Dissecting interbank risk using basis swap spreads

This paper analyses interbank risk using the information content of basis swap (BS) spreads, floating-to-floating interest rate swaps whose payments are associated with euro deposit rates for alternative tenors. To identify the impact of shocks affecting interbank risk, we propose an empirical model that decomposes BS quotes into their expected and unexpected components. These unobservable constituents of BS spreads are estimated by solving a signal extraction problem using a particle filter. We find that expected components covariate with aggregate liquidity and risk aversion while systemic risk arises as the main driver behind unexpected fluctuations. Our empirical findings suggest that macroprudential analysis emerges as a key device to ease asset pricing in a new multi-curve scenario.     

Conditional risk measures in a bipartite market structure

In this paper, we study the effect of network structure between agents and objects on measures for systemic risk. We model the influence of sharing large exogeneous losses to the financial or (re)insurance market by a bipartite graph. Using Pareto-tailed losses and multivariate regular variation, we obtain asymptotic results for conditional risk measures based on the Value-at-Risk and the Conditional Tail Expectation. These results allow us to assess the influence of an individual institution on the systemic or market risk and vice versa through a collection of conditional risk measures. For large markets, Poisson approximations of the relevant constants are provided. Differences of the conditional risk measures for an underlying homogeneous and inhomogeneous random graph are illustrated by simulations.     

A unified approach to systemic risk measures via acceptance sets

We specify a general methodological framework for systemic risk measures via multidimensional acceptance sets and aggregation functions. Existing systemic risk measures can usually be interpreted as the minimal amount of cash needed to secure the system after aggregating individual risks. In contrast, our approach also includes systemic risk measures that can be interpreted as the minimal amount of cash that secures the aggregated system by allocating capital to the single institutions before aggregating the individual risks. An important feature of our approach is the possibility of allocating cash according to the future state of the system (scenario‐dependent allocation). We also provide conditions that ensure monotonicity, convexity, or quasi‐convexity of our systemic risk measures.     

Promote Competitive Neutrality to Facilitate China’s Economic Development:Outlook,Policy Simulations,and Reform Implementation-A Summary of the Annual SUFE Macroeconomic Report(2019-2020)

Twenty nineteen(2019)marked another year of lethargic growth in the Chinese economy amidst escalated internal and external complexities.Internally,the country's macroeconomic landscape was overcast continuously by fallen consumption growth,plunged growth in manufacturing investment,rapid accumulation of household debt,risen income inequality,and the overhang of local government debt.The nation's external conditions did not fare any better,with drastically declined growth in imports and exports,continued trade tensions with the US,and weakened external demand.Based on the IAR-CMM model,which takes account of both cyclical and secular factors,the baseline real GDP growth rate is projected to be 6.0%in 2020(5.9%using more reliable rather than the official data),with a downside risk.Alternative scenario analyses and policy simulations are conducted,in addition to the benchmark forecast,to reflect the influences of various internal and external uncertainties.The findings emanated from these analyses lead us to stress the importance and urgency of deepening reform to achieve competitive neutrality for China’s transformation into a phase with sustainable and high-quality development.     

Bank Income Diversification,Asset Correlation and Systemic Risk

This paper explores whether the asset correlations among the non-interest activities of banks are the key causes for enhancing the bank diversification-systemic risk nexus. Our empirical evidence indicates that banks' income diversification significantly raises systemic risk. After removing those banks with high asset correlations, the effect of individual banks' diversification on banking systemic risk turns insignificant or even inverse. The results show that high asset correlations among banks could introduce bank failures, thereby leading to higher systemic risk in the financial sector.     

Too big to fail: Measures,remedies, and consequences for efficiency and stability*

This paper evaluates whether reform efforts addressing “too big to fail” actually enhance the stability of the financial system, and whether trade‐offs exist between stability and efficiency. We also present and discuss various measures of bank size and complexity since such measures are essential for implementing appropriate corrective remedies. As we will show, there are no unambiguous measures of size or complexity that can fully capture a bank's contribution to systemic risk. Their effects on efficiency are also impossible to capture with certainty. While we recognize the need for additional research and empirical evidence, we do identify weaknesses and strengths of proposed and implemented reforms that could have consequences for bank stability and efficiency.     

Can We Prove a Bank Guilty of Creating Systemic Risk? A Minority Report

Because increasing a bank's capital requirement to improve the stability of the financial system imposes costs upon the bank, a regulator should ideally be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that banks classified as systemically risky really do create systemic risk before subjecting them to this capital punishment. Evaluating the performance of two leading systemic risk models, we show that estimation error alone prevents the reliable identification of the most systemically risky banks. We conclude that it will be a considerable challenge to develop a riskometer that is sound and reliable enough to provide an adequate foundation for macroprudential policy.     

Tranching and Rating

In this paper we analyse the source and magnitude of marketing gains from selling structured debt securities at yields that reflect only their credit ratings, or specifically at yields on equivalently rated corporate bonds. We distinguish between credit ratings that are based on probabilities of default and ratings that are based on expected default losses. We show that subdividing a bond issued against given collateral into subordinated tranches can yield significant profits under the hypothesised pricing system. Increasing the systematic risk or reducing the total risk of the bond collateral increases the profits further. The marketing gain is generally increasing in the number of tranches and decreasing in the rating of the lowest rated tranche.     

Systemic and Idiosyncratic Risk in EU-15 Sovereign Yield Spreads after Seven Years of Monetary Union

The market capitalisation of international bond markets is much larger than that of international equity markets. However, compared to the large body of literature on international equity market linkages, there are far fewer empirical studies of bond systemic risk or international bond market co-movements. The extent of international bond market linkages merits investigation, as it may have important implications for the cost of financing fiscal deficit, monetary policymaking independence, modelling and forecasting long-term interest rates, and bond portfolio diversification. In this paper, we investigate the relative influence of systemic and idiosyncratic risk factors on yield spreads over 10-year German government securities during the seven years after the beginning of Monetary Integration. We estimate both panel regressions for the two groups of EU-15 countries (EMU and non-EMU) and specific-country regressions for the nine countries in the EMU group and the three countries in the non-EMU group. All estimations include both domestic (differences in market liquidity and credit risk) and international risk factors. The results present clear evidence that it was mostly idiosyncratic rather than systemic risk factors that drove the evolution of 10-year yield spread differentials over Germany in all EMU countries during the seven years after the beginning of Monetary Integration. Conversely, in the case of non-EMU countries, adjusted yield spreads (corrected from the foreign exchange factor) are influenced more by systemic risk factors. The fact that these countries do not share a common Monetary Policy might explain these results, which may show that government bonds from EMU countries have a better safe-haven status that those of non-EMU countries.