地方政府债务最适规模的数理分析

近年来地方政府债务问题已经成为我国的重要问题，已经成为潜在的财政风险。亟需在矛盾爆发之前，适度控制债务规模，防患于未然。本文从债务对国民经济的拉动和负担出发，探讨债务与国民收入和财政的内在关系，从而构建数学模型，论证地方政府新一期债务适量规模以及最佳债务规模，以化解地方政府债务风险，更好地服务于我国地方政府公债实践。     

Foreign Demand for Domestic Currency and the Optimal Rate of Inflation

We characterize the Ramsey optimal rate of inflation in a model with a foreign demand for domestic currency. In the absence of such demand, the model implies that the Friedman rule—deflation at the real rate of interest—is optimal. We show analytically that in the presence of a foreign demand for domestic currency, this result breaks down. Calibrated versions of the model deliver optimal annual rates of inflation between 2% and 10%. The domestically benevolent government imposes an inflation tax to extract resources from the rest of the world in the form of seignorage revenue.     

The lead–lag relationship between the spot and futures markets in China

Based on daily and one-minute high-frequency returns, this paper examines the lead–lag dependence between the CSI 300 index spot and futures markets from 2010 to 2014. A nonparametric and non-linear method based on the thermal optimal path method is adopted. Empirical results of the daily data indicate that the lead–lag relationship between the two markets is within one day but this relationship is volatile since neither of the two possible situations (the futures leads or lags behind the spot market) takes a dominant place. Our results using the high-frequency data demonstrate that there is a price discovery in the Chinese futures market: the intraday one-minute futures return leads the cash return by 0–5 min regardless of the price trend of the market.     

GENERAL INTENSITY SHAPES IN OPTIMAL LIQUIDATION

The classical literature on optimal liquidation, rooted in Almgren–Chriss models, tackles the optimal liquidation problem using a trade‐off between market impact and price risk. It answers the general question of optimal scheduling but the very question of the actual way to proceed with liquidation is rarely dealt with. Our model, which incorporates both price risk and nonexecution risk, is an attempt to tackle this question using limit orders. The very general framework we propose to model liquidation with limit orders generalizes existing ones in two ways. We consider a risk‐averse agent, whereas the model of Bayraktar and Ludkovski only tackles the case of a risk‐neutral one. We consider very general functional forms for the execution process intensity, whereas Guéant, Lehalle and Fernandez‐Tapia are restricted to exponential intensity. Eventually, we link the execution cost function of Almgren–Chriss models to the intensity function in our model, providing then a way to see Almgren–Chriss models as a limit of ours.     

政府诱导非产权化战略性可耗竭资源最优利用经济增长路径

结合我国的国情，现实中存在像稀土这种非产权化战略性可耗竭资源，合理开发这种资源对于国家的经济发展是至关重要的。文章试图利用模型的方式探索非产权化战略性可耗竭资源最优利用的经济增长路径，认为只要政府有效诱导，在人力资本与技术不断进步对经济增长的作用足够的情况下，合理利用非产权化战略性可耗竭资源并实现可持续发展的经济增长是可以实现的。     

Channel Management Through Selective Announcement of Reward and Punishment Decisions

Purpose: Although channel influence strategies such as reward and punishment are useful for firms to manage certain channel partners, the social effect of these strategies has not been examined in the literature. In practice, firms selectively announce their reward and punishment decisions, hoping that these announcements can help encourage or prevent the channel behaviors of other channel members. The main purpose of this article is to provide a theoretical understanding of this business practice in channel management.

Methodology: The authors conducted interviews and a scenario experiment with sales managers. The experiment is a 2 (degree of institutionalization: high vs. low)?×?2 (power of distributors: powerful vs. less powerful)?×?2 (influence strategy: punishment vs. reward) design.

Findings: The authors found that firms are more likely to announce their reward decisions than punishment decisions. Also, when institutionalization of marketing channel is low, firms tend to announce all their reward decisions, but they are reluctant to announce their punishment decisions regarding powerful channel members. When institutionalization of marketing channel is high, we find that firms are more likely to announce rewards and punishments regarding less powerful channel members.

Contribution: An important contribution of this research is that we are among the first to explore the social effects of power exercise in channel management. We extend the channel power literature by arguing that selective announcements of power exercise (reward and punishment) can influence more channel members. In addition, we combine institutional theory and channel power theory to explain the underlying mechanisms. That is, the degree of institutionalization in marketing channel influences how firms make selective public announcements of their channel decisions.     

优衣库电子商务仓库选址研究

以优衣库一年订单的地域分布情况以及各项物流成本做为依据,使用总运输成本最优和总运输耗时最优方法,探讨如何通过增加仓库来降低配送成本、缩短配送时间。并提出保留上海仓库为总仓,增设北京、广州分仓的方案。     

Taxes, M-M Propositions and Government's Implicit Cost of Capital in Investment Projects in the Private Sector

The corporate tax claim of the government is internalised in the analysis of the corporation's capital structure. In this framework the M-M Propositions are rederived. In the proposed approach, the current value of the firm is calculated on a before-tax basis, and is equal to the sum of present values of equity, debt, and government claim. An enhanced M-M model is derived, which is more representative of modern financial realities, and has significant implications for the practice of financial analysis. The paper highlights the potential conflict of interest among the different claimholders in making an investment decision. The model presented here allows us to analyse the tradeoffs among various policies available to the government to encourage investments to their socially optimal level.     

竞业禁止协议的经济学分析

用委托代理模型来分析竞业禁止协议,说明了对掌握信息不同的核心雇员应采取不同的激励措施,对掌握信息多的雇员以惩罚的威胁为主,对掌握信息少的雇员以经济补偿为主,最优竞业禁止协议应体现出这一点.通过对竞业禁止协议的实施难度和对雇员流动方向的影响,得出一个结论:不同的法律环境对小企业的发展有不同的影响.     

退出权和惩罚机制在俱乐部物品供给中的作用——以商会提供企业互助金为例

俱乐部物品有效供给的制度安排既要仿照市场机制设置较低的进入与退出成本,也要解决私人联合供给时出现的搭便车现象,对违约行为进行严重的惩罚制裁。本文基于俱乐部物品的本质属性,对退出权与惩罚机制的经济作用进行了理论分析,并通过商会提供企业互助金的成功案例验证了所得结论的有效性。