Candidate stability and probabilistic voting procedures

Summary. We extend the analysis of Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) on strategic candidacy to probabilistic environments. For each agenda and each profile of voters preferences over running candidates, a probabilistic voting procedure selects a lottery on the set of running candidates. Assuming that candidates cannot vote, we show that random dictatorships are the only unanimous probabilistic voting procedures that never provide unilateral incentives for the candidates to withdraw their candidacy at any set of potential candidates. More flexible probabilistic voting procedures can be devised if we restrict our attention to the stability of specific sets of potential candidates.Received: 4 February 2003, Revised: 14 September 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D71, D72.This is a revised version of a chapter of my Ph.D. Dissertation submitted to the Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona. I am indebted to my supervisor Salvador Barberá for his advice and constant support. I am grateful to Dolors Berga and an anonymous referee for their detailed comments and suggestions. I thank José Alcalde, Walter Bossert, Bhaskar Dutta, Lars Ehlers, Jordi Massó, Diego Moreno, Clara Ponsatí, Yves Sprumont, and William Thomson for many helpful comments and discussions. I thank the hospitality of the C.R.D.E. at the Université de Montréal and the Department of Economics of the University of Warwick where parts of this research were conducted. Financial support through Research Grant 1998FI00022 from Comissionat per Universitats i Recerca, Generalitat de Catalunya, Research Project PB98-870 from the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, and Fundación Barrié de la Maza is gratefully acknowledged.     

Approval voting in subset elections

Summary. Approval voting is designed to be “insensitive to numbers” of voters, and likely to elect a Condorcet candidate. However, the result of an election among one group of candidates gives no information about the results of elections among any other groups, even if every voter follows the recommended utility-maximizing strategy, which places strong restrictions on the individual voter's subset ballots. Thus the addition of a single candidate could completely reverse the outcome of an election, or a Condorcet candidate could finish last. Received: November 5, 1998; revised version: November 30, 1998     

Exploring Voter Preferences in Cultural Policy: A Case Study for Austria

The aim of the paper is to explore the demographic, social, economic and politicaldeterminants of voting behavior in a recently held referendum on the constructionof a new theater (``Musiktheater') in the city of Linz (Upper Austria) in 2000. Itwas the first referendum on cultural policy of its kind in Austria, and it led to arejection of the proposal by a majority of the voters (59.70% of ``No' votes).Exploring the determinants of approval or disapproval of the proposition by usingfor group data in communities is thus an interesting question from an economic aswell as a political point of view. We find econometric evidence for the influence ofthe size of the population in the community, the distance of the community from thecity of Linz, income-related variables, variables denoting the economic structure ofthe community, and political variables such as the ratio of the communities' debt torevenues and voters' preferences in the last national election.     

The demand for judicial sanctions: voter information and the election of judges

We examine 20 partisan judicial elections over an 8-year period to determine whether judge specific information shows in election results. We find demand for judicial sanctions looks much like other voting processes. Among voters, Democratic incumbent judges, who tend to be lenient, are rewarded for being harsh, while Republican incumbent judges, who generally are harsh, are rewarded for being lenient. Voters are not found to be a random sample of the population, and we find that straight ticket votes obscure information from selective voters. This paper benefitted from comments received by participants at the Public Choice Meetings, and from useful comments from Aimee Chin, Janet Kohlhase, an anonymous referee and the editor.