On the relationship among efficiency,capitalization and risk: does management matter in local banking market?

By employing a Granger causality methodology in a panel data framework, this article explores the relationship among efficiency, capitalization and credit risk within the local Italian banking system. Focusing the attention on cooperative banks, we specifically test whether managers take more risks in highly concentrated markets (i.e. monopoly) than in partially competitive markets (i.e. duopoly). The evidence shows that in more concentrated markets, management efficiency generates a decrease in risk-taking (rejecting the bad management hypothesis) with respect to the partially competitive markets. Results are consistent with the idea that banks with less local competition are able to increase their profits by indulging more freely in rent-seeking behaviour, minimizing their risk-taking and, consequently, improving the quality of their assets through additional screening processes. The financial crisis does not seem to affect the conduct of management in terms of bank investment decisions and risk-taking. A series of robustness tests generally confirms our findings.     

The effects of foreign strategic investors on business models in China’s commercial banks: does ownership structure matter?

Introducing foreign strategic investors (FSIs) is a vital step in the ownership reforms of China’s banking industry. Using China’s data from 1995 to 2014, we employ propensity score matching and difference-in-differences approaches to investigate the effects of FSIs on the business models of Chinese banks, including income structure and funding structure. We find that FSIs significantly influence income structure. The bank’s non-interest income (NII) share significantly rises after introducing FSIs. The higher ownership shares of FSIs are associated with the higher NII share. And the NII share has been increased when FSIs assign directors or senior managers to Chinese banks. We also report that the effects of FSIs on income structure are weaker in state-owned banks than those in other banks, and ownership concentration weakens the links between FSIs and income structure. Finally, this article shows that FSIs have no significant influence on funding structure. These findings will be informative and relevant to both policymakers and practitioners.     

Impact of split share structure reform on capital structures: empirical evidence from China’s listed companies

An econometric model based on a natural experiment and the difference-in-differences method is introduced to empirically investigate the impact of split share structure reform on capital structures. A total of 1026 listed companies in Chinese A-share during 2001–2011 are used as the sample for the research and interest-bearing debt ratios (BDRs) are taken as a representative indicator for capital structures. The theoretical and empirical analysis indicates that both market expansion effect and corporate governance effect caused by the split share structure reform are associated with an increase in BDR. As far as the timeliness is concerned, the effects of split share structure reform on capital structures will last 3–4 years.     

Does corporate governance still affect firm performance after controlling the distress factor?

We explore the impact of corporate governance on firm performance. We first identify whether corporate governance can still be an influential factor or has been largely captured by the traditional Fama-French three-factor model. More importantly, our study adds a financial distress factor to the Fama-French three-factor model to form a four-factor pricing model (labelled as the ‘financial distress four-factor model’). We find that for the US Russell 1000 firms, the financial distress four-factor model is the better model of the two models considered. We further find that the financial distress four-factor model has a higher explanatory power in capturing the return variation. We find that the differences between the return of firms with good (weak) corporate governance and the expected return are insignificantly different from zero for most portfolios in all the two models. The financial distress four-factor model, however, has the fewer portfolios with return difference being significantly different from zero, implying that corporate governance has been better priced in the financial distress factor.     

Corporate governance structure and product market competition

This article assesses the effects of the competitive structure of a product market on a firm’s corporate governance structure. Our model demonstrates that shareholders strategically determine the corporate governance structure, including the manager’s stock ownership and his controlling power over the firm, in order to maximize their utility in the product market competition. We find that the manager’s stock ownership is lower and his controlling power over the firm is higher when the firm’s product is more profitable or when competition within the product market is more severe. The inefficiency of the wealth transfer from shareholders to the manager also affects the corporate governance structure.     

Information on sellers and buyers characteristics: added value to explain price formation at primary fish markets in managed French scallop fisheries

The aim of this article is to explore, through a hedonic approach, the factors that might explain the price variability for the French-managed fishery of scallop at primary fish markets. In addition to factors classically identified in the current literature like intrinsic product characteristics or markets situation, the characteristics of operators are tested. The relationships of loyalty between sellers and buyers, and market assiduity are notably considered.     

Labour Markets in China: A Study of the Structure and Evolution of Wages

This paper examines the development of labour markets and the evolution of a structure of wages in China, using household surveys for 1988, 1995, 2002 and 2007. It finds evidence of both provincial and sectoral segmentation in labour markets, with eastern regions and the state-controlled sector enjoying high wage premiums in the early reform period. During the reform, China has progressed slowly towards an integrated labour market with convergence in incomes between the rural non-agriculture sector and the urban market-based sector by 1995, when industry flourished in the rural areas. The wage gap between the rural non-agriculture sector and other sectors increased and the urban state-controlled sector remained segmented with respect to all other sectors up to 2002. However, the data from 2007 show there has been increasing sectoral and spatial integration.     

战略联盟组织的稳定性、组织治理与信用约束机制

本文运用博弈论的分析框架分析了战略联盟组织不稳定性的原因在于战略联盟组织的中间组织性质所导致的战略联盟组织对机会主义行为约束的弱化,进而揭示了战略联盟组织稳定的关键在于组织内成员的博弈支付结构和博弈者对未来的预期。在此基础上,从组织治理结构的角度提出了稳定战略联盟组织应建立有效的信用约束机制的结论,阐述了这一机制的目标和内容,并针对我国战略联盟组织所面临的问题提出了相应的对策。     

人力资本、财务资本与资本结构：理论和实证

当今社会已经从工业经济迈进知识经济时代，现有以财务资本为研究对象的资本结构理论在解释咨询、高新技术等人力资本较为密集的公司时难免会捉襟见肘。视企业为财务资本与人力资本共同的投资组合是现代资本结构理论研究刻不容缓的任务。本文以现有财务资本结构的研究为基础，通过引入人力资本变量拓宽现代资本结构的内涵，构造债务、股权和人力资本三者之间相互关系和作用的数理模型，结合对我国计算机应用服务业的实证分析，得出结论和启示。     

上市公司治理与中小投资者利益保护

保护中小投资者利益是当前证券市场中亟待解决的关键问题之一。本文从理论和现状两个方面分析了上市公司治理与中小投资者利益保护的关系,并在此基础上,从股权结构、董事会治理、信息披露和法制建设四个方面提出了完善公司治理结构和保护中小投资者利益的若干对策。