In 1996, the UK government privatised the railway industry based on a separation of rail infrastructure from train operations. Track, stations and signalling were transferred to a private sector infrastructure company, Railtrack plc. Separate passenger and freight train operators were required to pay track access charges to Railtrack for use of its rail infrastructure.
In 2001, in an attempt to meet the government’s plan to expand freight traffic, the government-appointed rail regulator substantially reduced the amount of track charges payable to Railtrack by the freight operators. The resulting shortfall in Railtrack’s revenue is met by public subsidy from another regulatory agency, the Strategic Rail Authority.
A failure by the regulators to insist on rail freight growth targets or to impose any claw-back of the subsidies for non-performance is a tribute to weak political and legislative control over regulatory mechanisms and, to a certain extent, reflects the ‘capture’ of the state regulatory process by the freight industry.
The net result has been a decline in rail freight traffic, an increase in public subsidy and a substantial increase in the earnings of the largest freight operator. 相似文献
China has built a very comprehensive financial system, but has not let the market mechanism work freely. This unique pattern, rooted in China's dual‐track reform strategy between state and non‐state sectors, did not prevent a strong economic performance in the past, but is now a main cause of economic inefficiency and financial risks. The rapid development of digital finance is a back‐door way of financial liberalization, responding to both old repressive policies and new technologies. To accomplish the mission of building an efficient financial system, the government needs to take at least three further steps in financial reform: creating a level‐playing field; freeing up the market mechanism; and improving regulation. The key test lies in the effective enforcement of market discipline for corporate and financial institutions. 相似文献
We investigate two non-traditional harvest strategies for selling a privately-held company. Dual-track private firms file for an IPO while also courting acquirers. These firms withdraw the IPO to be taken over. Dual-track public firms complete an IPO and are taken over shortly thereafter. Examining 679 takeovers from 1995–2004, we find private dual-track sell-outs earn a 22–26% higher premium and dual-track public sell-outs earn an 18–21% higher premium than single-track sell-outs. Larger, VC-backed, prestigious underwritten, and bubble-year firms have a higher propensity to take the dual-track path. The implication is that entrepreneurs may increase their harvest value by using a dual-track strategy. 相似文献