Vertical externalities and control of politicians

A major role of (repeated) elections is to create incentives for politicians to act in the interests of voters. This paper considers the disciplining role of elections in countries with either one or two levels of government. Simple retrospective voting strategies which are based on cut-off levels with respect to expenditure and tax rates are considered. It is shown that the power of voters is weakened if a second independent level of government is added. However, voters can partially reinforce their power by making politicians not only liable for their own policy, but also for the policy carried out at each other level of government. Received: June 30, 2000 / Accepted: April 4, 2001     

Local monotonicity of power: Axiom or just a property?

This paper discusses whether Local Monotonicity (LM) should be regarded as a property of the power distribution of a specific voting game under consideration, indicated by a power measure, or as a characteristic of power per se. The latter would require reasonable power measures to satisfy a corresponding LM axiom. The former suggests that measures which do not allow for a violation of LM fail to account for dimensions of power which can cause nonmonotonicity in voting weight. Only if a measure is able to indicate nonmonotonicity, it can help design voting games for which power turns out to be monotonic. The argument is discussed in the light of recent extensions of traditional power indices.     

Voting on welfare reform Stemming migration, assisting the needy, or promoting economic growth?

This paper examines the influences on voting by members of the House of Representatives on the Carter Administration's welfare reform legislation. The analysis finds some support for the hypothesis that voting by national legislators responded to the potential mobility of welfare recipients from low to high benefit states. Defining the public interest as promoting economic growth and the special interest as increasing redistribution, the results also provide evidence in support of the Stigler hypothesis that politically secure legislators are better able to vote the public, as opposed to the special, interest. Received: July 15, 1998 / Accepted: August 6, 1999     

Voting on road congestion policy

This paper studies the political economy of urban traffic policy. A city council and a regional government (representing city and suburbs) decide respectively on parking fees and a road toll. Both charges are below the optimum when median voters in city and suburbs prefer cars to public transport sufficiently more than the average. Even if the city government would set an optimal road toll, the regional government blocks it when the median suburban voter prefers cars strongly enough. Letting the city control parking and road pricing may therefore increase chances of adoption of the latter. However, if the city controls parking and the region road pricing, the combined charges are higher than if the city controlled them both. Hence, when voters want all charges below the optimum, the involvement of two governments may be desirable. We also find that earmarking road pricing revenues for public transport is welfare-enhancing, compared to lump-sum redistribution, only if they are topped up by extra funds granted to the city by a higher level of government.     

融资约束视角下终极控股股东对企业风险承担的影响

本文利用我国2006～2014年沪深A股非金融类上市企业数据,研究终极控股股东对企业风险承 担的影响以及融资约束在该影响中的作用。结果表明,控股股东现金流权对企业风险承担的 影响呈U型结构,随现金流权的增大,现金流权对企业风险承担的影响由正转负。就我国市 场而言,控制权与现金流权的分离度对企业风险承担具有负向影响,这种负向影响程度随融 资约束的提高而减弱。     

Welfare Reducing Polls

We study costly majority voting when voters rationally anticipate others have similar preferences. The correlation in preferences lowers expected turnout because votes have a positive externality on those who abstain. We study the effects of the public release of information (polls) on participation levels. Polls raise expected turnout but reduce expected welfare because they stimulate the “wrong” group to participate resulting in a “toss-up” election. Our novel results highlight the adverse effects of providing information about the electorate’s preferences and may explain why some countries bar opinion polls close to an election date.     

Condorcet meets Bentham

We show that if the statistical distribution of utility functions in a population satisfies a certain condition, then a Condorcet winner will not only exist, but will also maximize the utilitarian social welfare function. We also show that, if people’s utility functions are generated according to certain plausible random processes, then in a large population, this condition will be satisfied with very high probability. Thus, in a large population, the utilitarian outcome will be selected by any Condorcet consistent voting rule.     

Strategic Analysis of High-tech Auctions

This paper deals with the security voting structure in an auction mechanism used to sell an item Of high-tech. The design of security voting structure allows the seller to choose between two objectives that are not mutually consistent. However, if the seller wants to maximize his revenue, he should retain some shares to benefit from the future dividends generated by the acquirer. In addition, if he wants to sell his high-tech to the most efficient candidate, he should sell all the shares.     

Is the MPC's Voting Record Informative about Future UK Monetary Policy?

It is shown that the voting record of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England helps predict future policy rate changes. This result is robust to the inclusion of market participants’ expectations as measured by the slope of the term structure of money market rates and interest rate futures. Moreover, expectations seem to adjust to the information contained in the voting record, which suggests that publishing the minutes of MPC meetings increases the transparency of monetary policy.