The role of credit officers in the performance of micro loans

This paper proposes a structural model explicitly considering the role played by credit officers in loan performance. The credit officer's ability is decomposed into the screening and the audit stage. This model is estimated using a rich database from VivaCred – a Brazilian NGO. Results suggest that: (i) there is substantial heterogeneity among credit officers in the sample; (ii) their ability affects more the screening than the audit stage; and (iii) their estimated ability is correlated with their experience at VivaCred but not with their experience before joining the organization. Evidence suggests that a reduction in staff turnover would be beneficial to the institution.     

探讨金属防锈膜的研制

本文实验主要用二甲苯、乙酸乙酯、乙酸丁酯,按一定的比例混合做成溶剂,用乙烯—醋酸乙烯酯作粘结剂,对苯丙三唑、尿素、亚硝酸二环乙胺、苯甲酸铵、羊毛脂、乙醇胺等缓蚀剂进行研究。     

建设世界科技强国背景下科技人才职业满意度指标筛选方法与测评模型研究

科技人才研究是围绕建设世界科技强国开展的一项基础性研究工作,科技人才职业满意度状况探索更是激发科技人才积极性、推动经济社会发展的重要课题。面临科技人才职业满意度研究可能存在指标数量较多、指标含义重复等问题,本文基于人才学相关理论,首先讨论科技人才职业满意度测评指标体系,然后提出先借助对职业满意度测评指标进行筛选、再对筛选前后的指标体系分别构建职业满意度测评模型的方法和思路,以期为全面评价我国科技人才职业满意度、挖掘关键影响因素提供参考。     

HARSH NORMS AND SCREENING FOR LOYALTY

Norms that restrict choice sets or impose otherwise harsh requirements would seem to act as barriers to group formation by raising the costs of adherence to potential and continuing members. Contrary to that intuition, one observes a broad range of group norms in the real world that impose large costs on group members. Iannaccone provides a rationale for harsh norms as a mechanism to reduce free‐riding in supplying a club good. This paper proposes a new rationalization for harsh group norms as a mechanism under which harsh norms serve to screen out disloyal members, providing what is essentially a technology for measuring loyalty in environments where group leaders cannot reliably measure group members' loyalty. The model demonstrates that loyalty can be signalled through acts that are seemingly irrelevant to the group's core objectives and identity.     

Screening and Signaling in Communication*

In this paper, we analyze a model of repeated strategic communication between a sender and a receiver. The sender has private information on a policy‐relevant variable but does not know the receiver's motives. Together with the desire of the sender to please the receiver and the desire of the receiver to be pleased, the two‐sided incomplete information creates an interesting communication problem in which players can choose to use information strategically. We analyze various modes of communication, which allow for information transmission, and we compare them in terms of both the quality of the policy implemented and the welfare of the players.     

西方主要教育经济理论分析与比较

人力资本理论、筛选理论、劳动力市场划分理论是构成西方教育经济理论的主要内容，它们分别从不同的角度解释教育是如何影响经济增长的。本文分别从理论产生背景、理论主要内容及政策主张等方面来分析和比较这三种理论的异同。     

贷款利率浮动区间扩大与银行授信业务风险性研究

本文建立并比较了两种不同贷款利率条件下的信贷市场模型,对我国银行授信业务中存在的风险问题进行了研究。得出结论,只有扩大贷款利率浮动区间,才能使利率成为银行信贷业务中的甄别机制,并对我国利率市场化改革问题提出了政策建议。     

联保贷款客户自动筛选机制研究

本文通过一个简单的决策模型,对借款者的决策行为进行分析.研究发现:联保贷款内生客户筛选机制,在借款者之间信息对称的情况下,通过借款者的自我选择,能有效避免逆向选择,实现贷款客户筛选的目的.