中国物流企业税收筹划策略研究

物流业是中国的一个新兴产业。近年来,中国经济的持续发展拉动了物流业的迅速崛起,但是中国物流业仍然处于发展的初级阶段,经营状况与盈利状况有待改善。列举了物流企业进行税收筹划的积极作用,分析了中国物流企业面临的税制现状,提出了物流企业税收筹划的建议和对策,为物流企业制定合理有效的税收筹划方案,降低企业税金成本,更好地促进企业发展,增强物流企业在国际物流市场的竞争力。     

基于STR模型的中国宏观经济 周期拐点的识别与预测

本文应用平滑转换模型（STR）对我国经济周期的运行特点及拐点识别进行深入研究,并成功识别出经济周期拐点。研究发现我国GDP机制转换发生在自身滞后1期,增长率96%是扩张与收缩的临界点;固定投资机制转换发生在自身的滞后4期,增长率19%是扩张与收缩的临界点;固定资产投资对GDP的拉动效应具有较为缓慢的调整特征和滞后效应,机制转换发生在固定资产投资的滞后2期。     

新生代农民工的城市创业与国家政策

创业是劳动者对自身或他人拥有的资源进行优化整合,以独立自主的方式创造出更大经济或社会价值的过程。国家的相关政策会对创业过程产生重要影响。当前,国家对海外归国人员和大学生创业给予了众多政策优惠,但对新生代农民工群体创业却鲜有政策支持,不符合公共政策公平公正的价值理念。创业对新生代农民工的城市适应等方面发挥了巨大作用,但因为"流动的劳动力体制"及附着其上的其他政策的存在,造成了劳动力市场的户籍分层,新生代农民工创业过程也遭遇瓶颈。为此,在短时间内无法改变"流动的劳动力体制"的情况下,应对的办法是放松其他现有政策限制,为新生代农民工创业提供更好的政策平台。     

从变迁历史看人民币汇率制度改革新思路

本文介绍了人民币汇率制度的变迁历程,主要包括改革开放前的起步阶段、可调整固定汇率钉住制、钉住货币篮子和改革开放后的汇率双轨制及两种不同的有管理的浮动汇率制度。通过对历史上汇率制度的探讨和我国现状的分析,笔者认为我国汇率制度的改革应沿着"有管理的浮动汇率制—爬行钉住制—浮动汇率制"这条道路稳步发展,随着人民币汇率波动的逐步加大,人民币汇率制度最终过渡到浮动汇率制度。     

资本账户开放和人民币汇率制度选择——基于升值压力下的中国特色IS-LM-BP模型分析

基于中国特色的IS—LM—BP模型分析人民币升值压力下的资本账户开放和汇率制度的选择所得出的结论都将与经典理论有很大差别。最终结论指出如果汇率制度先变革,财政货币政策应该反方向运作,或保持货币政策独立性,短期产量下降,由于资本账户的开放程度不同,长期产量增减不确定,完全浮动汇率制度不适用于中国。如果先开放资本项目,为保持内外均衡,必须保持汇率稳定,需要同方向实行扩张性的财政货币政策,短期和长期产量都大幅度增加。     

The exchange regime and trade balance in Turkey

Over the last 15 years, high trade deficits have become a source of external vulnerability for the relatively stabilized Turkish economy. This corresponds to the period where authorities have been following a floating exchange rate regime. Thus, this study aims to empirically show whether the adopted exchange rate regime has an impact on the trade balance for the period of 1987 Q1 to 2015 Q2. Estimation results indicate that there is a long-run relationship between the real effective exchange rate and trade balance under both fixed and floating regimes in Turkey, but there is no evidence for the J-curve hypothesis.     

Trade-threshold Effect on Inflation in Tunisia: New Evidence Resulting from a Nonlinear Approach

Trade openness is an important determinant of the inflation process. The effect of trade openness on inflation, however, is still an issue of debate at both theoretical and empirical levels. This study tried to provide a contribution to the literature by examining the relationship between inflation and trade openness in Tunisia over the period 1975Q1-2015Q4 using a nonlinear model. The originality of this study stems from the fact that it is the first investigation considering both the Residual-Based Tests for Cointegration in Models with the Regime Shifts and Threshold Regression model. The linear model confirms the existence of a positive relationship between inflation and trade in Tunisia. Yet, considering the nonlinear model, trade openness growth and Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation growth show a statistically significant negative link as long as the trade openness evolution does not exceed the threshold. Nevertheless, if the trade openness growth is higher than the threshold, integrating the trade positively affects CPI inflation. Furthermore, a positive influence of Money supply growth on this type of inflation was noticed in Tunisia in all the considered regimes proving the effect of monetary factors on inflation level. Consequently, trade openness could be used to control inflation in Tunisia.     

Tax competition,imperfect capital mobility and the gain from non-preferential agreements

The gain to competing governments from entering into binding non-preferential tax agreements (that prevents discriminatory taxation in favor of mobile capital) depends on the extent of capital mobility between jurisdictions. In particular the gain is increasing in the cost of relocation of capital and the fraction of the domestic tax base which is relatively immobile. We show this in a symmetric model of tax competition between two governments where all capital is imperfectly mobile and differ only in their cost of relocation.     

Time,Arbitrage, and the Law of One Price: The Case for a Paradigm Shift

Consider a Competitive, Efficient, and Frictionless Economy (CEFE) where resources are scarce at any date, and hence money as a valid claim against scarce resources is also scarce. In this economy, there is always price competition, which can at any date generate an unlimited number of arbitrage opportunities. For example, at any date, opportunities can exist to buy and sell each one of the contracts for delivery of the same good or asset at multiple prices currently as well as on an infinite number of future dates. I prove all arbitrage transactions, including “spot” transactions, tie up arbitrageurs’ capital representing money, good or asset such that this capital cannot be used for any other purpose for a non-zero quantity of time. This makes it impossible to exploit all arbitrage opportunities with the scarce capital available at any date and leads to an infinite number of unexploited opportunities and a non-negligible opportunity cost of the capital tied-up in arbitrage transactions, represented by each arbitrageur’s best missed arbitrage opportunity, if no better opportunity exits, hence the breakdown of the law of one price in its standard sense. This helps construct a new paradigm of CEFE which resolves long-standing theoretical, empirical, and experimental puzzles.     

When food regimes become hegemonic: Agrarian India through a Gramscian lens

The concept of food regimes, as developed by Friedmann and McMichael, has proven useful in analysing how systems of food production, distribution, and consumption are linked to cycles of global capital accumulation and identifying the contradictions and conflicts that underlie them. A question that food regime analysis is relatively less able to address, however, is how food regimes become established and endure with the apparent acquiescence of those who are the victims of their contradictions and inequities. In this paper, I argue that a deeper engagement with Gramsci's theory of hegemony may help to address this lacuna in food regime analysis. To illustrate my case, I draw on studies of rural India from the colonial period to the present day, highlighting the ways in which the hegemonic mechanisms of consent and coercion have been crucial to the consolidation of each of the three food regimes identified by Friedmann and McMichael.