公司治理问题的经济学分析

本文在对国外学者在公司治理研究中有关观点进行简述的基础上,把我国现阶段的企业划分为有代表性的三类,分别是国家控股,企业家和员工无股份和债权的公司;国家控股,企业家和员工有股份和债权的公司;企业家创业并控股,企业家和员工都有股份和债权的公司.我们建立有关模型,对不同类型公司治理进行分析,并从实际出发,对我国公司治理提出建议.     

变更设立股份有限公司自然人股东的个人所得税问题研究

目前,人们对有限责任公司整体变更为股份有限公司时所涉及的自然人股东缴纳个人所得税问题存在争议,争议的焦点在于,在公司整体变更过程中,自然人股东是否有应税所得,以及如何缴纳个人所得税。通过对整体变更前后公司实收资本和股东持股数量变化的分析可以看出,应根据自然人股东持股数量增加的来源构成确定其应税所得和个人所得税的金额,以进一步完善自然人股东的个人所得税制度。     

基于GE矩阵的环保企业技术创新战略选择

在经济全球化进程不断加快和环境问题日益严重的今天，环保企业传统的竞争模式已经被知识技术竞争所取代，技术创新战略在环保企业的发展中成为提升企业核心竞争力、实现企业可持续发展的基础。本文对环保企业在技术创新过程应用GE矩阵确定创新领域和选择创新战略进行了分析，给出了环保企业在面临技术创新的内外部环境变化和市场竞争不断加剧时如何选择最优战略的基本分析方法。并针对中国环保企业的特点提出环保企业技术创新战略的建议。     

试论吉林工业遗产保护与旅游利用

工业遗产是一种特殊的文化遗产,具有丰富的历史、文化、科教、旅游等价值。由于城市化加速发展,工业遗产的动态保护与适度开发成为城市化进程中所要解决的重要课题。文章在分析吉林工业遗产保护现状的基础上,对该省工业遗产的特征、旅游价值进行深入研究,提出吉林工业遗产保护与旅游利用的几点对策,以促进吉林省工业遗产的有效保护和合理利用。     

我国上市公司控制权私有收益的实证分析

以上市公司非流通股协议转让事件为样本,分析股权的转让价格,发现样本公司的平均转让价格高于净资产价值近12%。同时对影响转让价格的因素进行回归分析,发现随着股权转让比例和流通股比例的上升,转让价格也随之上升,转让溢价高低与企业规模和净资产收益率成反向变动,与市场中介组织和法律制度环境指数成正向变动。     

I Feel Your Pain: The Effect of Regulator as a Minority Shareholder on Merger and Acquisition Performance

We examine the effect of a regulator-led advocate for minority shareholders on merger and acquisition (M&A) performance in China. In recent years, the China Securities Regulatory Commission established the China Securities Investor Services Center (CSISC), which began its ownership of 100 shares of public firms in 2016. The CSISC advocates for the interests of minority shareholders proactively. Focusing on abnormal stock returns in M&A announcements, we find that acquirers that have the CSISC as a shareholder (CSISC acquirers) exhibit higher positive abnormal stock returns than non-CSISC acquirers. Cross-sectional analysis suggests that the core results are mainly driven by firms with severe agency problems and weak external/internal monitoring, and those not controlled by the state. In addition, we find that CSISC acquirers have better long-term performance and encounter more M&A failures than non-CSISC acquirers. Our findings indicate that although the CSISC only holds 100 shares of listed companies, it plays an effective role in monitoring and driving firms to make appropriate M&A decisions.     

