The impact of D&O insurance on excess corporate leverage

The governance effects of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance), an important tool for risk diversification, are of strong concern in the capital market. Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2009 to 2018, we examine the impact of D&O insurance on excess corporate leverage. We find that D&O insurance is negatively associated with excess corporate leverage and that this result is consistent with a series of robustness tests. Further analyses show that D&O insurance impedes excess corporate leverage mainly because of its effect on external monitoring. The effect is more pronounced for firms that are state-owned, have political connections and are located in provinces with low marketization than for other firms.     

Board experience and value creation in cross-border acquisitions: The role of acquirer and target country institutions

Our study investigates the effects of board acquisition experience on value creation in cross-border acquisitions and the dependence of this relationship on acquirer and target country institutions. We draw on cross-border acquisition research and institution-based corporate governance research to argue that the effect of board acquisition experience depends on the institutional characteristics of the acquirer and target countries and on cultural differences between these two countries. Based on 1775 cross-border acquisitions of U.S. and European acquirers, we show a positive effect of board acquisition experience on the announcement returns of cross-border acquisitions, which is even stronger when the target country’s takeover regulations are less friendly and when the target and acquirer countries are culturally more distant.     

Director compensation and foundation performance

In this paper I conduct the first empirical analysis of the relationship between director compensation and private foundation performance. Using compensation data for over 17,000 private foundations across the period 1993 to 2017 I find that private foundations which choose to compensate their directors make smaller charitable distributions each year, and are also more likely to minimize their charitable distributions to the legal minimum over time. I also examine the association between compensated directors and foundation investment returns and find no relationship. Finally, I find that foundation director compensation is not a substitute for either employee compensation or outside professional fees.