法律环境、金字塔结构与家族企业的“掏空”行为

我国家族上市公司的最终控制人多数采用金字塔结构实现对上市公司的超额控制,现金流量权和控制权的分离程度较为严重。以2002-2004年家族上市公司为研究样本,本文实证考察了家族上市公司所处地区的法律环境及金字塔结构与"掏空"行为之间的关系。研究结果表明:控制性家族"掏空"上市公司的概率与其拥有的现金流量权显著负相关,与现金流量权和控制权的分离程度正相关;同时,较高的法治水平能够有效地遏制控制性家族的"掏空"行为。因此,建立一个有效的股东权利保护机制,同时完善家族上市公司的现金流量权和控制权结构,对于推进公司治理具有重要意义。     

累积投票制的博弈性及其解决方法

累积投票制度因具备一个完整的博弈构成要件 (即 ,博弈方、策略空间和支付结构 ) ,具有博弈性。累积投票博弈性的特点有 :累积投票主要是非合作博弈、也可能是合作博弈 ,累积投票是静态博弈、有限策略博弈和非零和博弈。为了减少累积投票的博弈效果 ,鼓励合作博弈 ,可以采取立法手段、分类董事会、缩小董事会规模和购买表决权无效原则等方法。     

Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption

The goals of democratic competition are not only to implement a majority's preference on policy questions, but also to provide a deterrent against corrupt abuse of power by political leaders. We consider a simple model of multicandidate elections in which different electoral systems can be compared according to these two criteria. Among a wide class of single‐winner scoring rules, only approval voting is found to satisfy both effectiveness against corruption and majoritarianism for this model.     

The Poll Results Hypothesis

This empirical study seeks to broaden the interpretation of the rational voter model so as to reflect the potential impact of the results of polls of likely voters’ Presidential candidate preferences on the expected benefits of voting and hence on the voter participation rate. This study introduces the poll results hypothesis: in any given state, given the existence of the Electoral College, the greater the lead of a principal Presidential candidate over his/her closest rival as revealed in polls of likely voters, the lower, for at least some portion of prospective voters, the expected gross benefits of voting in that state and hence the lower the aggregate voter participation rate in that state. In a cross-section study of the 50 states during the 2004 general election, it is found, after allowing for a variety of other factors, that the greater the lead (as revealed in polls of likely voters) of either of the principal Presidential candidates over the other in any given state, the lower the voter turnout rate in that state.      

The Manipulation of Voting Systems

In this paper we consider several ways in which voting systems can be manipulated and we pose some related ethical questions. Our focus is on the recent phenomenon of vote trading or vote swapping that was invented in 2000 and used in the 2000 and 2004 U.S. Presidential elections. Vote trading is an Internet-based technique that sought to allow Democrats in heavily Republican states (like Texas) to effectively vote in swing states (like Florida), where their votes would have more impact. We also look at some other new ways that voting systems can be manipulated and we consider the general question of whether there exist voting systems that cannot be manipulated. David Hartvigsen is a professor in the Management Department of the Mendoza College of Business at the University of Notre Dame. He has a Ph.D. in Mathematics from Carnegie Mellon University and his research is in the areas of Operations Research, Optimization, and Algorithms.     

Pareto violations of parliamentary voting systems

It has been known for a long time that many binary voting rules can select a Pareto dominated outcome, that is an outcome such that there exists some other alternative which is preferred by every voter. In this paper, we show that some of these rules can select an outcome Pareto dominated in a much stronger sense. Furthermore, our main results are concerned with the evaluation of the likelihood of Pareto dominated outcomes under four social choice rules commonly used in Parliaments or in committees. Given a set of four alternatives and a set of n individuals, we assume anonymous profiles and using analytical methods we compute the proportion of profiles at which the Pareto criterion is violated. Our results show that one should not be especially worried about the existence of the possibility as such. We are grateful to two anonymous referees for very helpful remarks and suggestions.     

Did political constraints bind during transition?Evidence from Czech elections, 1990–20021

Many theoretical models of transition are driven by the assumption that economic decision making is subject to political constraints. In this paper we test whether the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of economic reform influenced voting behaviour in the first five national elections in the Czech Republic. We propose that voters, taking stock of endowments from the planning era, could predict whether they would become winners or losers of transition. Using survey data we measure the degree to which regions were ‘not afraid’ or ‘afraid’ of economic reform in 1990. We define the former as potential ‘winners’ who should vote for pro‐reform parties and the latter as potential ‘losers’ who should support left‐wing parties. Using election results and economic indicators at the regional level, we demonstrate that there is persistence in support for pro‐reform and communist parties which is driven by prospective voting based on initial conditions in 1990. We find that regional unemployment rates in 2002 are good predictors of voting patterns in 1990 and provide empirical evidence that political constraints bind during transition.     

Collective Trust Behavior*

This paper investigates trust behavior in situations where decision‐makers are large groups and the decision mechanism is collective. Theories from behavioral economics and psychology suggest that trust in such situations may differ from interindividual trust. The experimental results here reveal a large difference in trust but not in trustworthiness between the individual and collective setting. Furthermore, a field experiment captures the determinants of collective trust behavior among two Swedish cohorts. Beliefs about the other group and one's own group are strongly associated with collective trustworthiness and trust behavior.     

类别股东表决机制与股权分置改革

制度具有相互依存性,制度的效率依赖于其它配套制度的发展。类别股东表决机制的建立保证了以支付对价为核心的股权分置改革的多数选择原则和帕累托改进性质,推动了改革的顺利完成。解决资本市场的基础性、制度性问题是一项复杂的系统工程,因此,在未来的改革进程中,必须充分考虑到制度的关联性、互补性及可操作性。