Indirect Reciprocity and Corporate Philanthropic Giving: How Visiting Officials Influence Investment in Privately Owned Chinese Firms

This study examines how privately owned firms that are listed on Chinese stock exchanges and often surrounded by Buddhist or Taoist temples use money to bind themselves to officials who can mitigate their underinvestment problems. Philanthropic giving is a traditional way of achieving this task. Based on social‐exchange theory, we consider the potential for indirect reciprocity, in which visiting officials do favours for local businesses that do favours for other social actors. We analyse whether China’s Buddhist and Taoist cultures influence how philanthropic giving induces visiting officials to do favors. We also examine temple locations and the behaviours of privately owned firms listed on Chinese stock exchanges from 2001 to 2012 in an empirical study that provides strong support for our arguments. Results show that philanthropic giving initiates and amplifies indirect reciprocity between visiting officials and local businesses, thereby increasing corporate investment. The magnitudes of these effects depend on the magnitude of religious norms. Our study thus illuminates the influence of visiting officials on corporate investment.     

Like Father,Like Son: Inheriting and Bequeathing

This paper incorporates indirect reciprocal behavior in the context of bequeathing decisions into an otherwise standard OLG model. We provide conditions for the existence of a unique steady state with operative bequests. Contrary to standard OLG models, we show that taking into account such behavioral interactions allows one to rationalize both an increasing and U‐shaped pattern of the inheritance to GDP ratio over time, consistent with recent empirical evidence. Moreover, the model predicts a nonlinear (U‐shaped) relationship between the size of an unfunded social security program and the long‐run stock of per capita capital, which in turn provides a novel explanation of the inconclusive empirical findings on the relationship between social security, savings and long‐run growth. Ricardian equivalence is shown to hold in a special case of the model     

互惠性企业环境下知识转化的经验性研究

知识转化是知识管理理论的核心内容,是实现知识资本价值功能的主要方式。随着行为经济学的兴起,互惠性企业文化建设日益得到加强。在互惠性的企业环境下,知识转化的效率得到明显提高。知识转化的经验性研究可以有效地揭示互惠性环境下知识转化的微观机理,为我国企业加强互惠性文化建设、并提高互惠性企业环境下的知识转化效率提供了有效的理论借鉴。     

组织支持相关理论研究综述

文章系统阐述了组织支持理论的产生和发展,组织支持感的概念、结构以及国内外相关研究进展,并时组织支持理论今后进一步的研究进行了展望。     

互惠原理在企业营销中的应用

通过对人类文化传统中互惠原理的深入挖掘,巧用顾客负债感,探讨互惠原理的营销适用方法,获取他人顺从的有效策略,互惠式让步使交易顺利达成在营销中的应用,从而更好地提高企业营销工作效率,满足顾客需求的目的。     

企业创新能力影响机制研究——基于河北省高新技术产业集群创新网络的实证分析

企业创新能力受其所在产业集群创新网络关系和结构特征的双重影响,网络关系强度、稳定性、互惠性和中心性与企业创新能力正相关,而网络密度则相反。为此,改善网络关系、优化网络结构将对企业创新能力提高具有重要作用。     

Managing for stakeholders,stakeholder utility functions,and competitive advantage

A firm that manages for stakeholders allocates more resources to satisfy the needs and demands of its legitimate stakeholders than would be necessary to simply retain their willful participation in the firm's productive activities. We explain why this sort of behavior unlocks additional potential for value creation, as well as the conditions that either facilitate or disrupt the value‐creation process. Firms that manage for stakeholders develop trusting relationships with them based on principles of distributional, procedural, and interactional justice. Under these conditions, stakeholders are more likely to share nuanced information regarding their utility functions, thereby increasing the ability of the firm to allocate its resources to areas that will best satisfy them (thus increasing demand for business transactions with the firm). In addition, this information can spur innovation, as well as allow the firm to deal better with changes in the environment. Competitive advantages stemming from a managing‐for‐stakeholders approach are argued to be sustainable because they are associated with path dependence and causal ambiguity. These explanations provide a strong rationale for including stakeholder theory in the discussion of firm competitiveness and performance. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strong reciprocity and team production: Theory and evidence

Punishment of shirkers is often an effective means of attenuating incentive problems and sustaining coordination in work teams. Explanations of the motivation to punish generally rely either on small group size or on a Folk theorem that requires coordinated punishment and, hence, highly accurate information concerning the behavior of each player. We provide a model of team production in which the punishment of shirkers depends on strong reciprocity: the willingness of some team members to contribute altruistically to a joint project and also to bear costs in order to discipline fellow members who do not contribute. This alternative does not require small group size, complex coordinated punishing activities, or implausible informational assumptions. An experimental public goods game provides evidence for the behavioral relevance of strong reciprocity and how it differs from unconditional altruism.     

互惠性金融创新:我国农村小额信贷可持续发展研究

运用博弈论、行为经济学对我国农村小额信贷的可持续发展进行分析,从中可以发现小额信贷的可持续发展不仅是基于农户的"理性人"假设,机构与农户之间的"互惠性"也是重要因素之一。其发展的关键在外部环境(宏观、中观、微观层面)的影响而并非农户本身。     

公平与互惠理论视角的知识员工激励

知识员工的特性使得基于理性人假设的经济契约不能进行有效激励。本文建立了基于知识员工互惠性的委托-代理模型。研究结果显示,新模型的最优委托-代理合约可给委托人带来比传统的委托-代理最优合约更高的利润水平。