论城市交通网对旅游交通的影响--以重庆为例

旅游交通是旅游业发展的充要条件，交通条件的优劣在很大程度上决定了旅游经济发展的快慢。笔通过分析重庆市旅游交通条件的现状，认为必须依托城市交通网进行旅游线路布局，并提出了改善重庆旅游交通条件的对策措施。     

论风险投资行为及其规律

章从作提出的行为统计结构理论出发，认为包括风险投资行为在内的风险行为都遵循三条规律，即风险行为的预期效益引导规律，风险责任承担的制约规律，风险效用规律。     

论绿色消费与可持续发展

绿色消费是实现人与自然和谐的可持续发展的重要保证，而要实现绿色消费，关键是在生态意识的支配下实施绿色消费行为。     

对旅游商品开发战略模式的探讨

旅游商品的开发对于促进旅游业的发展具有重要意义，而我国旅游商品的开发却成为旅游业发展的瓶颈。本文对我国旅游商品开发的现状及存在的问题进行了深刻分析，提出了开发特色旅游商品、创新经营模式、完善产权保护、发挥政府主导作用等策略和建议。     

外资进入对本土企业风险承担的影响：资本逐利还是风险规避

外资自由化作为我国资本市场开放的重要内容,在促进境内外资本要素互联互通的同时,也深刻影响着微观企业行为。以我国2007—2017年A股上市公司作为研究样本,实证检验外资进入对我国本土企业风险承担的影响。研究发现：外资进入能够显著提升企业的风险承担水平。进一步地,外资进入对企业风险承担的促进效应在融资约束严重、股权集中度更高和市场化进程缓慢地区的企业中更加显著。此外,在不同资本市场开放水平,外资进入对企业风险承担的作用存在明显差异。     

香奈儿品牌形象对消费者购买意愿的影响分析

中国消费者为现阶段全球最大的奢侈品消费群体。自香奈儿进入中国市场以来,因其高贵、优雅、简约的设计风格受到中产阶级以上女性消费群体的欢迎和喜爱。在奢侈品行业中,品牌形象作为企业重要的无形资产,成为了品牌竞争的另一领域。基于上述背景,论文以“香奈儿品牌形象对消费者购买意愿的影响分析”为选题,以贝尔模型为研究基础,使用问卷调查法获取数据,运用SPSS 19.0统计软件对数据进行处理分析,并结合消费者行为学相关理论,研究品牌形象的不同变量对于消费者购买行为产生的影响。     

Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?—An experimental analysis

We experimentally investigate whether individuals can reliably detect cooperators (the nice(r) people) in an anonymous decision environment involving “connected games.” Participants can condition their choices in an asymmetric prisoners’ dilemma and a trust game on past individual (their partner’s donation share to a self-selected charity) and social (whether their partner belongs to a group with high or low average donations) information. Thus, the two measures of niceness are the individual donation share in the donation task, and the cooperativeness of one’s choice in the two games. We find that high donors achieve a higher-than-average expected payoff by cooperating predominantly with other high donors. Group affiliation proved to be irrelevant. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C91, C72, D3     

Estimating Willingness to Pay for Improved Drinking Water Quality Using Averting Behavior Method with Perception Measure

This paper suggests an application of an averting behaviormethod to reconcile inconsistent public activity with objectiveenvironmental risk. In Korea, an historically polluted watersupply has created citizen resistance to using tap water. Koreansperceive low quality levels for tap water, although objectivelymeasured data show that the pollution levels are lower than theacceptable risk. We hypothesized that the irrational aversion tousing tap water is a consequence of inconsistencies between theobjectively measured and perceived pollution levels. We introducethe perception averting behavior method, in which we add aperception measure unit to the conventional averting behaviormethod. We found that the perception measure provided a validexplanation for citizens' aversion to using tap water in Korea.     

绿色财务管理的短期均衡分析

当前,生态问题日趋严重,这种状况的形成主要是人类自身行为造成的,人们虽然已经越来越多地认识到其危害性,但是在经济利益的驱使下,人类的这种破坏行为并没有真正停止或减少。作为微观经济主体的企业,它的行为对生态问题的影响非常重要,所以必须改变企业的经济行为。作为经济主体其目标就是为了获取经济利益,只有保证其有一定经济利益的情况下,来改变其行为以利于解决生态问题才是可行的。鉴于此,本文从市场上各类企业的经济行为特点入手,来探讨解决问题的途径。     

Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

We present a brief overview of recent developments in discounted repeated games with (imperfect) private monitoring. The literature explores the possibility of cooperation in a long-term relationship, where each agent receives imperfect private information about the opponents' actions. Although this class of games admits a wide range of applications such as collusion under secret price-cutting, exchange of goods with uncertain quality, and observation errors, it has fairly complex mathematical structure due to the lack of common information shared by players. This is in sharp contrast to the well-explored case of repeated games under public information (with the celebrated Folk Theorems), and until recently little had been known about the private monitoring case. However, rapid developments in the past few years have revealed the possibility of cooperation under private monitoring for some class of games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D43, D82, L13, L41.