黄金股研究综述

黄金股在欧洲国有企业民营化过程中发挥过重要作用,在目前中国国有企业股份制改革中,政府设置黄金股作为新的企业控制形式非常有研究价值。本文较为详细地梳理了黄金股的各类相关研究文献,从私有化对业绩的影响、公司业绩和收购可能性的关系、投票权溢价和控股的价值、限制国外直接或间接投资对公司的影响四个方面对黄金股的研究进行归纳总结。     

基于Shannon-RVM模型的科研项目评审排序方法

对科研项目进行合理排序,是科研项目评审和筛选的前提,是科研管理的重要内容。现有的研究均是基于专家打分进行的,因为专家打分的主观性,排序结果往往失于准确。本文基于信息熵理论和专家有序投票模型,提出一种多专家多科研项目的排序方法。该方法的数据基础(即专家排序)更为合理,因而能得出更为客观的排序结果。实例研究证实了本方法的合理性。     

Endogenous political competition and political accountability

We contribute to the debate over the effectiveness of elections in motivating incumbents to perform well. We show that with endogenous political competition the effectiveness of democracy in disciplining officials can be largely diminished.     

Does a deviation between the rights and obligations of the board and controlling shareholders affect firm value？

This study examines the association between firm value and ownership structure, when board and controlling stockholders＇ voting rights deviate from obligations. The measurement of the corporate governance variables is different from prior research. The author further investigates whether monitoring mechanisms can alleviate the agency problem due to percentage of outside directors. The empirical results show that the higher board voting rights-obligations is deviated, which means the weaker relation with the firm value. The author also finds the monitoring from outside directors can reduce the agency problems from board＇s deviation and thus can improve firm value. But the results of the controlling stockholders＇ deviation are mixed or insignificant. This research has implications for Taiwan＇s regulators who are striving to improve the information, transparency, and corporate governance of board and controlling shareholders＇ voting rights-obligations deviation.     

The Secretary Problem Revisited - The Group Decision-Making Perspective

We consider a decision situation where there is an initial set of alternatives that may be augmented, a variant of the problem known in the literature as the "secretary problem". We focus the discussion on the special case of group decision-making, where a group or committee is charged with the responsibility of negotiating the decision. We investigate situations of explicitly stated (multiple) criteria and the simpler situation of no such stated criteria. The former case includes the congenial, the mixed, and the uncongenial cases, where the individuals agree on the direction of all, some, or none of the criteria, respectively. We offer a framework within which a group of individuals can be supported in such a decision process. In the case of explicit criteria, we provide the decision-makers with probability information of the likelihood of finding more preferred alternatives provided the initial set of alternatives is expanded. The framework is tested using a simulated real-world choice situation.     

Unsettling aspects of voting theory

Summary. Voting procedures are known to be plagued with a variety of difficulties such as strategic voting, or where a voter is rewarded with a better election outcome by not voting, or where a winning candidate can lose by receiving more support. Once we know that these problems can occur, the next objective should be to completely understand how, why, and where they arise. Namely, for each election procedure, the new goal is to determine when such problems can occur, all voter types who can cause these difficulties, and the actions they must take. This paper develops an easily used approach to handle all of these issues for standard voting methods. New intuitive explanations for these various oddities follow from this approach. Received: August 14, 2002 ; revised version: September 4, 2002 RID="*" ID="*"My thanks to Richard Barrett and, in particular, to Hannu Nurmi for corrections, several useful comments, and suggestions they made about earlier versions. Also, my thanks to a referee for calling some excellent references to my attention. An earlier draft was presented at the 2002 Public Choice Society meeting. This research was supported by an NSF grant.     

Uniformity Requirement and Political Accountability

This paper discusses the fundamental hypothesis of policy uniformity under centralized decision making, which underlies Oates' famous decentralization theorem. The theorem has, in more recent times, come under pressure owing to the prediction that local public goods are provided to minimum winning coalitions rather than uniformly. The focus of this paper is on the impact of uniformity rules on political accountability. Using the concept of minimum winning coalitions, it is shown that the power of voters over politicians vanishes if election districts receive different levels of local public goods. However, the setting up of sufficiently strong uniformity rules means that voters regain power. According to Oates' theorem, uniformity is the main disadvantage of centralization but, according to the analysis undertaken in this paper, centralization without uniformity would be even worse.     

直接所有权与最终所有权

以往对企业所有权的研究都是基于直接所有权进行的,然而对集团公司的关注,使得对最终所有权的研究日益受到重视.以雅戈尔集团股份有限公司为例,介绍公司的直接所有权结构、最终控制人的识别以及最终控制人现金流权与控制权的分离情况.     

刍论公司章程限制股东表决权制度的架构

通过首次对表决权限制制度进行分类,并梳理章程限制表决权的架构.发现,新公司法提供了较之以往更大的自治空间,使得章程制定者能够考虑采取恰当的措施去限制表决权的滥用行为,提高公司治理水平.     

投票信托与股东投票协议

为保护中小投资者的利益 ,建议在我国建立投票信托制度和股东投票协议制度。投票信托制度是指应当允许一个或多个股东设立一个投票信托组织 ,把股票转让给受托人 ,并授予受托人在一定期限内行使投票权或其它活动的权力。股东投票协议制度是指允许部分股东就特定的股东大会决议事项按照约定的方式行使表决权