上市方式、大股东持股与民营上市公司的绩效

企业上市可以采取直接上市（IPO）和间接上市（买壳上市等）两种方式。本文考察了民营上市公司的不同上市方式下大股东持股与公司绩效间的关系。研究发现,间接上市的民营企业的大股东持股对公司绩效没有影响,而直接上市的民营企业的第一大股东持股与公司绩效存在正的线性关系,前5大股东持股与公司绩效呈非线性的U形关系。当考虑大股东持股的内生性时,发现间接上市的大股东持股与公司绩效互不影响,而直接上市的大股东持股与公司绩效互为正相关。     

Cross‐border mergers and acquisitions: The role of private equity firms

Research summary: We show that private equity ownership (“PE backing”) of the acquirer is a signal of deal quality in cross‐border takeovers. As such, PE‐backed acquirers experience higher announcement returns in cross‐border takeovers, but only if targets are in poor information environments. We show that PE backing is a positive market signal because of PE firms' experience and networks that result from prior deals in target countries. We document that the market correctly anticipates that operating performance of PE‐backed acquirers increases as a result of cross‐border mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Managerial summary: We study cross‐border acquisitions by acquirers that are partially owned by private equity firms (“PE backing”). Cross‐border acquisitions are challenging as acquirers often have little information about targets. We document that investors react positively to cross‐border deals of PE‐backed acquirers—their stock prices increase upon deal announcements. However, this is only the case if targets are in countries with poor information environments. This is because PE backing allows acquirers to access PE firms' deal experience and networks. This makes it easier to identify and evaluate good targets, making it more (less) likely that a deal eventually creates (destroys) value. Consistent with this, we find that earnings of PE‐backed acquirers increase after buying targets in poor information environments. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

PPP的认识误区与公共服务改革

通过查阅大量国外文献,试图厘清公私合作(PPP)的家族谱系,纠正对PPP、BOT、PFI等融资模式的误解。通过论述政府采购的特征,阐明PPP不是政府投资而是政府公共服务采购。根据我国PPP的发展阶段以及政府在各类PPP模式中发挥的作用,提出公共服务改革的10项建议。     

A Course in Economic Forecasting: Rationale and Content

This note shows that the impact of an increase in product price on factor demand in the typical textbook depiction is overstated to the point of indicating that competitive firms demand factors even when marginal product is negative.     

The effectiveness of quantitative easing: new evidence on private investment

This paper examines the effect of Federal Reserve’s large-scale purchases of securities on private investment. We find tentative evidence that quantitative easing (QE) stimulated the level of aggregate investment through the interest rate channel by narrowing corporate bond spread. In particular, the Fed’s purchases of mortgage-backed securities were found to have a statistically significant effect on aggregate private investment. Moreover, using a GARCH model, we find that QE has led to a reduction in the volatility of private investment. This finding remains robust with a QE dummy variable as an alternative measure of the unconventional monetary policy. The study also indicates how different aspects of QE influence private investment and its volatility.     

An Experimental Study of the Effect of Private Information in the Coase Theorem

We investigate, in an experimental setting, the effect of private information on the Coase theorem's predictions of efficiency and allocative neutrality. For a two-person bargaining game, we find significantly more inefficiency and allocative bias in the case of private information compared with the case of complete information. We also find substantial bargaining breakdown, which is not predicted by the Coase theorem. For the case of private information, we reject the Coase theorem in favor of the alternative of a generalized version of the Myerson—Satterthwaite theorem, which predicts inefficiency, allocative bias in the direction of the disagreement point, and some bargaining breakdown.     

Incentives and teacher effort

Few would contest that teachers are a very important determinant of how much students learn in school, and how to improve teacher performance has been the focus of lively policy debate in both rich and poor countries. This paper examines how teacher incentives, both pecuniary and non‐pecuniary, correlate with teacher effort. Using school survey data from Lao PDR, we estimate measures of teacher effort, including the number of hours that teachers spend preparing for classes and teacher provision of private tutoring outside of class hours, which are not the typical measures used in previous research. Estimation results fit well under the standard labour supply framework and indicate that greater teacher effort is associated with non‐pecuniary incentives such as more teacher autonomy over teaching materials and monitoring as measured by the existence of an active parent – teacher association and the ability of school principals to dismiss teachers. Methodologically, this paper provides a detailed derivation of a simultaneous OLS‐probit model with school random effects that can jointly estimate teacher work hours and tutoring provision.     

腐败影响的宏观经济分析

文章首先将腐败引入Arrow-Kurz-Barro新古典生产函数,在Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans模型框架下,建立宏观经济动态模型,求解最优条件、讨论稳态均衡值的存在性和稳定性,并进行稳态比较的动态分析和短期分析。研究结果表明,贿赂水平的永久增加将减少稳态的资本积累,但对稳态消费的影响则呈现多种可能;短期贿赂水平变动对资本存量与消费水平的影响也呈现出多种可能性。     

民营企业自主创新能力分析与评价

随着经济全球化、中国经济体制改革、以及加入WTO的影响,中国民营企业面临着日益严峻的挑战。概要介绍了在此背景下,民营企业、自主创新与国民经济的关系,分析了民营企业自主创新现状和特点,提出了应建立科学的评价体系,并探讨了民营企业自主创新评价体系基本原则和测评方法。     

基于竞争优势的民营企业薪酬管理策略

文章在分析影响民营企业竞争力因素的基础上,对我国民营企业薪酬管理与竞争优势的关系作了分析,并提出了优化民营企业薪酬管理的策略,为民营企业的薪酬管理提供新思路。