引进外资战略投资者就能推动国有商业银行改革吗?--兼与田国强、王一江两位老师商榷

田国强、王一江两位老师合作发文认为:引进外资战略投资者推动国有商业银行改革可以做到“打破一种局面、引进两类股资、形成三方制约、达到四个有利”。但我们在引入模型分析的结果却是:当国有商业银行的控制权租金大到可以补偿控股风险成本和股权交易成本时,引进外资与非国有两类股资后所形成的三方制衡体系是不稳定的,被打破的国有股一股独大的局面可能被新的股权集中模式所替代,而外资战略投资者更可能寻求获得银行的控制权,并造成银行价值额外的损失。因此,引进战略投资者推动国有商业银行改革成功的关键在于要先行从市场微观基础建设方面消除国有商业银行特殊的垄断地位、降低国有商业银行的控制权租金。     

Time price differentials in the rent‐to‐own industry: implications for empowering vulnerable consumers

Rent‐to‐own enterprises represent a lucrative and rapidly growing industry. They are of particular concern to social service agencies, policy makers and consumers because they target a vulnerable, economically disadvantaged segment of the population. This article presents an investigation of a major player in the industry in one US state that fell under scrutiny by the courts because of a question of whether it is a retail enterprise covered by truth in lending legislation. Findings indicate that the average time price differentials charged by the largest retailer in this state exceed by more than three times the regulated 30% cap on interest rates. Rent‐to‐own is an example where regulation must be put into place so consumers can make more informed decisions. Such regulation, however, must be accompanied by financial literacy education that will further empower vulnerable consumers in the marketplace.     

创新空间扩散、集聚租金与经济高质量发展

基于新经济地理学和内生增长理论,构建了一个贸易自由度约束下的局域溢出模型,探究了创新的空间扩散与集聚影响经济高质量发展的作用机制。研究发现：对称均衡是模型的唯一内点均衡;当角点均衡时,存在唯一的贸易自由度支撑区间,此时,如果运输成本变小,则技能劳动力、R&D部门、制造业部门以及创新活动将变得更集聚,同时创新的空间扩散程度变大,外围区域在研发创新方面的劣势减弱;从增长和福利评价的角度看,在技能劳动力存量不变的条件下,创新的空间扩散对整个经济体的经济增长并没有影响,然而,当区域的经济增长源于可流动的技能劳动力集聚时,中心区域的技能劳动力和普通劳动力总是偏好集聚状态,当且仅当创新的空间扩散效应足够大或者集聚租金较小时,外围区域的普通劳动力偏好集聚状态。因此,降低运输成本,提高贸易自由度,有助于增大创新空间扩散效应,减小集聚租金,提高全域劳动力福利水平,从而促进经济的高质量发展。     

浅论公司社会责任的地位

公司社会责任理论的产生是对传统公司囿于其营利性所导致的弊端进行反思的结果。对于对公司社会责任是否应当就其整体赋予独立的法律地位,学理上有不同的观点。我国公司社会责任的地位主要应当体现在学理和道德层面,而不应概括的反映在公司法律中。此外,相对于公司的营利性目标,它应当是补充和辅助性的。     

基于中间性组织视角的产业集群三层次治理模式

产业集群作为弥补企业、市场效率空隙的中间性组织,在有效的治理结构下能充分发挥其效率优势,创造集群租金。然而,在信息不对称的条件下,各集群成员有采取机会主义行为以分得更多集群租金份额的动机,并衍生出产业集群风险,弱化产业集群效率。因而,构建合理分配产业集群租金、激发最大化产业集群租金动力的产业集群治理框架就显得十分必要。根据产业集群租金的来源,我们将产业集群租金分解为“集群剩余”和“价值链剩余”,并分别以其为基础阐释了产业集群治理的内部网络治理和外部价值链治理。最后,进一步考虑企业（集群成员）的科层治理,提出了以行业协会为核心的产业集群三层次治理模式。     

When do more selfish politicians manipulate less,not more?

We model the political manipulation of deficits in a political budget cycle model. Assuming that a share of voters suffers from debt illusion the incumbent can increase her re-election chances by expanding government spending. However, the optimal manipulation may exceed the amount necessary to maximize re-election chances (over-manipulation) if the deficit is not very costly (low repayment obligation). Then, more selfish politicians (higher ego rents and, therefore, increased re-election motivation) reduce the over-manipulation. Conversely, “excessive” spending may wrongly be interpreted as opportunistic government manipulation. Theoretical results are supported empirically, with very robust evidence in a sample of 87 democracies.     

Rent-seeking,R&D,and productivity

To investigate whether rent-seeking discourages productivity, we consider a third-market model, in which a domestic firm and a foreign firm engage in both Research and Development (R&D) and output competition. We show that the relationship between rent-seeking and productivity depends on two forces. On the one hand, rent-seeking increases the marginal benefit of R&D and encourages productivity. On the other hand, a lower production cost due to R&D enables the government to extract the rent from the firm to a greater extent and discourages the productivity. Which force is dominant depends on the level of corruption or, as an alternative interpretation, the weight the government attaches to political contributions. Unlike the monotonic relationship proposed by the literature, we find a non-monotonic relationship between rent-seeking and productivity.     

The political economy of the G20 agenda on financial regulation

The paper empirically examines the implementation record of international financial regulation of the banking sector. The study finds that the size of the banking sector and the presence of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) are positively associated with a stronger implementation record. These results suggest that cooperative motives of internalising externalities, creating a level playing field and preserving financial stability play a role in explaining the implementation record. We find evidence that this cooperative behaviour may be driven by the self-interest of global players as the positive record is particularly strong in countries where large banking sectors and big banks are both present, and where regulation only applies to large players. Sectoral concentration, bank health and the share of foreign ownership yield more mixed results as regards their impact on implementation.     

On the optimality of social status seeking

We present an endogenous growth model in which households display their social status by holding not only capital but also bonds. According to conventional wisdom, the quest for social status provides an incentive for individuals to accumulate wealth, which stimulates economic growth and elevates it to a socially optimal level. Instead, we show that portfolio allocation is crucial to the growth-enhancing effect of the quest for social status. If households exhibit their social status by accumulating physical capital and holding government bonds, the quest for social status may not increase economic growth. As a result, social status seeking cannot achieve the social optimum. Calibrating our model to data, we find that if government bonds constitute part of the wealth for households’ quest for social status, the quest for social status decreases economic growth.