技术独董、经济政策不确定性与企业创新产出

创新产出是企业创新能力的直观体现,也是企业价值创造的源泉。以2008—2017年披露了专利授权信息的中国A股上市公司为样本,研究了独立董事技术专长对企业创新产出的影响。结果显示：（1）技术独立董事显著地促进了企业创新产出,且这种促进作用受到经济政策不确定性的负向调节;（2）技术独立董事是通过提高企业的创新投入来促进企业的创新产出的;（3）技术独立董事兼职席位与企业创新产出呈倒U型关系。根据上述研究结论,企业应当增加技术独立董事的引入并适当限制技术独立董事在其他企业兼职的行为,以充分发挥技术独立董事的创新驱动效应,提高企业创新产出。     

论人民币内外价值偏离

近几年来,人民币同时面临对外升值和对内贬值的双向压力。本文以“一价定律”为理论视角,分析了人民币内外价值偏离的表现及其危害,并从涉外经济政策层面探讨了内外价值偏离的深层原因,进而提出纠正人民币内外价值偏离的对策性建议。     

略谈代表(执行)董事及其对第三人的责任

现代公司的权力由股东转移到董事会手中 ,而实际行使权力的主要是代表 (执行 )董事。其对公司有一定的控制力 ,就应当承担相应的义务。在代表 (执行 )董事造成公司损害同时也使第三人遭受损害时 ,要对第三人承担损害赔偿责任。我国公司法应该借鉴英美法系的做法 ,以完善我国的公司制度。     

独立董事报酬水平和薪酬结构设计分析

目前，我国独立董事薪酬制度存在严重的效率问题。研究发现，最优薪酬水平取决于独立董事的风险偏好、收入预期、工作能力和生产函数；最优薪酬结构取决于独立董事的风险偏好、收入预期，与其工作能力和生产函数无关；风险厌恶程度较高的独立董事适宜偏重货币工资激励。     

我国制造业的对外开放与国家经济安全

随着商品、技术和投资等方面对外开放程度的不断扩大，我国制造业日益融入国际分工体系之中。即使是在经济全球化不断深化的今天，国家仍然是最重要的经济利益主体，由于制造业在国民经济中无可替代的重要地位，制造业对外开放必然会对国家经济安全产生深刻影响。     

Board governance and corporate performance

We examine the link between the monitoring capacity of the board and corporate performance of UK listed firms. We also investigate how firms use the flexibility offered by the voluntary governance regime to make governance choices. We find a strong positive association between the board governance index we construct and firm operating performance. Our results imply that adherence to the board‐related recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance Code strengthens the board's monitoring capacity, potentially helping mitigate agency problems, but that investors do not value it correspondingly. Moreover, in contrast to prior UK findings suggesting efficient adoption of Code recommendations, we find that firms at times use the Code flexibility opportunistically, aiming to decrease the monitoring capacity of the board, which is followed by subsequent underperformance. This finding questions the effectiveness of the voluntary approach to governance regulation followed in the UK and in many countries around the world.     

股权制衡、非国有股东委派董事与公司绩效

从公司治理层面完善国有控股企业的股权制衡是国企混合所有制改革的重点和难点,以往学者仅仅研究了股权制衡与公司绩效之间的关系,很少研究两者关系的作用路径和影响机理.因此,引入非国有股东委派董事这一概念,研究非国有股东委派董事在股权制衡与公司绩效之间发挥的中介效应.结果表明:股权制衡有利于公司绩效的提升,非国有股东委派董事在股权制衡与公司绩效两者之间发挥了中介效应.     

Independent directors and earnings management: The moderating effects of controlling shareholders and the divergence of cash-flow and control rights

The research results on the suppressing effect of independent directors on earnings management are not consistent in existing literature. In addition, it has been argued that using financial statements provided by top management to investigate top management's earnings management is not appropriate. Therefore, the purpose of this study is twofold. First, we used external auditors (including the auditors of Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation and the auditors of two Big Four accounting firms – Deloitte & Touche and KPMG in Taiwan) as respondents in order to obtain less biased data. Second, we investigate the moderating effects of controlling shareholders and the divergence of cash-flow and control rights on the relationship between independent directors and earnings management. The results show that both the existence of controlling shareholders and the divergence of cash-flow and control rights have significant suppressing effects on the relationship between independent directors and earnings management. Theoretical and practical implications are also discussed.     

Board changes and CEO turnover: The unanticipated effects of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act

The board independence requirements enacted in conjunction with the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) provided motivation for firms that were already compliant with the regulations to alter their board structure. We consider actual board changes made by compliant firms and how such changes affect the monitoring efficiency of the boards. We find that the majority of compliant firms (approximately 56%) add independent directors following SOX. However, we find a nontrivial number of firms (approximately 26%) actually decrease the number of independent directors to move closer to the stated 50% requirement. For firms that decrease independence, the CEO turnover performance sensitivity significantly decreases following SOX. We also find that large board independence changes seem to be most detrimental to the monitoring function of the board. Our results highlight that SOX may have had unintended consequences.     

Does CEO duality constrain board independence? Some evidence from audit pricing

This study examines whether CEO duality affects the association between board independence and demand for higher quality audits, proxied by audit fee. The findings show that there is a positive association between board independence and audit fees. This result is consistent with findings of Carcello et al. (2002) that more independent boards demand higher audit quality and effort. However, this positive association is only present in firms without CEO duality, thus suggesting that CEO duality constrains board independence. The results support recommendations against CEO duality by showing that dominant CEOs may compromise the independence of their board of directors. Additionally, evidence is provided that board size (the number of directors on the board) is positively associated with audit fee pricing. This is consistent with prior studies that indicate that larger board sizes are associated with inefficiency and negative firm performance.