角速度传感器误差校正研究

某角速度传感器的输入与输出成近似线性关系,测量输出的电压值即可得到目标运动的角速度。为了提高测量的精度,通过对角速度传感器零位和灵敏度的误差进行校正,可得到更为精确的目标运动角速度。实验表明,该校正方法能有效提高角速度传感器的测量精度,有一定的实用性。     

A model of person‐pay interaction: how executives vary in their responses to compensation arrangements

A wealth of research indicates that both executive characteristics and incentive compensation affect organizational outcomes, but the literatures within these two domains have followed distinct, separate paths. Our paper provides a framework for integrating these two perspectives. We introduce a new model that specifies how executive characteristics and incentives operate in tandem to influence strategic decisions and firm performance. We then illustrate our model by portraying how executive characteristics interact with a specific type of pay instrument—stock options—to affect executive behaviors and organizational outcomes. Focusing on three individual‐level attributes (executive motives and drives, cognitive frame, and self‐confidence), we develop propositions detailing how executives will vary in their risk‐taking behaviors in response to stock options. We further argue that stock options will amplify the implications of executive ability, such that option‐heavy incentive schemes will increase the performance of talented executives but worsen the performance of low‐ability executives. Our framework and propositions are meant to provide a starting point for future theorizing and empirical testing of the interactive effects of executive characteristics and incentive compensation on strategic decisions and organizational performance. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

灵东水库平面控制网的投影变形抵偿分析

文章结合灵东水库除险加固工程,阐述了应用TrimbleGPS全球定位系统施测、TGO平差软件处理数据的情况,介绍投影变形抵偿计算在工程控制网中的重要性,以及投影变形抵偿解决方案的选择。     

Compensation of owner managers in Canadian family‐owned businesses: expropriation of minority shareholders

The aim of this paper is to test the hypothesis of owner managers expropriating minority shareholders by receiving excessive compensation. Using a sample of Canadian family firms, we found that when there is divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights, owner CEOs receive higher compensation than non‐owners. The higher the divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights, the higher the excess compensation. Further analysis shows that only poorly governed firms are affected by the expropriation problem. Copyright © 2010 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

基于MATLAB的STATCOM阶梯波调制策略设计

在现代电力系统中STATCOM(静止同步补偿器)能对电力系统的无功潮流进行快速灵活的调整,从而达到提高电力系统综合稳定性的目的。文章在Matlab中搭建了基于阶梯波调制法的STATCOM的仿真模型并进行了仿真分析,阶梯波调制法是利用阶梯波逼近正弦波的原理,通过控制各个晶闸管的通断来产生相应的阶梯波,将各个H桥的阶梯波进行叠加来逼近正弦波的。     

Executive Compensation: A Model of Disclosure Choice

Recent public policy debates have led to increased calls for full transparency of executive compensation. However, in practice, many firms are reluctant to disclose the full details of how they link executive compensation to performance. One possible reason for lack of full disclosure is that managers use their power to hide the details of their compensation plan in order to disguise opportunistic rent extraction. If this is the reason for secrecy, then public policy designed to force firms to provide full disclosure is unlikely to be resisted by shareholders. However, another possible explanation for less than full transparency is that some degree of secrecy about executive compensation may be in the interest of the company and its shareholders. If this explanation is correct, then public policy moves to increase transparency may be met by counter moves designed to protect managers and shareholders from such policies. In this paper we investigate if full disclosure of executive compensation arrangements is always optimal for shareholders. We develop a model where optimal executive remuneration solves a moral hazard problem. However, the degree to which the moral hazard problem affects the shareholders depends on hidden information, so that disclosure of the executive compensation scheme will typically reveal the hidden information, which can be harmful to shareholders. The model derives, therefore, the optimal disclosure policy and the optimal remuneration scheme. We find that the shareholders are better off pre‐committing not to disclose the executive compensation scheme whenever possible. Executive directors are shown to be better off too in the absence of disclosure of executive compensation schemes. An argument for mandating disclosure is that it provides better information to shareholders but our analysis demonstrates that disclosure does not necessarily achieve this objective. The results suggest that less than full disclosure can be in the interest of shareholders, the reason for this being that disclosures cannot be made selectively to shareholders but will also be made to strategic opponents. This will be the case if the board of directors and the remuneration committee includes enough independent directors. Whether or not non‐disclosure to shareholders is in their interest is however an empirical matter involving a trade‐off between the proprietary costs associated with disclosure to shareholders and the costs of potential collusion between executive and non‐executive directors associated with non‐disclosure.     

能源自动检测系统的设计

本文介绍一种高精度、多功能、智能化能源检测系统,可对各种液体、蒸汽的温度、压力、流量以及电力负荷等参数进行巡检,越限报警和自动打印(共118个测试点)。该系统适合于在大、中型企业中推广应用。     

Compensation System of Land Takeover in USA and Its Enlightenment to Our Country

According to the amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the 5^th article stipulates governmental entities expropriation of private property in particular land for public purposes, must pay reasonable compensation, and with due process of law. This paper analyzes features of the USA＇s fair compensation system of land takeover, discusses governmental actual process of land takeover and compensation approaching to specific issues. Finally, comparing with serious loss of farmland in our country, four onlightenments are drawn from USA＇s compensation system of land takeover.     

论保险代位求偿权行使的范围限制

保险代位求偿权当然有其行使范围.时至今日,理论界有很多学者认为:"代位求偿权只在财产保险中适人身保险中不存在代位求偿权."但依有些学者的态度,保险代位求偿权不只适用于财产保险.我国<保险法>的有关规定(第68条)虽有力地支持了否定说,但亦留下了一些缺憾.笔者建议将<保险法>第68条修改为:"人身保险的被保险人因第三者的行为发生保险事故的,保险人向被被保险人或者受益人给付保险金后,不得享有向第三者追偿的权利.但被保险人或者受益人仍有权向第三者请求赔偿."这样,肯定说就难有立锥之地了.