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71.
Do some top executives matter more than others? Integrating insights from upper echelons and executive mobility research, we suggest that the functional roles performed by top executives shape their value to the firm. We examine the effects of interfirm executive mobility on firm survival for New York City advertising firms from 1924 to 1996. We find that, while losing any top executive is damaging, the loss of a top executive whose functional role focuses on internal firm processes is more detrimental to firm survival than losing a top executive whose functional role focuses on managing external exchange relationships. Additionally, in situations when multiple executives leave simultaneously, firms are more negatively affected when the group departing is functionally heterogeneous. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   
72.
We investigate whether managers' personal political orientation helps explain tax avoidance at the firms they manage. Results reveal the intriguing finding that, on average, firms with top executives who lean toward the Republican Party actually engage in less tax avoidance than firms whose executives lean toward the Democratic Party. We also examine changes in tax avoidance around CEO turnovers and find corroborating evidence. Additionally, we find that political orientation is helpful in explaining top management team composition and CEO succession. Our paper extends theory and research by (1) illustrating how tax avoidance can serve as another measure of corporate risk taking and (2) using political orientation as a proxy for managerial conservatism, which is an ex ante measure of a manager's propensity toward risk. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   
73.
梁云  白仁春 《商业研究》2011,(9):198-201
重庆提出建设长江上游贸易中心,完善购物功能,打造"购物天堂"。本文通过借鉴相关评价标准界定"购物之都"内涵,通过相关城市比较明确重庆建设长江上游"购物之都"的战略定位,确定其消费购物、生产采购、品牌集聚、时尚引领、信息集中、价格形成六大核心功能,从主体、载体、产业体系、支持系统上形成建设长江上游购物之都的总体思路与框架。  相似文献   
74.
王璐  李巧艳  王小改 《价值工程》2012,31(30):290-291
对邻域关系下的覆盖粗糙集的矩阵描述及模糊性度量进行分析和研究。首先,给出了一种新的邻域关系的覆盖粗糙集上、下近似的定义。其次,在邻域关系下的覆盖近似空间引入了一类新的模糊集,得覆盖近似空间的模糊性度量,最后通过实例给出直观解释。  相似文献   
75.
在对高管团队人口统计学特征指标和企业绩效指标进行因子分析的基础上,结合高层梯队理论和代理理论,研究了高管团队不同层次的属性(自然属性、能力属性和治理属性)与企业不同层次的绩效(成长绩效、增长绩效和经营绩效)的关系,并进一步分析了CEO的社会资本在两者关系中所起的调节作用。研究结论如下:中国上市公司的绩效与高管团队的管理素质有关;CEO的社会资本削弱了高管团队的管理素质与企业绩效的正向关系;中国现实环境中存在的"关系"不利于中国企业整体的成长。提出:完善市场经济体制、加强法制建设、厘清政府与市场的关系对于企业健康成长具有重要意义。  相似文献   
76.
随着广大汽车消费者审美水平的不断提高,汽车不再是单纯的代步工具,还是时尚和潮流的最好的体现。汽车灯具作为车身画龙点睛之笔,对于汽车整体造型的完美体现起到至关重要的作用,而在灯具的设计过程中,光源的选择在一定程度上限制着灯具整体设计的自由度。文章简单介绍了LED应用于汽车灯具的优势,概述了LED在车灯行业的发展趋势。  相似文献   
77.
[目的]分析岷江上游地区农牧户融入现代农业生产体系意愿的影响因素及其内部异质性。[方法]文章运用Logit模型,基于岷江上游地农牧户调研数据,选取农牧户认知水平、社会资本、邻里效应等五个方面19个指标分析其对农牧户融入现代农业生产体系意愿的影响。[结果](1)认知水平对农牧户融入现代农业生产体系的意愿有显著的正向影响;这种影响不存在农牧行业异质性。(2)换工行为显著提升了农牧户融入现代农业生产体系的意愿(3)政策环境因素对于提升农牧户融入现代农业生产体系的意愿具有重要影响。[结论](1)提高农牧户对现代农业生产体系的认知水平是促进岷江上游地区农牧户融入现代农业生产体系的根本途径。(2)农牧户的换工行为已经不再是一种简单劳动交换行为,而演变为现代农业生产方式的演示和交流活动。(3)岷江上游地区的现代农业发展战略不能仅仅就农业而谈农业,而要通过教育、医疗和基建等各方面的协同推进,全面增强农牧户对现代生产方式的认知水平,为农牧户融入现代农业生产体系提供基本条件。  相似文献   
78.
张季辉  何文钦 《价值工程》2015,(21):107-108
对贵州某煤与瓦斯突出矿井建立FLAC3D模型进行分析,沿走向在中间部分的应力减小,在开切眼和收作线的应力增大;沿走向方向,煤层开挖到100m和150m的时候煤层的卸压范围最大,开挖200m时候卸压区范围有所减小。通过对上保护层开采后的煤层群应力变化进行研究,可以更好的确定保护层保护范围。  相似文献   
79.
We study an optimal consumption and portfolio selection problem for an investor by a martingale approach. We assume that time is a discrete and finite horizon, the sample space is finite and the number of securities is smaller than that of the possible securities price vector transitions. the investor is prohibited from investing stocks more (less, respectively) than given upper (lower) bounds at any time, and he maximizes an expected time additive utility function for the consumption process. First we give a set of budget feasibility conditions so that a consumption process is attainable by an admissible portfolio process. Also we state the existence of the unique primal optimal solutions. Next we formulate a dual control problem and establish the duality between primal and dual control problems. Also we show the existence of dual optimal solutions. Finally we consider the computational aspect of dual approach through a simple numerical example.  相似文献   
80.
We model strategic competition in a market with asymmetric information as a noncooperative game in which each seller competes for a buyer of unknown type by offering the buyer a catalog of products and prices. We call this game a catalog game. Our main objective is to show that catalog games have Nash equilibria. The Nash existence problem for catalog games is particularly contentious due to payoff discontinuities caused by tie-breaking. We make three contributions. First, we establish under very mild conditions on primitives that no matter what the tie-breaking rule, catalog games are uniformly payoff secure, and therefore have mixed extensions which are payoff secure. Second, we show that if the tie-breaking rule awards the sale to firms which value it most (i.e., breaks ties in favor of firms which stand to make the highest profit), then firm profits are reciprocally upper semicontinuous (i.e., the mixed catalog game is reciprocally upper semincontinuous). This in turn implies that the mixed catalog game satisfies Reny’s condition of better-reply security—a condition sufficient for existence (Reny in Econometrica 67:1029–1056, 1999). Third, we show by example that if the tie-breaking rule does not award the sale to firms which value it most (for example, if ties are broken randomly with equal probability), then the catalog game has no Nash equilibrium. This paper was written while the second author was Visiting Professor, Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, Universite Paris 1, Pantheon-Sorbonne. The second author thanks CES and Paris 1, and in particular, Bernard Cornet and Cuong Le Van for their support and hospitality. The second author also thanks the C&BA and EFLS at the University of Alabama for financial support. Both authors are grateful to Monique Florenzano and to participants in the April 2006 Paris 1 NSF/NBER Decentralization Conference for many helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper. Finally, both authors are especially grateful to an anonymous referee whose thoughtful comments led to substantial improvements in the paper. Monteiro acknowleges the financial support of Capes-Cofecub 468/04.  相似文献   
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