“夫妻搭档”治理与家族企业竞争优势——基于倾向得分匹配法

“夫妻搭档”创业是一种较为普遍的现象,在中央政府提出“大众创业、万众创新”号召的背景下,了解“夫妻搭档”企业的优势和局限性无疑具有重要的现实意义。基于此,以2012—2015年上市民营企业为对象,以夫妻同时在董事会或（和）高管层任职表示“夫妻搭档”治理,运用倾向得分匹配法来缓解样本选择偏差,本文分析“夫妻搭档”治理对企业竞争优势的影响机理。研究发现,“夫妻搭档”治理对企业竞争优势的影响具有两面性：一方面,“夫妻搭档”企业的管理费用率显著低于非“夫妻搭档”企业,“夫妻搭档”通过降低代理成本提升企业竞争力;另一方面,由于更加关注家族社会情感财富的维护,“夫妻搭档”企业的研发投入水平低于非“夫妻搭档”企业,而企业的研发投资保守行为制约企业获得长期竞争优势。     

Public–private partnership in Public Administration discipline: a literature review

Public–private partnerships (PPPs) have become popular tools to deliver infrastructure and public services around the world. As an innovative public procurement approach, PPPs have drawn considerable attention from academic circles. In order to enhance our knowledge of PPPs, the authors conducted a systematic literature review of articles published in international journals of the Public Administration (PA) discipline. Four main topics in this discipline are identified by means of social network analysis, including PPP concept, risk sharing amongst PPP participants, the drivers of PPP adoption, and PPP performance. Seven propositions about the four topics are summarized. Directions for future research are also considered.     

Linear Inequality Methods to Enforce Partnerships under Uncertainty: An Overview

We review different (generic) conditions on stochastic outcome functions to enforce either efficient or nearly efficient partnerships. Their logical relationship is explored. Two kinds of conditions are considered. However, the property for an action profile to be “compatible” plays a crucial role in both kinds. Also, two kinds of enforcement mechanisms are considered: enforcement through utility transfers and enforcement through repetition.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D2, D7.     

Antecedents and Consequences of Mutual Trust in PPPs

This article aims to identify the antecedents and consequences of mutual trust in public-private partnerships (PPPs), making use of the theory of mutual trust to develop the conceptual model. The article then tests hypotheses to find the role of trust in PPPs and also to identify the antecedents and consequences. Data have been collected from personnel working in government, corporate and non-profit sectors related to a post-earthquake psychological rehabilitation program in China. A total of 234 usable responses have been obtained with a return rate of 69.2%. The results of structural equation modeling show that while mutual communication, corporate reputation, and shared value influence mutual trust between partners positively, opportunism exerts negative influence on trust; in addition, trust also influences performance, commitment, and long-term relationships between partners. We conclude that mutual trust eliminates opportunism and increases confidence between partners, leading to improved inter-firm performance. If the partners establish trust in the PPP, they reap all other benefits of cooperation of PPPs.     

武汉城市圈政策网络治理:参与主体与治理模式

武汉城市圈的发展既是提升区域竞争力的需要,也是中部崛起的中坚力量。但是,城市圈内各地方政府机构分属不同的行政区划,形成了版图利益的冲突。这种利益冲突通过更高一级的政府来协调,行政成本巨大,而且改变不了根本的利益诉求。此外,城市圈公共事务的复杂性和社会自组织机制的发展要求一种自下而上的权力分配格局。面对这种难题,经过国外大量实践证实的政策网络治理理论为问题的解决提供了思路。本文在对政策网络治理文献梳理的基础上,针对区域规划、公共产品供给、私人产品供给和民生等不同的政策领域,提出了政府机关为中心、政府引导下的私人企业与非营利组织参与、第三方和私人企业为主政府为辅和全部主体参与四种治理模式。     

供应链"公差-配合合作伙伴关系"模型

引入公差配合的概念,系统地研究了供应链体系中的配合选择问题,在分析合作伙伴评估因素和供应链结构的基础上,提出了应用“公差-配合合作伙伴关系”模型描述供应链节点企业间匹配关系的方法,并阐述了该模型的应用方法和应用实例。     

Optimal partnership contracts: Foundation and duality

We use the duality in linear programming to solve the problem of optimal contracts with moral hazards. We show the importance of allowing the partners to throw away outputs under some contingencies. A two-step procedure is used to find the optimal contracts. The first step minimizes the loss from undistributed outputs, and in the second step, a second best solution is found. A characterization of the optimal contracts in two-by-two-by-two partnership games is offered. Such contracts implement an optimal strategy profile that either has no incentive cost to implement or is near a pure strategy profile.     

供应链成员契约关系可视化研究

文章通过对供应链成员之间的信息风险的分析，说明了实现合作伙伴关系可视化的重要性。在总结至今为止各国学者对于供应链协调和供应链契约研究的基础上，提出通过契约来实现供应链成员关系的可视化。以回购契约、利润共享契约和弹性数量契约在某些产业中的应用为例，说明契约在供应链成员关系可视化中的作用，并在此基础上，分析供应链成员关系可视化后的绩效。     

从公司制到有限合伙制的公司治理研究

不同的风险投资组织形式,具有不同的投资效率。基于对公司制和有限合伙制这两种组织结构的运作机制进行简要分析,并根据收益期望值模型,从公司治理的角度,运用比较分析方法,论述了创业投资的组织形式,认为有限合伙制是较好的组织形式。