of contingent valuation have relied on voluntary contribution mechanisms to elicit actual willingness to pay, and may overestimate hypothetical bias because of free riding in the actual contributions. This paper argues that provision point mechanisms are a preferred alternative for field validity tests of contingent valuation because they increase the proportion of demand revealed in cases in which public goods can be provided in a step function. The results of a contingent valuation validity study of participation in a green electricity pricing program that uses a provision point mechanism are reported, and hypothetical open-ended and dichotomous choice responses are compared to actual participation. Calibration of hypothetical responses is also explored. 相似文献
Objective: To investigate preferences for fertility treatment from the Australian general population with the aims of calculating the willingness to pay in tax contribution for attributes (characteristics) that make up treatment and for an “ideal” fertility treatment program. We also assessed whether willingness-to-pay varies by the relationship status or sexual orientation of the patient.
Methods: A stated preference discrete choice experiment was administered to a panel of 801 individuals representative of the Australian general population. Seven attributes of fertility treatment under three broad categories were included: outcome, process, and cost. Attributes were identified through published literature, focus group discussions, expert knowledge, and a pilot study. A Bayesian fractional experimental design was used, and data analysis was performed using a generalized multinomial logit model. Further analyses included interaction terms and latent class modeling.
Results: Six of the seven attributes influenced the choice of a treatment program. Under process attributes, individuals preferred: continuity of care of clinic staff, where patients are seen by the same doctor but different nurses at each visit; “alternative” treatments being offered to all patients; and onsite clinic counseling and peer-support groups. Personalization and tailoring of the treatment journey were not important. Among outcome attributes, the improved success rate of having a baby per cycle and significant side-effects were considered important. Cost of treatment also influenced the choice of treatment program. Individual preferences for fertility treatment were not associated with patients’ relationship status or sexual orientation. Latent class modeling revealed sub-groups with distinct fertility treatment preferences.
Conclusion: This study provides important insights into the attributes that influence the preferences of fertility treatment in Australia. It also estimates socially-inclusive willingness-to-pay values in tax contributions for an “ideal” package of treatment. The results can inform economic evaluations of fertility treatment programs. 相似文献