Unleashing the Power of Networks: Shareholder Activism,Sustainable Development and Corporate Environmental Policy

In recent years, a new trend has emerged in which shareholder activists have formed networks to empower shareholders and magnify shareholder voices. This study explores the structural patterns and effectiveness of shareholder activism networks and shows how those networks affect corporate sustainability policies. We draw upon stakeholder influence theory, stakeholder network management theory and recent studies on activism networks to examine a shareholder activism network formed around environmental issues. The study found that (1) the structure of shareholder activist networks is largely driven by organizational attributes such as organization type, organizations’ human resources, media visibility and history; and (2) activist organizations with high centralities and eigenvector centralities enjoy more efficient results. This study contributes to our understanding of the business responses to shareholder demands on improving environmental performance and paves the way for future research on sustainable development through partnerships with shareholder networks. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

Affiliated block shareholders and analyst optimism

We investigate several previously under-documented conflicts of interest that may result in analyst optimism by utilizing two unique features of brokerage firms in China, namely, the dominant ownership of large shareholders within the brokerage firms and the mandatory disclosure of brokerage firms’ commission income derived from each mutual fund client. We show that controlling shareholders of an analyst’s brokerage-firm put pressure on the analyst to report more optimistically biased earnings forecasts and recommendations to the stocks they hold larger positions in. We also find that the magnitude of analyst optimism increases with the shareholdings of the mutual funds that contribute commission fees to the analyst’s brokerage firm. These findings remain robust after incorporating a regulation change that reduces conflicts of interest in the brokerage industry and higher dimensional fixed effects, and thus are unlikely to be driven by reverse causality or omitted variable bias.     

Why do auditors fail? What might work? What won’t?†

Auditing failures and scandals have become commonplace. In response, reformers (including the Kingman Review in the U.K. and a recent report of the U.K.’s Competition and Market Authority) have proposed a variety of remedies, including prophylactic bans on auditors providing consulting services to their clients in the belief that this will minimize the conflicts of interest that produce auditing failures. Although useful, such reforms are already in place to a considerable degree and may have reached the point of diminishing returns. Moreover, this strategy does not address the deeper problem that clients (or their managements) may not want aggressive auditing, but rather prefer a deferential and perfunctory audit. If so, auditors will realize that they are marketing a ‘commodity’ service and cannot successfully compete based on their quality of services. Rationally, they would respond to such a market by seeking to adopt a cost-minimization strategy, competing by reducing the cost of their services and not investing in new technology or higher-priced personnel.

What could change this pattern? Gatekeepers, including auditors, serve investors, but are hired by corporate management. To induce gatekeepers to better serve investors, one needs to reduce the ‘agency costs’ surrounding this relationship by making gatekeepers more accountable to investors. This might be accomplished through litigation (as happens to some degree in the U.S.), but the U.K. and Europe have rules that discourage collective litigation. Thus, a more feasible approach would be to give investors greater ability to select and remove the auditor. This paper proposes a two part strategy to this end: (1) public ‘grading’ of the auditor by the audit regulator in an easily comparable fashion (and with a mandatory grading curve), and (2) enabling a minority of the shareholders (hypothetically, 10%) to propose a replacement auditor for a shareholder vote. It further argues that both activist shareholders and diversified shareholders might support such a strategy and undertake it under different circumstances. Absent such a focus on agency costs, however, reformers are likely only re-arranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.     

论股东代表诉讼之判决既判力主观范围的扩张

股东代表诉讼判决既判力主观范围的扩张，包括向公司与其他股东二者的扩张。长期以来原告股东与公司的关系存在诉讼代理与诉讼担当之争，综合立法现状、制度渊源与改革成本等因素的考量，原告股东与公司的关系应定性为法定诉讼担当，从而为判决既判力向公司扩张提供正当理论支撑。但受制于股东代表诉讼前置程序形骸化，对原告股东起诉的正当性审查无从实现，公司与其他股东对于诉讼的获悉存在信息壁垒，由此应当通过诉讼告知程序为公司或其他股东作为有独立请求权第三人进入诉讼开辟通路。同时借由不起诉理由书与统一案件受理费等程序构建，作为其他股东进入诉讼的激励机制，进而为既判力的扩张提供有理性基础。