高职高专院校学生校外实习风险防范对策研究

由于大量校外实习活动的进行,学生面临人身安全、合法权益受侵害等各种风险,影响了校外实习活动开展,从而影响高职培养目标的实现。因此,探索一套行之有效的校外学生实习风险防范对策,形成科学的学生校外实习管理制度,对于高职高专院校推行“2＋1”教学模式显得尤为重要。     

双边议价框架内主导零售商买方势力及政府规制取向

在双边议价框架内,外部选择价值决定纵向关系中交易双方各自的议价势力。规模以及作为产品进入市场的"守门人"角色是主导零售商自身所具备的影响外部选择价值的因素,是主导零售商买方势力的主要来源。在对称性寡头竞争的零售市场,主导零售商的买方势力产生有益的"抵消效应",而在非对称性寡头竞争的零售市场,主导零售商的买方势力可能产生有害的"水床效应"。"水床效应"既可能会加剧零售市场垄断化趋势,又可能损害消费者福利。因此,政府规制应高度关注主导零售商的市场兼并行为,高度关注主导零售商剥削中小供应商的行为,高度关注主导零售商过度低价促销行为。     

董事会特征、高管激励与集团绩效——来自中国上市集团公司的经验证据

作为一个多法人联合体,企业集团的治理与单体企业不同.通过实证研究发现,中国上市集团公司的董事会规模并没有对集团绩效产生积极效应,独立董事也未能有效发挥监管职能;董事长与总经理两职合一与集团公司绩效负相关;合理有效的报酬制度与公平透明的股权激励环境有助于集团公司绩效的提高,而股权激励制度有待进一步完善.     

国有企业双重目标与投资效率改进——基于独立董事网络和国企混改视角

立足国有企业具有社会和经济双重目标的理论逻辑,本文选取2007~2016年A股国有上市公司作为研究样本,分析了独立董事网络和国有股比例对投资效率的影响以及调节效应。研究发现:独立董事网络降低了国有上市公司的投资效率,较高比例的国有持股抑制了投资效率,但当国企更加关注经济目标时,则有助于改善投资效率;进一步研究发现,相比于特定功能类企业,独立董事网络在商业竞争类企业中发挥投资效率的改善作用更加显著。因此,独立董事应因地制宜在国企中发挥治理作用;政府应分类推进国企混合所有制改革;竞争性国企应引入较大比例的优质民营资本,优化投资决策、提高投资效率。     

新形势下加快贵州对外开放研究———兼与广东、内蒙古、重庆比较

贵州作为欠发达、欠开发地区,由于基础设施不健全、地理条件制约,长期以来在国家发展战略中处于辅助的角色,与周边省市产业互补性弱,省内大型企业资源依附性强。随着贵州交通等基础设施条件的改善,尤其是“工业强省”与“城镇化带动”两大战略的实施,新形势下纵深推进对外开放工作正当时。     

中国集体林产权制度改革回顾与展望

采用历史产权制度研究方法,利用详实的历史数据与信息,系统地分析改革开放以来中国集体林产权制度改革每个重要时期的改革内容与进程以及集体林地林木流转制度演化历程,发现改革开放四十年中国集体林所有权和家庭经营的基因没有变,变的是集体林地承包经营权的实现形式;指出集体林产权制度变迁道路中的困惑;提出未来集体林产权制度的选择路径。     

股权分置改革视角下独立董事对议案事项监督机制研究

采用2005—2014年我国上市公司独立董事对议案事项意见的独特数据,从明确监管议案事项、非明确监管事项和股权分置改革等三方面深入考察其对独立董事出具否定意见的影响。研究发现,在我国上市公司中,对明确监管议案事项出具否定意见概率低,说明“逆淘汰”机制和“任人唯亲”董事会文化的存在使得监督效果大打折扣。同时发现,在股权分置改革后,独立董事对议案事项出具否定意见概率更低;出于规避法律风险的考虑,独立董事对明确监管事项出具否定意见的概率相对较高。因此,监管层应加强对各类议案事项检查力度而非仅仅明确监管事项;科学厘清独立董事在董事会决策中的责任边界,明确独立董事承担的法律风险。     

Is regulatory adoption ceremonial? Evidence from lead director appointments

Research Summary: Regulatory bodies often wrestle with the thorny question of whether to mandate a governance practice or allow for organic adoption. While mandates afford rapid diffusion, we theorize that they also result in ceremonial adoptions. Leveraging a quasi‐natural experiment, we compare adoption outcomes for a governance practice—lead director adoption—that was mandated by the NYSE but not the NASDAQ. We find that NYSE firms are more likely than NASDAQ firms to have installed a lead director as a symbolic management tactic, so their lead directors are less effectual. We also find that transient institutional investors are deceived by this symbolic management, but dedicated institutional investors are not. Managerial Summary: Shareholders and analysts often desire to see companies introduce strict governance measures, such as proxy access and independent boards. Consequently, regulatory bodies often wrestle with the thorny issue of whether and when to mandate such practices for all companies. What they might not realize is that mandates may not work as well as they seem. Although more companies adopt reform under a mandate, they do so merely as a symbolic gesture. We look at one governance reform—appointing a lead director—finding that companies who introduce this reform as a result of a mandate appoint someone that is relatively toothless. We also find, though, that savvy investors are not actually fooled by this tactic and will trade out of firms that attempt such symbolic management.     

Independent director death and CEO acquisitiveness: Build an empire or pursue a quiet life?

Research summary : This study examines the relationship between an independent director's death and CEO acquisitiveness. Using a sample of large U.S. public firms, we find that CEOs who have experienced an independent director's death undertake fewer acquisitions in the post‐director death period, in particular fewer large acquisitions. Our findings are consistent with the prediction of posttraumatic growth theory that mortality awareness can induce CEOs to reevaluate their life priorities and reduce the importance of extrinsic goals in their decision making. This study contributes to the strategic leadership literature by highlighting the influence of the death of CEOs ' social peers on CEOs ' strategic decisions . Managerial summary : Does the death of CEOs ' social peers influence CEOs ' strategic decisions? We find that CEOs who have experienced an independent director's death engage in fewer acquisitions in the post‐director death period, in particular fewer large acquisitions. One likely explanation for our findings is that the death of an independent director may heighten CEOs ' mortality awareness, lead the CEOs to pursue a quieter life, and weaken their propensities for undertaking decisions (i.e., acquisitions) that increase their compensation and social status . Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Board structure and CEO compensation: Evidence from U.S. lodging industry

Using a sample of U.S. lodging firms, this paper examines the relationship between board of director characteristics and chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. Previous research shows that larger boards are detrimental to the effectiveness of the board of directors and deteriorate the control imposed on CEO actions and pay. Board independence is also suggested as an important quality to emphasize the control on the CEO. We propose that U.S. lodging firms’ board of directors provide a nice setting to investigate the effects of size and independence on CEO compensation level. Our findings suggest that CEO compensation is not related to board size, and positively related to proportion of the outside board members. These findings are contrary to the findings of previous studies. Our findings may provide significant insights to lodging firms’ board of directors to structure efficient compensation packages.