基于中间性组织视角的产业集群三层次治理模式

产业集群作为弥补企业、市场效率空隙的中间性组织,在有效的治理结构下能充分发挥其效率优势,创造集群租金。然而,在信息不对称的条件下,各集群成员有采取机会主义行为以分得更多集群租金份额的动机,并衍生出产业集群风险,弱化产业集群效率。因而,构建合理分配产业集群租金、激发最大化产业集群租金动力的产业集群治理框架就显得十分必要。根据产业集群租金的来源,我们将产业集群租金分解为“集群剩余”和“价值链剩余”,并分别以其为基础阐释了产业集群治理的内部网络治理和外部价值链治理。最后,进一步考虑企业（集群成员）的科层治理,提出了以行业协会为核心的产业集群三层次治理模式。     

Bailing out conflicted sovereigns

How should sovereign bailouts take account of the effects bailouts have on policy reforms? Conflicted recipient governments complicate bailout choices because some reforms that spur growth reduce rents that benefit government decision makers. Our model takes account of whether bailout generosity and policy reforms are strategic substitutes, strategic complements or both, and each case implies a different optimal bailout contract, which generally cannot achieve First Best. Conditional forgiveness of some loan payments when economic outcomes are sufficiently favorable can achieve outcomes closer to First Best, and this is so for a small ex ante amount of the bailout subsidy.     

廉租住房的退出机制研究——以青岛市为例

摘要：廉租住房退出机制是保障低收入群体住房权益的必要手段,是廉租住房制度建设的关键环节。基于社会流动和住房梯度消费的双重动力,青岛市已建立符合本市特色的梯度退出机制,但目前仍面临着诸如政府重视程度不够、收入监测机制缺乏、规章政策层级较低、激励配套制度欠缺等退出困境,致使有限的廉租住房资源未能充分得到有“进”有“退”地动态使用。本文针对青岛市廉租住房退出机制面临的政策性和操作性困境,从政策宣传、住房征信、动态管理、制度立法、配套激励等方面提出了构建进入——退出——进入的动态管理格局的改进思路。     

On the desirability of an efficiency defense in merger control

We develop a model in which two firms that have proposed to merge are privately informed about merger-specific efficiencies. This enables the firms to influence the merger control procedure by strategically revealing their information to an antitrust authority. Although the information improves upon the quality of the authority's decision, the influence activities may be detrimental to welfare if information processing/gathering is excessively costly. Whether this is the case depends on the merger control institution and, in particular, whether it involves an efficiency defense. We derive the optimal institution and provide conditions under which an efficiency defense is desirable. We also discuss the implications for antitrust policy and outline a three-step procedure that takes the influence activities into consideration.     

Top-floor discounts in residential buildings: Evidence from South Korea

This study assesses the phenomenon of resale price discounts for top-floor units of residential buildings, or “top-floor discounts.” Using 1.9 million resale transactions of apartment units from South Korea, we find that top-floor discounts range from 1.3% to 8.3% of resale prices. We hypothesize that top-floor discounts exist because of larger heating/cooling costs for these units relative to those on lower levels, resulting from relatively more extreme variation in indoor temperatures unique to top-floor apartment units. Using a household-level survey data on energy consumption and exploiting variations in weather conditions and roof material across time and regions throughout South Korea, we provide evidence in support of our hypothesis.     

Toward a synthesis of the resource-based and dynamic-capability views of rent creation

Two distinct causal mechanisms—resource-picking and capability-building—have been proposed in the strategic management literature about how firms create economic rents. Under the resource-picking mechanism, managers gather information and analysis to outsmart the resource market in picking resources, similar to the way that a mutual fund manager tries to outsmart the stock market in picking stocks. Under the capability-building mechanism, managers design and construct organizational systems to enhance the productivity of whatever resources the firm acquires. These two rent-creation mechanisms are certainly not mutually exclusive, and it is likely that firms generally use both of them. It is therefore important to consider the interaction between these two rent-creation mechanisms: Do they complement each other? Or are they substitutes for each other? In other words, do they enhance each other's value, or detract from each other's value? Answering these questions is a necessary precondition to understanding how firms should allocate their time and effort between these two rent-creation mechanisms. The present paper develops a basic theoretical model to address these questions, and derives testable hypotheses from the model. The model predicts that the two rent-creation mechanisms are complementary in some circumstances but substitutes in others. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

政府管制和寻租的控制理论模型与应用

管制经济学认为 ,市场力量配置资源会导致“市场失败”(marketfailure) ,管制是政府纠正市场失败而采取的手段 ,它的主要作用就是提高市场条件下的资源配置和再分配的效率。管制必须借助于各种政策和规定来执行 ,而执行的结果必须回到市场检验其有效性。但是 ,管制的政策、法令和规定都有相对稳定的目标值 ,它与管制决策机构、管制执行机构、管制反馈机构及管制对象构成了管制的控制系统。目标值和管制控制系统的本身就成为寻租者的寻租对象     

邓小平对实事求是思想路线的继承和发展

在中国新民主主义革命和社会主义现代化建设过程中,中共一代又一代的马克思主义者把马克思主义普遍原理同中国具体实践相结合,不但科学地继承了马克思主义思想路线,而且丰富和发展了马克思主义思想路线。本文主要是就邓小平对实事求是思想路线的继承和发展做一个简单的论述。     

政府机构改革背景下的第三部门逐利现象分析

被视为＂第三种权力＂的第三部门,本应是独立于政府和企业之外的非营利组织,但是却逐渐沾染了利益之气,各种腐败事件层出不穷。在政府机构改革的过程中,第三部门承接了一部分原本属于政府的职能,同时也与政府部门形成了密切的人事关系,由此给第三部门带来了政治权威和政治体制内的资源,也埋下了第三部门逐利的祸根。而对第三部门实行的业务主管制也在为第三部门逐利铺垫温床的过程中扮演了重要的角色。     

契约视角下PPP项目寻租行为与激励监督模型

在PPP项目中,项目公司的行为可以分为有利于项目绩效的履约行为和不利于项目绩效的寻租行为,基于委托代理理论分析了项目公司两种行为与政府激励机制、监督惩罚力度之间的博弈关系及其对项目绩效的影响。研究表明,项目公司寻租与否是在寻租边际收益、激励水平和监督惩罚力度三者之间权衡的结果,进一步研究发现在满足政府收益最大化的条件下仅仅依靠激励监督机制是不能完全消除项目公司的寻租行为的,但政府部门可以通过强化惩罚力度来抑制项目公司的寻租行为。