The Effect of Monetary Unification on German Bond Markets

We develop a benchmark against which the effects of ECB monetary policy on the German bond market can be evaluated. We first estimate an affine term structure model for the pre‐EMU period linking the German yield curve with the Bundesbank monetary policy. The German monetary policy and its implied yield curve are then reprojected onto the EMU period. The reprojected yield curve differs significantly from the observed one. Short‐term interest rates during the EMU period are significantly lower than they would have been in case the Bundesbank were still in charge of monetary policy. Furthermore, yield spreads increased substantially during the EMU period.     

How opportunistic are partisan German central bankers: Evidence on the Vaubel hypothesis

Recent research has found inconclusive evidence regarding the presence of opportunistic political business cycles in German data. Inferring from Vaubel, 1993 and Vaubel, 1997one could argue, however, that at least in the case of monetary policy the results are seriously flawed from the onset, because an independent central bank such as the German Bundesbank will support the government only when it shares its partisan views. Vaubel has not presented parametric empirical evidence in support of his hypothesis. We show that the application of time series analysis yields results that clearly run counter to the hypothesis. Evidence on voting behaviour from the central bank council minutes points in the same direction. It appears perhaps paradoxically that an opportunistic government is better off facing an ideologically opposing Bundesbank council majority than a supportive one before elections.     

Monetary policy in Germany: A cointegration analysis on the relevance of interest rate rules

The paper attempts to identify an empirical relationship that characterizes the way the Bundesbank adjusted its short-term rate with respect to various objectives. By building on a careful exploration of the properties of the variables involved, it is established that interest rate rules —often remarkably similar to the Taylor rule— remain valid and relevant in a Vector Error Correction framework, and thereby proposing a distinctive interpretation of German monetary policy during the period 1975–1998.     

Bashing and supporting central banks: the Bundesbank and the European Central Bank

In this paper, we analyse the influences leading to external pressure on or public support for German and European monetary policy. Based upon the findings for the Deutsche Bundesbank, lessons are drawn for the European Central Bank (ECB). We show that external pressure on the ECB stems mainly from politicians or from international organisations (such as the IMF). In contrast with evidence for the Bundesbank, interest groups (such as commercial banks) hardly attempt to influence European monetary policy. German data show that factors leading to external pressure on the central bank are rising unemployment and the threat that governments will lose their majority in the next election. Evidence for the latter is, however, weak, and we show that in any case this source of pressure is likely to be of minor importance for the ECB.     

‘Trust is good,control is better’: The 1974 Herstatt Bank Crisis and its Implications for International Regulatory Reform

With its international supervisory and regulatory implications, the failure of Bankhaus Herstatt is one of the landmarks of post-war financial history. This article offers the first comprehensive historical account of the Herstatt crisis, and contributes to the wider discussions on international supervisory and regulatory reform since the mid-1970s, including regulatory capture, markets' self-regulation and resolution of failed banks. In doing so, it first argues that contrary to a widely held view, the German authorities received early and repeated warnings about Herstatt's dealings but this involved only limited and ineffective regulatory/supervisory responses, then it turns to the actual collapse of the bank in June 1974, and finally explores the wider regulatory issues raised by the Herstatt case.     

Bundesbank intervention effects through interest rate policy

This paper investigates the effects of the changes in the Bundesbank's discount and Lombard interest rates on the volatility of European Union country exchange rates relative to the German mark during 1987–93. The first year of the sample period contains the last major realignment in the ERM before its ‘breakdown’ in 1993. Using a parsimonious EGARCH model, we find that the conditional volatility of these exchange rates increased in response to interest rate changes, regardless of the rate change direction. This finding is in direct conflict with Bundesbank's public statements that indicate that its interest rate policy was designed to calm its foreign exchange markets.     

Comparing monetary policy reaction functions: ECB versus Bundesbank

This paper compares the European Central Bank’s (ECB) conduct of monetary policy with that of the Bundesbank. Estimated monetary policy reaction functions show that the ECB reacts similarly to expected inflation but significantly stronger to the output gap than the Bundesbank did. Theoretical considerations suggest that this stronger response to the output gap may rather be due to a higher interest rate sensitivity of the German output gap than to a higher weight given to output stabilisation in the objective function of the ECB. Counterfactual simulations based on the estimated interest rate reaction functions reveal that German interest rates would not have been lower under a hypothetical Bundesbank regime after 1999. However, this conclusion crucially depends on the assumption of an unchanged long-run real interest rate for the EMU period and is reversed when the Bundesbank reaction function is adjusted for the lower long-run real interest rate estimated for the ECB regime.